Protest and Prejudice

 

It should be obvious to all of even rudimentary intelligence that protest and prejudice aren't one and the same. Prejudice is, in fact, one of the things which may be protested.  It often is protested, in fact.  Similarly, one may be prejudiced against protests and protesters.  

Since the difference between them is obvious, when it's claimed that people who protest are prejudiced, the claim can't reasonably be accepted on its face, without explanation.  Their prejudice and the prejudicial nature of the protest should be established.  If prejudice isn't or can't be established then it may be inferred that those making the claim are, in some sense, prejudiced against the protesters and the protest.

Lately we're deluged with media coverage of protests being made against Israel regarding its actions in Gaza.  We're also imposed upon by posturing politicians and pundits who are apoplectic over those protests and condemn them as anti-semitic.  

Being a Boomer, I've seen, heard of and read about protests since I was a wee lad.  I haven't participated in any, as I'm one of those Boomers who were born late enough to miss the major ones which took place in the 1960s, and am also by nature more an observer of events than a participant in them.  I will participate when in great need, however.

In any case, protests, particularly those which take place on college campuses, don't astonish or appall me.  I consider them somewhat commonplace.  College students are excitable and easily swayed and have a keen sense of injustice, though they aren't necessarily sensible.  They can also be self-righteous and ignorant, though that may be said of humans generally who would rather avoid the rigors of thought and critical thinking. 

It is, or should be, clear that someone who criticizes the state of Israel isn't thereby anti-semitic.  I, personally, think that the creation of Israel assured that the Mideast would be subject to bloody conflict for many years.  That has been the case and I suspect will continue to be the case for the foreseeable future.  I don't accept the claim that any people have or are entitled to have a homeland by grant of God. As a result, I don't think Israel is more or less entitled to exist than any other nation.  I don't think that these opinions establish I'm anti-semitic.  Israel is a nation, and is as subject to criticism as any other nation.

No reasonable person can contend that the Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel in October of last year were justified.  I think that's apparent.  They were horrific.  If it is being claimed by those protesting against Israel on college campuses that they were justified, does that in itself make them anti-semitic?  If it's being claimed by the protesters that Israel's response to those attacks is excessive, does that in itself make them anti-semitic?  If anti-semitism is properly defined as hatred of or prejudice against Jews qua Jews (which seems a common definition of it), wouldn't the consideration of whether conduct directed at them is justified, or whether their conduct in certain circumstances is excessive, indicate that the fact that they are Jewish isn't the sole basis for approval or condemnation?

Mere criticism of Israel's conduct in Gaza should not be deemed anti-semitic.  Is more than that involved in the protests?  If so, then clearly there should be concern about them.  In particular, if Jewish people are being targeted merely because their Jewish, and for being Jewish, the claim of anti-semitism is justified.

The latest protests, at Columbia University, seem peaceful; certainly in comparison to some of those protests engaged in by Boomers against the Vietnam War, for example.  According to accounts I've read, even the police who were called on by the University to clear students away, resulting in arrests, commented on the fact the protesters were peaceful and the University's reaction excessive.  

Unfortunately, reports regarding what is taking place conflict, and much of what is said and written seem polemical.  There are politicians who claim, or perhaps merely assume, that protests are anti-semitic and Jews are being repressed or are in danger, and demand colleges takes steps.  It's difficult to find much in the way of evidence to support such claims, though.

I admit to suspicion regarding the claims of anti-semitism being made by right-wing politicians and pundits.  Although it's probably unfair to believe that most if not all of them are gibbering, drooling idiots, it seems clear enough that their posturing is politically motivated and disingenuous.  Their relish of the opportunity to be sanctimonious where Ivy League colleges are concerned is too excessive to be genuine.  In fact, I find it disturbing whenever members of Congress insert themselves in matters of most any kind.  I doubt their good faith and believe most of them to be corrupt, that being the case almost necessarily in a political system where the acquisition and spending of money by politicians are of primary concern.

So, the question I think must be answered is:  What is it about the protests being condemned that makes them anti-semitic?  To me, that means:  What is it about them that isn't merely a criticism of Israel's conduct in Gaza?  If they aren't anti-semitic, then they should be handled by the authorities like any other protest

Homage to Steely Dan

 I'm not yet retired, and so can't yet attribute my inclination to avoid, for a time at least, the great events of our time to a sense of ennui.  Nonetheless I am so inclined, and so will indulge in another homage, this time to the work of Steely Dan.

I know of no work of Steely Dan I haven't liked.  The duo of Don Fagen and Walter Becker, backed over the years by a legion of highly competent studio musicians, have been consistently good, and have managed to work at a high level despite what I think are the inherent limitations of popular music.  Those limitations derive from the need that popular music be, well, popular.  The songs must sell, and sell well.  That may require pandering to the less artistic among the buying public, and the buying public in our Glorious Union doesn't have a high reputation.  H.L. Mencken reportedly said "Nobody ever went broke underestimating the taste of the American public."

