The fact that one's email messages may be gathered up and relocated, as it were, to some "place" one would rather they did not appear is rather troubling. There are those who seem to stop thinking when they use electronic mail. Lawyers involved in e-discovery can find a great deal which may be useful to their clients, because there is, apparently, a tendency to become unguarded when at the keyboard; even to become stupid. It's as if we feel somewhat liberated because there is no the need to look at or directly confront others personally. We feel we are not accountable, and are among friends, but we are making marks which can always be found, and will always exist in one form or another.
It's easy to understand, then, the dismay of those whose emails which apparently indicate they have been doing some fudging or disregarding data are upset by this development, and are inclined to blame the "enemy" (who is, of course, unscrupulous and acting contrary to our best interests). But it also is easy to understand why those who can grab emails and publish them widely do so on this issue, and difficult to understand how scientists, or others, can be so unthinking as to make electronic records of this kind.
Like seemingly most everything else these days, climate change is a battleground. "Climate Change" seems a much shrewder description than "Global Warming" by the way. One is not thereby committed to the prediction that things will get warmer, and it seems there are those who say, now, that it isn't at all clear that warming will occur, and that greenhouse gases may in fact result in global cooling, or something else. One may also thereby dissociate oneself from Al Gore, who seems as incapable of appearing at ease and amicable in public as Richard Nixon, for what seem to be different reasons.
Those who claim that global climate change is not occurring, or at least that it is not occurring because of us, can be rather disconcerting. I recently saw an article in which it was claimed that Copenhagen will be the start of a one world government, and that the President intends to enter into a treaty of some kind without consultation with or approval by the Senate which will, inevitably, bankrupt us (further?) and leave us subject to claims by the Thirld World which will be enforced against us in some fashion, presumably by the infant global government which will be spawned.
Knowledgeable scientists may disagree more than we have been led to believe, but it seems to be the case that climate change has taken place in the past, and that its effects were dramatic. Some claim civilization would not have resulted but for the end of the last great Ice Age. What is called the "Little Ice Age" which ended in the mid-19th century did not destroy us, but apparently could have done so if things were a bit different, and caused quite a few serious problems in any case.
It would seem to make sense, then, to study climate change and take steps to avoid its serious effects. That would seem to mean that we should identify the causes of climate change (a single cause of such a complicated phenomenon seems unlikely). We should do so, obviously, using the best science possible. Political and other considerations should not be allowed to influence the study (they always do to some extent, but we should do our best to eliminate politicians and true believers of all sorts from the process). It would seem to make sense to pool our resources to make the study, and may be equally wise to do so based on the results of the study. The problem is that there are many who feel that no complete study has been made.
It makes no sense in any debate, let alone scientific study, to make certain positions sacrosanct, or certain information unavailable, or to actively attempt to silence disagreement. The response that "everything points to it" or "the evidence is overwhelming" has not been satisfactory. If the scientists who are making such claims have been reckless enough to do what their emails appear to indicate, they have only themselves to blame if they are distrusted. All information should be made available (it apparently can be, these days) and subject to dispute. For good or ill, elites can no longer dictate policy with the same ease as they have in the past because nothing is hidden. So, as there is to be a battle, why not get everything out in the open? How else can a reasonable decision be made?
Saturday, November 28, 2009
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
Ezra Pound and Speculations on Monomania and Madness
I've been trying to read certain of the essays of Ezra Pound. I find it's not an easy task.
Pound was, by all accounts, a monumental figure in literature during the 20th Century. He was extraordinarily generous to many authors and poets of the time. He was clearly able and erudite, and this should be evident to any person who reads his work.
Reading his essays, though, (at least those I've read so far) I can't help but get the impression that something is very wrong with the author. I wonder if anyone shares this same impression, or if I'm merely so used to reading certain things, in certain ways, that I miss some essential point or pattern.
Pound was, of course, hospitalized for mental disease, and it may be that the essays I'm reading were for the most part written during that period. If that's not the case, though, I wonder if his manner of writing is peculiar to those who are monomaniacs, as it seems he was.
I'll refer to his essay on the letters exchanged by John Adams and Thomas Jefferson as an example. The essay celebrates them as indicative of the fact that America was, at least at one time, civilized, or at least was home to two civilized men (Pound seems to think America lost whatever civilization it possessed shortly after their deaths). So he begins the essay, and then something happens. Various other persons are referred to, from Henry Adams to Romulus Augustulus to Flaubert to Thomas Aquinas. They are either cited with approval, as it were, or disapproval, as are certain institutions. Banks, as institutions, don't meet with approval. Sometimes, but not often, Jefferson and Adams are quoted, though it's not clear if their correspondance with each other is the source of the quotations. Sometimes, it is clear that it is not the source. When quoted, they refer to money and interest on money, except at the very end of the essay, where it is noted (approvingly) that John Adams, I think it was, wrote that they should not die without explaining themselves to each other.
