Nation Building, Nation Leaving

 

Not for nothing has Afghanistan been called "the graveyard of empires."  It's seen several come and go, and it's unclear that any of them left it changed in any significant or enduring respect.  This isn't to say that it has been unchanged since the time of Alexander the Great, when he and the army his father Phillip built wandered and conquered there.  But it is to say that what has changed in Afghanistan would very likely have changed regardless of efforts made to control and dominate it by foreign powers.

Our Glorious Union was there in force for twenty years.  Let's not debate whether our Great Republic is an empire, properly speaking.  Let's not debate the soundness of the reasons for our entry, though that's certainly something which can be debated.  Of more importance at this time (I think) are what took place after we intervened in that country's history, and the manner of our departure.

I can't think of an instance where a foreign power has conquered a nation and successfully built another, different nation in its place.  The concept of "nation building" strikes me as essentially hubristic.  It's a task so colossal, and therefore so expensive, that it's hard to believe any would attempt it.  Ancient Rome managed to conquer and have imperium of vast territory occupied by different nations for centuries, but even when "Romanizing" its provinces, it never sought to drastically alter the religion and culture of those conquered, except in the case of Judea.  Judea was a special case, though.  It revolted twice, and its distinctness, otherwise tolerated by Rome due to the fact its uniqueness was ancient, became dangerous.  Also, the emperor who presided over the second revolt of its people, Hadrian, was misguided in thinking he could change it into something it simply could not be.

It's likely that Hadrian may have thought not merely that the response to the second revolt should be brutal and thoroughly so, as it certainly was.  He may have thought, as an avid Hellenophile, that suppression of Judaism and forceful imposition of Graeco-Roman culture and religion was in the best interest of its people.

It doesn't seem to be the case that we entered Afghanistan to engage in nation building.  But the mission must have changed, somehow.  Our leaders evidently thought it was in the best interests of the people of Afghanistan that its society, culture and religion be changed, not merely that its people be controlled and rendered quiescent.  The latter was generally the strategy of Rome.  Let them be orderly, peaceful, and tax-paying, respectful of the genius of Rome and its emperors; then all will be well no matter what gods they worship or what their customs may be.  It's possible that order may have been achieved, and violence, at least against the U.S., limited if not eradicated.  But I think it's always been highly unlikely that Afghanistan would become anything like America or Europe in its customs, or in its religion or system of law, or in the freedoms and rights granted its people, though that may well be in the best interests of its people.

When that's unlikely or impossible, the wisdom of "nation building" must be questioned, and the costs especially in terms of lives lost or destroyed that result from such an ill-fated effort recognized, and it should be avoided.  Some people are very different from us and some don't even want to be like us.  They can't be made to be like us.  This should be a truth easy enough to accept.  But it seems we don't, or can't accept it.

In any case, it seems that if we're inclined to accept it, we do so far too late, and when we do we strive to extricate ourselves from the mess created precipitately.  We want to "cut our losses" as soon as we can.  The thought is to remove Americans as quickly as possible, regardless of consequences.  The result is chaos.  Such is the fate of those who purport to create a Western style democracy in Afghanistan, perhaps.  

The speed with which the Taliban was able to "take back their country" to use a phrase we've heard before was apparently surprising.  Also surprising, we hear, was the manner in which the army we tried to create to replace us, eventually, took flight from them.  Perhaps it was our intent to help those who helped us, putting their lives at risk, by evacuating them as well as ourselves.  One would hope so.  One would hope we still manage to save all the people we can.  But we won't save all who helped us or wished for a change, and their fate becomes the legacy of our twenty years there, to little purpose though the cost was great.  What did those who died in service to their country there die for?  We ask the same question regarding those who died in Vietnam. 

A helicopter perched on the top of the U.S. embassy in Saigon, a line of people trying to climb into it.  That photograph taken in 1975 during the Fall of Saigon is a famous one, and has been dug up for display alongside photos taken much more recently in Kabul.  The evacuation of Saigon was called "Operation Frequent Wind."  One wonders who came up with the name, and what was intended by it.  Better than "Breaking Wind" I suppose.  What will the evacuation of Kabul be called?  Something like "Frantic Departure" probably won't be selected.  

The United States should not be an empire.  It acts as if it is one from time to time.  In the Mexican War, in the Spanish-American War, in taking the Philippines.  There clearly are moral reasons for not being imperial.  But I also think that we're too inclined not only to enrich ourselves and our friends, but  also  to impose not merely order but what we think and believe on others, our culture and society, on others.  That may be impossible and is certainly impractical.  We're not Romans, that's to say.

The Bergdahl Brouhaha

I've come to believe that the mere mention of our President's name causes some of us (figuratively, at least) to twitch and drool with a kind of lunatic wrath.  I no longer expect such folk to be sensible in assessing anything he does, and in some cases doubt their capacity to be sensible at all.  It's difficult therefore to find any reasonable assessment of the barter of Sergeant Bergdhal for five Taliban among our politicians, the pundits and the media; frenzied claims are generally met by more frenzied claims, from all participants in our political circus.  It may be too early to comment rationally in any case, as we learn more all the time and doubtless will continue to learn more of the circumstances.  But I will make an effort.