Be that as it may, the music of Steely Dan has been consistently sophisticated, and has made use of styles and themes prevalent not just in rock music but in jazz, blues and Latin music while managing to sell very well.  Many of the band's songs are classics.

I've always thought of Fagen and Becker as having more in common with the Beat Generation than with those who came of music-buying age in the 1970s.  There is, of course, the fact that the name "Steely Dan" was taken from William S. Burroughs' novel The Naked Lunch, where it appeared as the name of a very special dildo.  Burroughs was one of the great figures of the Beat Generation.  Also, they strike me as having in common with the Beats an aptitude for poetry and a disdain for conventions, with none of the histrionic showiness seen in subsequent efforts of rebellious youth. 

But in addition to that, there seems to be nothing at all of the hippie in the band's music.  There's nothing psychedelic there; there's nothing about peace and love.  Peace and love are more subjects of mockery or disillusionment than anything else.  I think of Third World Man or Don't Take Me Alive when it comes to peace, and songs like Everyone's Gone to the Movies, Babylon Sisters and Janie Runaway when it comes to love.

The various conceits of the Me Generation are certainly present, however.  But again when they're made the subject matter they're treated ironically.  The album Gaucho is full of this sort of thing, particularly the song Glamour Profession.

It's unsurprising that the lyrics of many Steely Dan songs are seemingly unclear, and have been subject to interpretation.  But what is surprising about this is that the lack of clarity is the result of clever artifice and metaphor.  Through the use of artifice significant issues may be addressed in a manner which isn't self-important or banal, as are most efforts along those lines in popular music.  The meaning of the lyrics of The Royal Scam (the song, not the album), for example, is far from clear on their face, but some thought and attention to them suggests that immigrants and the American Dream are their focus.

Ultimately I think one's preference for artists of the written word, or the written word when put to music, is based mostly on the extent to which one associates with the author, composer and musician.  That is to say, the fan in that case sees the fan in the artist, has something in common with the artist, or think they do though they may flatter themselves.  The fan may even dream they are the artist, or at least wish they could be like them.

Steely Dan's songs often are seemingly delivered by or made from the perspective of jaded, cynical, sophisticated observers of life.  They're gentleman losers, disconnected and shrewd ("The Gentleman Loser" is the name of a bar in one of William Gibson's cyberpunk novels, if I recall correctly).  They're aware of the faults of people and in society, aware of our many weaknesses and vices, and may even share in them but do so with a kind of blithe, knowing detachment.  

Which may say something about this particular fan, in the end, and not all of it to his credit.

Homage to "Anatomy of a Murder"

Let's indulge in what, in the law, used to be called "a frolic and a detour" from the onerous and distasteful duties imposed on us by this miserable world.  In other words, let's do something for purely personal reasons.  Well, I will in any case.

I happened across the film Anatomy of a Murder playing on TV at the home of a relative, and saw what must have been the last half of it.  I'd seen it before, but seeing it again reminded me of something I think makes it remarkable.  It's a good movie, of course, but what makes it special to me is its mostly realistic portrayal of lawyers and what takes place in a courtroom.  

This is unusual in my experience.  The portrayals of lawyers and trials I've seen, though reflective of what seems to be a fascination with them both, are for the most part inaccurate, sometimes wildly so.  I've made a point of ignoring TV shows and movies which purport to describe them for that and other reasons.  I imagine health care professionals feel much the same regarding the ubiquitous dramas involving doctors and hospitals which likewise fill screens large and small in our Glorious Union and probably elsewhere.

There are good reasons for this movie's accuracy.  The novel on which the movie is based was written by a Michigan Supreme Court Justice and derived from a case in which he was involved as defense attorney.  As a result, it's faithful, for the most part, to what actually takes place in a courtroom.  There are embellishments, as might be expected, but its realism impresses me.

The performances by the actors are quite good.  As to the lawyers, Jimmy Stewart is beguiling as the shrewd small-town attorney for the defendant and George C. Scott is sharp playing the big city lawyer brought in to assist in the prosecution.  It was good to see Stewart in a film which isn't maudlin and sentimental.  I'm ashamed to admit that until recently I didn't know that the judge was played by none other than Joseph Welch, who represented the U.S. Army in the Army-McCarthy hearings and famously smashed Joe McCarthy by asking him if, at long last, he had no decency.  His judge was wise to the antics of the lawyers and sardonic, but presided over the proceedings fairly and quite well. 

Mirabile dictu, lawyers were shown actually researching the law, though they used books to do so, the film having been made in 1959.  They investigated; they interviewed witnesses before trial; they brainstormed.  The examination of witnesses was lawyerly as were the objections.  They engaged in some histrionics in the courtroom (it was a murder trial), and crowded the witness stand a bit too much, but perhaps that's more common in a criminal trial than it is in a civil trial (I'm not a criminal lawyer).

The defense raised to the charge of murder was that of "irresistible impulse"--the defendant knew what he was doing was wrong but was overwhelmed by an impulse he couldn't control due to his mental condition.  Experts testified, and their testimony was credible.