It is a very rambling work, and I finish it feeling that the author intended to say something about Adams, Jefferson and civilization, but just what he intended to say about them is unclear.
Pound was very concerned with usury, and it keeps popping up oddly in the essays I've been looking at, and not merely in those which are actually about usury and economics. He thinks it is a very bad thing. He seemed to feel that it is the cause of most, if not all, of the world's problems, and was the primary cause of both world wars. He said as much on the radio in Italy during WWII, and made anti-semitic statements apparently feeling that the Jews, if they did not create usury, practiced it more than others.
This concern seems to have been an overwhelming one, which he held for most of his life. When one becomes obsessed, does the object of the obsession become of such significance that it is always there, somehow always relevant to what we are thinking, doing and writing that must be mentioned, regardless of its relevance? And, is this a peculiarity of brilliant people, or particular kinds of brilliant people? One thinks of Bobby Fisher, and others--geniuses who are consumed by a very narrow and precise concern, unable to break away from it entirely, anywhere or anytime. Is this a necessary function of genius?
Pound was, by all accounts, a monumental figure in literature during the 20th Century. He was extraordinarily generous to many authors and poets of the time. He was clearly able and erudite, and this should be evident to any person who reads his work.
Reading his essays, though, (at least those I've read so far) I can't help but get the impression that something is very wrong with the author. I wonder if anyone shares this same impression, or if I'm merely so used to reading certain things, in certain ways, that I miss some essential point or pattern.
Pound was, of course, hospitalized for mental disease, and it may be that the essays I'm reading were for the most part written during that period. If that's not the case, though, I wonder if his manner of writing is peculiar to those who are monomaniacs, as it seems he was.
I'll refer to his essay on the letters exchanged by John Adams and Thomas Jefferson as an example. The essay celebrates them as indicative of the fact that America was, at least at one time, civilized, or at least was home to two civilized men (Pound seems to think America lost whatever civilization it possessed shortly after their deaths). So he begins the essay, and then something happens. Various other persons are referred to, from Henry Adams to Romulus Augustulus to Flaubert to Thomas Aquinas. They are either cited with approval, as it were, or disapproval, as are certain institutions. Banks, as institutions, don't meet with approval. Sometimes, but not often, Jefferson and Adams are quoted, though it's not clear if their correspondance with each other is the source of the quotations. Sometimes, it is clear that it is not the source. When quoted, they refer to money and interest on money, except at the very end of the essay, where it is noted (approvingly) that John Adams, I think it was, wrote that they should not die without explaining themselves to each other.
It is a very rambling work, and I finish it feeling that the author intended to say something about Adams, Jefferson and civilization, but just what he intended to say about them is unclear.
Pound was very concerned with usury, and it keeps popping up oddly in the essays I've been looking at, and not merely in those which are actually about usury and economics. He thinks it is a very bad thing. He seemed to feel that it is the cause of most, if not all, of the world's problems, and was the primary cause of both world wars. He said as much on the radio in Italy during WWII, and made anti-semitic statements apparently feeling that the Jews, if they did not create usury, practiced it more than others.
This concern seems to have been an overwhelming one, which he held for most of his life. When one becomes obsessed, does the object of the obsession become of such significance that it is always there, somehow always relevant to what we are thinking, doing and writing that must be mentioned, regardless of its relevance? And, is this a peculiarity of brilliant people, or particular kinds of brilliant people? One thinks of Bobby Fisher, and others--geniuses who are consumed by a very narrow and precise concern, unable to break away from it entirely, anywhere or anytime. Is this a necessary function of genius?
Sunday, November 22, 2009
H. L. Mencken and the Art of Journalism
Reading Mencken's articles makes me wonder how it was possible, then, for someone with his intelligence and lucid, interesting and sometimes even learned style to be a journalist, and even-it seems-a journalist who was widely read. I know of no journalist or columnist (or even blogger!) of our time who can compare. Were those who read and wrote newspapers in his era simply more intelligent, or better writers or readers, than we are now? If so, why?
It's important to note that I am speaking of articles in newspapers, not essays or articles in sophisticated journals. He wrote for newspapers in Baltimore, of course, but also in New York and Chicago (and probably elsewhere also). And, he wrote (I think) very well indeed, on a number of topics. I confess to a fondness for the great "bathtub hoax", but he obviously could and did write on many serious subjects.