It is important to note, first, that this exchange is not something which can be said to have taken the President's political opponents by surprise.  At least according to the Washington Post, efforts to obtain his release have been urged for quite some time, even by Republicans.  It also seems to be the case that it has been known for some time that his release would likely be conditioned on release of the Taliban in question (even by Republicans).  Why then the sound and the fury?

Prisoners have been exchanged in times of war for centuries, by the U.S. and other nations.  The exchange of this one prisoner should not in itself be objectionable.  If it's maintained that this case is different because we deal here with terrorists instead of formally declared enemies, we've fought many wars without declaring them wars, and it seems almost silly to require that war be declared for this common practice to apply.  This is not even to mention the fact that our long military involvement in Afghanistan can only be considered a war, and not a kind of police action against terrorists.  Would those who object so loudly be doing so if a hero was released in these circumstances?

Much of what we hear regarding his conduct when captured and prior to that time is indeed quite strange.  It's possible, I suppose, that a good deal of the outrage results from the fact that there are those who served with Bergdahl who claim he was a deserter and that there were those who lost their lives in searching for him.  It's unclear to me whether this was known or not known by the high and mighty in our government.  If it was known, the condemnation of the arrangement by those who knew this beforehand yet felt his release should be obtained is contemptible, but I've come to expect that most of our politicians are contemptible, so this is no surprise.  The pertinent question would be whether this fact if it is a fact, or possible fact which may or may not be established, should have precluded efforts at his release.

Even if he deserted, if he did not then join the Taliban or participate in activities against the U. S., I think the view that soldiers should not be left behind is sound and admirable and should have been honored in this case.  He will be subjected to military law on his return.  If he deserted he should pay the penalty; it doesn't follow that he should be left in the hands of the enemy, however.  If it is not enough for those that object to his release that he be subject to investigation, trial and punishment on his return pursuant to American military law, then one has to ask why it isn't.  It's likely that any answer given will itself be of very questionable worth.

Whether the terms of his release are objectionable is another issue, however.  I think it would be unsurprising if the five Taliban continued to fight against the U.S. if given the chance.  The best that could be hoped for is to neutralize them for a time.  So it would seem what would have to be considered is whether the release of the Taliban is "worth" the release of the Sergeant given the likelihood they will cause harm to the U.S. and its citizens and soldiers some time in the future.

This isn't an easy judgment to make, and it's to be hoped that the factors were considered and steps taken appropriate under the circumstances (and there could be many factors to be considered).  Whether they were is hard to say, at this time at least.  It appears that Congress should have been notified and was not at least in the manner specified by the law.  I don't know that anyone is in a position to say whether the judgment was a good one or not at this time, but I think that on any reasonable view that, if anything, should be the focus of attention, not this soldier's character and actions before taken captive. 

Eventually, I think the high and mighty will get around to considering the propriety of the judgment from the standpoint of the terms of the release, not the release itself.  But now I think there is too much political hay to be made, and we must resign ourselves to the posturing on this issue which typifies our politics.  Soon enough, something else will trigger the outrage of our outrageous representatives in government.

Regarding Assumptions and Afghanistan

Assume, arguendo, that the armed forces of the U.S. should be in Afghanistan. Use of the word "should" implies the existence of a good reason, so let's further assume there is one, e.g., their presence prevents the Taliban from dominating that nation, or their presence prevents the use of that nation as a staging ground for terrorist attacks.

Rather significant assumptions, some might say.

If they are made, though, the addition of 30,000 soldiers to that presence may make very good sense, if that addition is necessary to the continued success of the desired good outcome. Let's assume that's the case as well.

Adding 30,000 soldiers while telling the world that you will be withdrawing soldiers as of 2011 doesn't seem to make sense, even given the assumptions made, unless one makes further assumptions.  Those assumptions would be, I think, along the lines of (1) the danger of a Taliban resurgence or of the use of that nation as a haven for terrorists intent on wrecking havoc will diminish as of 2011, or (2) there will be a decreasing need for an American military presence to assure the desired good outcome commencing in 2011.

There would seem, though, to be little reason to believe either is likely to occur.  It would appear probable that the Taliban won't be leaving Afghanistan as of 2011, or that, if they should do so, they will return.  It would also seem probable that a steady decrease in the American military presence will not make the nation less a haven for terrorists.  It becomes more and more difficult to make assumptions on top of assumptions.

What then is the likely purpose of proclaiming that the U.S. will add 30,000 soldiers to its military presence and will begin withdrawing troops as of 2011?  It's difficult to think of any legitimate purpose.  As a result, it is natural to wonder if the purpose is not legitimate, or is an indication that those in power have no idea what to do, and are therefore willing to tread water, as it were, while they try to come up with a course of action.  Treading water in these circumstances, though, would seem to preclude adding soldiers; instead one would simply maintain the status quo.  So, does it make sense to infer that the 30,000 are being sent in an effort (vain, one would think) to placate political opposition?