Unlike Ambrose Bierce (another personal favorite), he did most of his writing for newspapers in the 20th century, so one would think his audience was wider than was Bierce's, and not so much of an identifiable "elite." Do current journalists and those others who feel they must tell us their opinions, and are allowed to do so by various media, feel they must talk down to us, or is it simply the case that they know no better?
It's important to note that I am speaking of articles in newspapers, not essays or articles in sophisticated journals. He wrote for newspapers in Baltimore, of course, but also in New York and Chicago (and probably elsewhere also). And, he wrote (I think) very well indeed, on a number of topics. I confess to a fondness for the great "bathtub hoax", but he obviously could and did write on many serious subjects.
Unlike Ambrose Bierce (another personal favorite), he did most of his writing for newspapers in the 20th century, so one would think his audience was wider than was Bierce's, and not so much of an identifiable "elite." Do current journalists and those others who feel they must tell us their opinions, and are allowed to do so by various media, feel they must talk down to us, or is it simply the case that they know no better?
Thursday, November 19, 2009
Trials in which "Failure is not an option"
With some frequency, I find myself grateful for the fact that I don't practice criminal law. I have some basic knowledge of it, though, and have tried civil cases, to judges and juries.
One of the few things I know about criminal law in the U.S. is that prosecutors face an extremely heavy burden of proof; that being, of course, to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. One of the things I know about juries in civil trials (which of course involve a lesser burden of proof) is that they can be unpredictable.
Now, there is disagreement over whether or not those we call the "9/11 defendants" should be tried in a U.S. District Court or a military tribunal. An argument may be made that the rights accorded American citizens under our criminal law should be restricted to those who can say civitas Americanus sum. But let's assume (that is to say, I will) that the Obama administration's determination they should be tried in District Court is appropriate. If that is the case, should the Attorney General be making statements such as "failure [to convict] is not an option" and should the President be predicting that convictions are forthcoming, and the death penalty will be imposed (without prejudging the matter, of course)?
I think not. Clearly, such statements give the impression that the outcome of the trials is preordained, an impression which those in authority are normally very careful to avoid, with good reason. And, making such statements seems to fly in face of the supposed purpose for holding the trials in District Court, which appears to be to assure fair trials, and to induce the world to marvel at the impartial nature of American justice and its care for the rights of defendants, even loathsome ones (who will, we are assured, be convicted).
So, it seems appropriate to wonder just what the administration thinks it is doing, and whether it is trying to do something it cannot do--assure fair and impartial trials and assure convictions. Already we see reference to "show trials." The effort to please all in politics is futile. It's likely this will result in trials which will please no one, and which will defy description.
One of the few things I know about criminal law in the U.S. is that prosecutors face an extremely heavy burden of proof; that being, of course, to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. One of the things I know about juries in civil trials (which of course involve a lesser burden of proof) is that they can be unpredictable.
Now, there is disagreement over whether or not those we call the "9/11 defendants" should be tried in a U.S. District Court or a military tribunal. An argument may be made that the rights accorded American citizens under our criminal law should be restricted to those who can say civitas Americanus sum. But let's assume (that is to say, I will) that the Obama administration's determination they should be tried in District Court is appropriate. If that is the case, should the Attorney General be making statements such as "failure [to convict] is not an option" and should the President be predicting that convictions are forthcoming, and the death penalty will be imposed (without prejudging the matter, of course)?
I think not. Clearly, such statements give the impression that the outcome of the trials is preordained, an impression which those in authority are normally very careful to avoid, with good reason. And, making such statements seems to fly in face of the supposed purpose for holding the trials in District Court, which appears to be to assure fair trials, and to induce the world to marvel at the impartial nature of American justice and its care for the rights of defendants, even loathsome ones (who will, we are assured, be convicted).
So, it seems appropriate to wonder just what the administration thinks it is doing, and whether it is trying to do something it cannot do--assure fair and impartial trials and assure convictions. Already we see reference to "show trials." The effort to please all in politics is futile. It's likely this will result in trials which will please no one, and which will defy description.
Wednesday, November 18, 2009
Tolerance and Hypocrisy
Is it possible to take position "A" and, at the same time tolerate position "not A" (-A)? If so, to what extent may one tolerate, without being hypocritical, or at least so inconsistent as to be justly criticized?
These seem to be questions we may be compelled to address with greater frequency in these increasingly contentious times. And, though I've posed them abstractly here, they're intended to address disputes we must deal with, or are at least confronted with, on a day to day basis, e.g. political, social and religious issues. "Confronted" in the sense that they are hurled at us by eager adherents of opposite positions from almost every side given the technology of communication.
X claims that God exists (or perhaps that a particular God does so; say a God worshipped by an established institutional religion). Y disagrees. May X and Y tolerate each other despite their disagreement? Should they respect each other in spite of their disagreement?
If X begins hectoring Y, trying to induce him to accept X's God, or if Y begins hectoring X to accept that there is no God, it would seem that in either case the one being hectored could legitmately resent it. If either sought to impose his/her position on the other, it would be legitimate to object. This seems obvious enough.
What if X asks Y to attend some religious ceremony, or Y asks X to accompany him to a speech by [insert name of prominent atheist]? I'd say there is nothing a priori objectionable in either case, and the manner of the response would, I think, vary with the circumstances, and how the request is made. In other words, if Y decided to attend the ceremony, or X the speech, I would contend that neither are necessarily hypocrites, or being untrue to themselves or their beliefs, by doing so. If either chooses to do as they are asked out of friendship, or respect, for example, they are not legitimately subject to criticism.
To criticize in such or similar circumstances seems to me a function of absolutism, regardless of the nature of the request made or position taken. It also would seem to be the result of needless concern with things beyond our control, which should be anathema to stoics, but also, I think, to any reasonable person, and (by definition, of course!) to any pragmatist, who will make decisions based on an an intelligent consideration of each situation, not according to some preset standard which is unquestioned. Generally, religious, political or social beliefs and positions will not be objectionable in and of themselves (there can be exceptions, obviously). Instead, the conduct of those who accept them may be objectionable.
There is no reason why X who accepts A must object every time -A rears its head.
These seem to be questions we may be compelled to address with greater frequency in these increasingly contentious times. And, though I've posed them abstractly here, they're intended to address disputes we must deal with, or are at least confronted with, on a day to day basis, e.g. political, social and religious issues. "Confronted" in the sense that they are hurled at us by eager adherents of opposite positions from almost every side given the technology of communication.
X claims that God exists (or perhaps that a particular God does so; say a God worshipped by an established institutional religion). Y disagrees. May X and Y tolerate each other despite their disagreement? Should they respect each other in spite of their disagreement?
If X begins hectoring Y, trying to induce him to accept X's God, or if Y begins hectoring X to accept that there is no God, it would seem that in either case the one being hectored could legitmately resent it. If either sought to impose his/her position on the other, it would be legitimate to object. This seems obvious enough.
What if X asks Y to attend some religious ceremony, or Y asks X to accompany him to a speech by [insert name of prominent atheist]? I'd say there is nothing a priori objectionable in either case, and the manner of the response would, I think, vary with the circumstances, and how the request is made. In other words, if Y decided to attend the ceremony, or X the speech, I would contend that neither are necessarily hypocrites, or being untrue to themselves or their beliefs, by doing so. If either chooses to do as they are asked out of friendship, or respect, for example, they are not legitimately subject to criticism.
To criticize in such or similar circumstances seems to me a function of absolutism, regardless of the nature of the request made or position taken. It also would seem to be the result of needless concern with things beyond our control, which should be anathema to stoics, but also, I think, to any reasonable person, and (by definition, of course!) to any pragmatist, who will make decisions based on an an intelligent consideration of each situation, not according to some preset standard which is unquestioned. Generally, religious, political or social beliefs and positions will not be objectionable in and of themselves (there can be exceptions, obviously). Instead, the conduct of those who accept them may be objectionable.
There is no reason why X who accepts A must object every time -A rears its head.
Sunday, November 15, 2009
Montaigne, Dualism and Christianity
I was reading Montaigne's essay On Presumption, and was struck by his rejection of the distinction between mind (or, more properly, soul) and body, which is something of a favorite of certain philosophers, poor fellows. I was impressed by the fact that he argued that such a distinction cannot even be properly sustained without the use of "hypocritcal monkey tricks" (why monkey?).
For some reason, I thought that someone of his time would be inclined to make the distinction. I thought the rejection of such dualisms was more of a modern point of view. Dewey, for example, famously rejected the many dualisms which litter the philosophical landscape. I've personally felt that those who profess dualism are being in some respects disingenuous as their conduct in life belies the dualisms they cling to, so I had a certain sympathy with Montaigne's view that they rely on hypocritical tricks, though as noted above I'm not sure they are monkey tricks, whatever that's intended to mean.
Montaigne also writes that the rejection of the soul-body distinction is very Christian, which I confess also took me by surprise. This is due to what used to be called the "resurrection of the body" (who can guess what it is called now?) which it is believed will happen in due time, at least according to the Catholic Credo. Soul and perfect body reunite for eternity.
I thought the rejection of dualism was a modern tendency, prompted in part by the development of the sciences. It's a bit humbling to encounter it in Montaigne, backed up by Catholic doctrine. Nothing new under the sun, indeed.
For some reason, I thought that someone of his time would be inclined to make the distinction. I thought the rejection of such dualisms was more of a modern point of view. Dewey, for example, famously rejected the many dualisms which litter the philosophical landscape. I've personally felt that those who profess dualism are being in some respects disingenuous as their conduct in life belies the dualisms they cling to, so I had a certain sympathy with Montaigne's view that they rely on hypocritical tricks, though as noted above I'm not sure they are monkey tricks, whatever that's intended to mean.
Montaigne also writes that the rejection of the soul-body distinction is very Christian, which I confess also took me by surprise. This is due to what used to be called the "resurrection of the body" (who can guess what it is called now?) which it is believed will happen in due time, at least according to the Catholic Credo. Soul and perfect body reunite for eternity.
I thought the rejection of dualism was a modern tendency, prompted in part by the development of the sciences. It's a bit humbling to encounter it in Montaigne, backed up by Catholic doctrine. Nothing new under the sun, indeed.
Wednesday, November 11, 2009
On Our Fascination with Disaster
We're being deluged (it seems an appropriate word) with TV shows regarding 2012 and our impending doom rather regularly these days. The latest broadcasts predicting our awful fate late in that year and detailing the many horrible ways we may perish were, of course, preceded by various other programs regarding Notradamus, supervolcanos, asteriod or comet strikes, etc., which seem make up a significant part of the fare available on the Discovery, History, National Geographic and Science channels.
We have, of course, been amusing ourselves for many, many years by claiming that our end will most certainly come at various times certain, but have been disappointed so many times in the past that it's difficult to understand why we continue to do so.
What is it about us that leads us to anticipate our violent end so frequently, and with such apparent...delight? Pleasure? For that matter, what prompts us to find portents of our doom in ancient Sumerian or Mayan works, or the Bible, or the scribblings of a 16th century pharmacist?
We certainly are capable of being very stupid, but are we really so stupid that we can persist in this kind of delusion over so many centuries, despite the fact that we have always been wrong? Granted, the great majority have refrained from giving away all their possessions, or drinking poisoned kool aid, in the past, but there seems always to be some group willing to accept, and anticipate, disaster without reservation.
I don't think stupidity is an adequate explanation. Perhaps we are doomed in the sense that we are never content; we're always unsatisfied. There always is something which makes us miserable. Rather than accept what life brings or (worse yet) trying to resolve our problems, we hope for an end to them. And, if we must end, why shouldn't everyone else?
We have, of course, been amusing ourselves for many, many years by claiming that our end will most certainly come at various times certain, but have been disappointed so many times in the past that it's difficult to understand why we continue to do so.
What is it about us that leads us to anticipate our violent end so frequently, and with such apparent...delight? Pleasure? For that matter, what prompts us to find portents of our doom in ancient Sumerian or Mayan works, or the Bible, or the scribblings of a 16th century pharmacist?
We certainly are capable of being very stupid, but are we really so stupid that we can persist in this kind of delusion over so many centuries, despite the fact that we have always been wrong? Granted, the great majority have refrained from giving away all their possessions, or drinking poisoned kool aid, in the past, but there seems always to be some group willing to accept, and anticipate, disaster without reservation.
I don't think stupidity is an adequate explanation. Perhaps we are doomed in the sense that we are never content; we're always unsatisfied. There always is something which makes us miserable. Rather than accept what life brings or (worse yet) trying to resolve our problems, we hope for an end to them. And, if we must end, why shouldn't everyone else?
Sunday, November 8, 2009
Reasonable and Unreasonable Responses in the Wake of Fort Hood
The responses to the murders at Fort Hood continue to interest me, from the outrage expressed over the apparently flippant attitude of the President on national TV shortly after the shootings, to the concerns expressed regarding anti-Muslim backlash, to the efforts of some to use them as a basis on which to question American foreign policy.
It may be argued that each response is understandable, given human nature. That may well be true. But such responses also raise questions regarding what response is reasonable, and what should be of primary concern.
After stopping the killer, the first concern, obviously it would seem, should be taking care of the wounded. That is being done. It's even possible that all may agree this is the case, even in this curious, disconnected world. Determining why and how this happened is a legitimate concern, correcting mistakes made which could have prevented it from happening, if any, is another; taking steps to prevent such things from occurring in the future is yet another. The law should take its course. Those seem to be reasonable responses to the killings.
One might feel outrage that the President acted inappropriately on national TV, and say so. That may at least be an understandable immediate response. Continuing to express such outrage, and writing about it repeatedly, or commenting on it before cameras repeatedly, however, doesn't seem a useful response, and clearly is not intended to address the event itself and its aftermath. Concerns regarding anti-Muslim backlash may also be understandable. However, such concerns as well do not address what happened, or how to prevent such things from happening in the future. The same may be said regarding criticism of foreign policy.
As to the latter two, it may be argued that they do address potential causes of such killings. Some are claiming that the shooter was reacting to being harassed for being a Muslim, or that such things are to be anticipated when we are in conflict with Muslim countries. However, neither such harassment, if it occurred, or the foreign policy involved, can reasonably be said to justify the killings. People who feel they have been verbally abused in some fashion, or disagree with U.S. policy, should nevertheless not kill people. The fact that they do so is not in any legitimate sense caused by the verbal abuse, or foreign policy, unless we are to take the position that murder is a legitimate, or somehow necessary or probable, response in those circumstances. Why, then, emphasize such things in responding to the killings? What purpose does it serve to do so?
When not directly involved in a horrible event, we generally, and those in the media in particular, tend to use it in some fashion to make points we/they consider important in some sense, but which ultimately fails to address the event. We lose sight of the event itself; it diminishes in importance, and our often disconnected opinions and concerns take priority.
It may be argued that each response is understandable, given human nature. That may well be true. But such responses also raise questions regarding what response is reasonable, and what should be of primary concern.
After stopping the killer, the first concern, obviously it would seem, should be taking care of the wounded. That is being done. It's even possible that all may agree this is the case, even in this curious, disconnected world. Determining why and how this happened is a legitimate concern, correcting mistakes made which could have prevented it from happening, if any, is another; taking steps to prevent such things from occurring in the future is yet another. The law should take its course. Those seem to be reasonable responses to the killings.
One might feel outrage that the President acted inappropriately on national TV, and say so. That may at least be an understandable immediate response. Continuing to express such outrage, and writing about it repeatedly, or commenting on it before cameras repeatedly, however, doesn't seem a useful response, and clearly is not intended to address the event itself and its aftermath. Concerns regarding anti-Muslim backlash may also be understandable. However, such concerns as well do not address what happened, or how to prevent such things from happening in the future. The same may be said regarding criticism of foreign policy.
As to the latter two, it may be argued that they do address potential causes of such killings. Some are claiming that the shooter was reacting to being harassed for being a Muslim, or that such things are to be anticipated when we are in conflict with Muslim countries. However, neither such harassment, if it occurred, or the foreign policy involved, can reasonably be said to justify the killings. People who feel they have been verbally abused in some fashion, or disagree with U.S. policy, should nevertheless not kill people. The fact that they do so is not in any legitimate sense caused by the verbal abuse, or foreign policy, unless we are to take the position that murder is a legitimate, or somehow necessary or probable, response in those circumstances. Why, then, emphasize such things in responding to the killings? What purpose does it serve to do so?
When not directly involved in a horrible event, we generally, and those in the media in particular, tend to use it in some fashion to make points we/they consider important in some sense, but which ultimately fails to address the event. We lose sight of the event itself; it diminishes in importance, and our often disconnected opinions and concerns take priority.
Friday, November 6, 2009
Explanation, Justification and Blame in the Modern World
An army major kills several of his fellow soldiers at Fort Hood. Instantly, efforts are made by the media and bloggers, and others, not simply to report what happened, but to "explain" it. Indeed, it seems that very shortly after such an event occurs, reporting becomes a secondary concern. With "explanation" comes blame, and justification. Technology is now such that this all occurs instantly, as well.
The speed with which this all occurs discourages critical thinking. Analysis is instant as well and, because it is instant, it's not thoughtful, and may be misinformed. But, it is there, and exists permanently, in cyberspace, for all to see.
One must be well-informed, and have the opportunity to think, in order to think well. Because time is of the essence (to use a well-known legal phrase) in today's media and culture, and on the Internet, not only is critical thinking discouraged--thinking itself is discouraged. There simply is no time to think. One must get one's thoughts and words out there, as quickly as possible. Ultimately, nothing else is as important.
Does the speed and ease with which we can all now communicate induce us to express our thoughts, desires, hates, etc., without taking the time or trouble to actually think about them? In other words, does it encourage us to proclaim to the world at large what is most irrational in us? If this is the case, we may become completely reactive in our participation in the world, and react unthinkingly. Conduct will be blamed, or justified, without reasonable basis. We may come to judge the appropriateness of our own conduct with the same thoughtless speed as we judge the conduct of others, and as we see others judge the conduct of others. Then, we may act accordingly. That is something to be feared.
The speed with which this all occurs discourages critical thinking. Analysis is instant as well and, because it is instant, it's not thoughtful, and may be misinformed. But, it is there, and exists permanently, in cyberspace, for all to see.
One must be well-informed, and have the opportunity to think, in order to think well. Because time is of the essence (to use a well-known legal phrase) in today's media and culture, and on the Internet, not only is critical thinking discouraged--thinking itself is discouraged. There simply is no time to think. One must get one's thoughts and words out there, as quickly as possible. Ultimately, nothing else is as important.
Does the speed and ease with which we can all now communicate induce us to express our thoughts, desires, hates, etc., without taking the time or trouble to actually think about them? In other words, does it encourage us to proclaim to the world at large what is most irrational in us? If this is the case, we may become completely reactive in our participation in the world, and react unthinkingly. Conduct will be blamed, or justified, without reasonable basis. We may come to judge the appropriateness of our own conduct with the same thoughtless speed as we judge the conduct of others, and as we see others judge the conduct of others. Then, we may act accordingly. That is something to be feared.
Wednesday, November 4, 2009
The Legal Significance of "Gay Marriage"
Specifically, what would be its significance, in the law? In what respect would it make a difference, in the law?
Certain unions in addition to those traditionally recognized between a man and woman would be recognized as having certain legal characteristics. Certain legal rights and obligations between the partners, and the between the union and third parties, would apply in the case of the union, or partnership (which is what a marriage is, as to money, property and contracts) of two humans of the same sex in addition to two humans of the opposite sex (why "opposite", by the way?). There would be more work for lawyers (we keep creating such work, on an almost daily basis, and yet complain that there are too many). More work for the courts, as there is no reason to believe such unions between two of the same sex will be any more successful than those between two of the opposite sex. And that would, as they say, be that--for the law.
There are dangers in legislating morality. Sometimes, morality figures in the creation of law. The law, once in place, is not moral, however. It is a functioning system, often of great complexity.
The law shouldn't concern itself with the morality of marriage. Let religions treat as "marriage" whatever they deem appropriate. Let the law treat "marriage" as it already treats it--as a partnership, nothing more, nothing less. If ideas associated with the word "marriage" create problems in the law, eliminate it from the law, and let all such unions be called "domestic unions" (or partnerships, or whatever) and be done with it.
Certain unions in addition to those traditionally recognized between a man and woman would be recognized as having certain legal characteristics. Certain legal rights and obligations between the partners, and the between the union and third parties, would apply in the case of the union, or partnership (which is what a marriage is, as to money, property and contracts) of two humans of the same sex in addition to two humans of the opposite sex (why "opposite", by the way?). There would be more work for lawyers (we keep creating such work, on an almost daily basis, and yet complain that there are too many). More work for the courts, as there is no reason to believe such unions between two of the same sex will be any more successful than those between two of the opposite sex. And that would, as they say, be that--for the law.
There are dangers in legislating morality. Sometimes, morality figures in the creation of law. The law, once in place, is not moral, however. It is a functioning system, often of great complexity.
The law shouldn't concern itself with the morality of marriage. Let religions treat as "marriage" whatever they deem appropriate. Let the law treat "marriage" as it already treats it--as a partnership, nothing more, nothing less. If ideas associated with the word "marriage" create problems in the law, eliminate it from the law, and let all such unions be called "domestic unions" (or partnerships, or whatever) and be done with it.
Tuesday, November 3, 2009
Ayn Rand, Romanticism and Napoleon
The recent publication of new biographies of Rand prompts me to express some thoughts about her and her status, or perhaps I should say etiology.
Like so many, I read The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged and was impressed by them on first reading. I was, however, an adolescent at that time. I was also impressed by the works of Nietzsche in those days. Now, though....
She chose to call her philosophy "Objectivism." She seemed to consider herself something of a realist. But, I think of her as being very much in the Romantic tradition. There is something Napoleonic about her fictional characters (although Napoleon would never have had the time or the patience to indulge in the lectures her characters indulge in, all too often) and the legend of Napoleon, if not the man himself after his youth, was a Romantic creation. She doesn't just favor the individual and expound the importance of individual rights--she glorifies the individual, who is invariably a genius of some kind in her fiction.
Her vision is a very unrealistic vision, I think. Wisdom involves the rational acknowledgement of limitations. This doesn't mean the unthinking acceptance of them, but a recognition that they exist. To deny their existence is stupidity, and ultimately is of no benefit; one must know a problem in order to solve it, and solving it may involve cooperation with others. Goethe, if I recall correctly, said of Napoleon that he was as intelligent as a man can be without wisdom, and as great as a man can be without virtue. For all his ability, he cannot be said to have been great benefactor of humanity. That seems to me a fair description of the Randian Ideal Person. Rand was a Romantic, and Romantics are not known for their thinking. Philosophy involves more than chest-pounding.
Like so many, I read The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged and was impressed by them on first reading. I was, however, an adolescent at that time. I was also impressed by the works of Nietzsche in those days. Now, though....
She chose to call her philosophy "Objectivism." She seemed to consider herself something of a realist. But, I think of her as being very much in the Romantic tradition. There is something Napoleonic about her fictional characters (although Napoleon would never have had the time or the patience to indulge in the lectures her characters indulge in, all too often) and the legend of Napoleon, if not the man himself after his youth, was a Romantic creation. She doesn't just favor the individual and expound the importance of individual rights--she glorifies the individual, who is invariably a genius of some kind in her fiction.
Her vision is a very unrealistic vision, I think. Wisdom involves the rational acknowledgement of limitations. This doesn't mean the unthinking acceptance of them, but a recognition that they exist. To deny their existence is stupidity, and ultimately is of no benefit; one must know a problem in order to solve it, and solving it may involve cooperation with others. Goethe, if I recall correctly, said of Napoleon that he was as intelligent as a man can be without wisdom, and as great as a man can be without virtue. For all his ability, he cannot be said to have been great benefactor of humanity. That seems to me a fair description of the Randian Ideal Person. Rand was a Romantic, and Romantics are not known for their thinking. Philosophy involves more than chest-pounding.
Sunday, November 1, 2009
In Praise of "In Praise of Doubt"
I'm reading a rather nice book called In Praise of Doubt by Berger and Zijderveld. Critical of what they call "Fundamentalism" and "Relativism", which they characterize as two forms of escape from the uncertainty of modern life, the authors seem to propose a kind of middle course or path (where have I heard that before?) which seems to be a species of pragmatic (my word) skepticism.
Intelligent doubt (my words) is useful as its application prevents fanaticism which can result from the acceptance of certain ideas as absolute. Intelligent doubt is not, however, the kind of absolute doubt that relativists and postmodernists indulge in. Their escape from uncertainty takes the form of an absolute belief that nothing is, or can be, "true"; all thoughts, ideas are equally invalid narratives. So, in effect, who the hell cares? Choices may have to be made, but one is relieved from the hard work of thinking. No choice, or decision, is better than another. The authors note that both forms of escape may be harmless when confined to sects or university faculties, but become problems when their true believers try to impose them on others.
The emphasis on the usefulness of doubt strikes me as a pragmatic point of view. Dewey criticized famously the "quest for certainity." However, like Peirce, he rejected the kind of futile or faux "doubt" professed by some philosophers and other intellectuals because, I think, he recognized that such "doubt" has nothing to do with, and is belied by, the way we live, i.e. how we conduct ourselves, and how we meet and resolve questions and problems we encounter in life.
Intelligent doubt (my words) is useful as its application prevents fanaticism which can result from the acceptance of certain ideas as absolute. Intelligent doubt is not, however, the kind of absolute doubt that relativists and postmodernists indulge in. Their escape from uncertainty takes the form of an absolute belief that nothing is, or can be, "true"; all thoughts, ideas are equally invalid narratives. So, in effect, who the hell cares? Choices may have to be made, but one is relieved from the hard work of thinking. No choice, or decision, is better than another. The authors note that both forms of escape may be harmless when confined to sects or university faculties, but become problems when their true believers try to impose them on others.
The emphasis on the usefulness of doubt strikes me as a pragmatic point of view. Dewey criticized famously the "quest for certainity." However, like Peirce, he rejected the kind of futile or faux "doubt" professed by some philosophers and other intellectuals because, I think, he recognized that such "doubt" has nothing to do with, and is belied by, the way we live, i.e. how we conduct ourselves, and how we meet and resolve questions and problems we encounter in life.
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