Interestingly, there was some coaching of the witnesses, and particularly the defendant.  Rather adroitly, the defense lawyer played by Stewart suggested to his client what defense could be successful while others would fail without actually telling his client what to say and how to act.  I have no doubt that this happens.  

The American Bar Association once asked 12 "prominent lawyers" what they felt were the best "legal movies."  Anatomy of a Murder was one of them selected.  Frankly, I don't understand why some others making up the 25 selected were chosen, and this makes me wonder just what "prominent" meant in these circumstances.  My Cousin Vinny was amusing in a silly way, but wouldn't be one I'd choose.  I have no idea why Chicago appears in the list.  Finding Miracle on 34th Street on the list was a shock.

Is this post entirely "a frolic and a detour", an utterly frivolous bit of fluff on my part?  Perhaps not.  It's important, I think, that people know what actually takes place in a courtroom and what should take place according to the rules of evidence and procedure.  It may be even more important that people understand why matters result in a trial.  We're witnessing a series of trials being brought which are believed to be baseless and brought for political or malicious reasons by those being told that is the case by the defendant and his minions.  They're believed, although anyone with knowledge of how the system works would understand there's nothing unusual about them.

The death of O.J. Simpson reminds us of the bizarre trial which took place in which his "dream team" and it seems overwhelmed prosecutors, an easily manipulated Judge, poor witnesses and a jury suspicious of the police combined to create a circus.  That should not and need not happen, though it might for a number of reasons.  The system has checks in place to prevent such things from taking place, though, and the perversion of the process isn't easily achieved.  Unfortunately, the unrealistic portrayal of it has added to a tendency to distrust it in many.

 

The Arizona Supreme Court's Use and Abuse of Statutory Construction

 

By now, all know through the magic of modern media the opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court in the case of Planned Parenthood Arizona, et al v. Mayes, et al.  In that opinion it held that a law adopted in 1864, when Arizona was a mere territory, effectively making abortion a crime unless to prevent the death of the mother, is applicable here and now, some 160 years later.

It always disturbs me when a court reaches more than a century into the past to dispose of issues coming before it now.  I think that in many cases, what was the law then was adopted in circumstances so different from those pertaining now that it's applicability is suspect.  This attitude has made me feel embarrassed, often, whenever I've cited legal antiquities after a search reveals that they are the only authority supporting the position I take in a case.  I can't help but think that the court and opposing counsel will conclude that if they are all I can rely on, there is a problem with my argument.

Regardless, though, laws adopted long ago which haven't been expressly repealed or ruled invalid by a court remain.  They exist and are available in a court of law.  They may well be binding from the perspective of the law.  The law is rather like the Internet in that all our statements, decisions, rules and regulations incorporated into the law cannot be erased no matter how evil, unjust or foolish they seem now.  For example, there are laws prohibiting certain sexual acts between consenting adults and laws prohibiting adultery still out there, though for the most part unenforced.

The opinion is lengthy, and I can only review it in summary in this post.  However, review it I will and I think the review addresses the major points and arguments made.

Since the 1864 law (let's call it "Law 1") was adopted by the Territory of Arizona, the State of Arizona adopted a law (let's call it "Law 2") which in pertinent part states that except in the case of a medical emergency, an abortion may not be knowingly and intentionally performed if the probable gestational age of "the unborn human being" has been determined to be more than 15 weeks.  At issue was the question whether Law 1 or Law 2 applies at this time.  In other words, at issue was the question whether an abortion could be performed under Arizona law if it was performed at any time before the expiration of the 15 week period.

Because neither Law 2 nor anything else expressly repealed Law 1, it is our fate as it was the fate of the Arizona Supreme Court to consider the rules of statutory construction, as it was necessary to interpret Law 2 as related to Law 1.  A law adopted by a legislature is to be construed to say just what it says if its language is clear and unambiguous.  If it is, then construction is not required.  If a law is ambiguous, then recourse may be had to a number of other sources in interpreting it, including, e.g., legislative history (the proceedings of a legislature during the debate and adoption of the law).  Generally, a law is considered ambiguous if two reasonable persons would interpret it differently.

Neither Law 1 nor Law 2 strike me as ambiguous.  The majority of the Arizona court decided Law 2 was, however.  As I noted, it didn't expressly repeal Law 1.  However, it clearly stated that an abortion was prohibited when performed after 15 weeks, unless medically necessary.  It doesn't take much in the way of intelligence to infer from this that an abortion performed with the 15 week period is not prohibited.  If you think as I do and the plaintiffs in the case did, you would conclude that the law allowed abortions to take place within the 15 week period; in other words, that it authorized abortions during that period.   Someone could therefore have an abortion in that period under Arizona law without incurring any penalty under the law.

 The majority conceded this was a reasonable construction of Law 2.  However, it determined that there was another reasonable construction.  Law 2, according to the majority, could reasonably be interpreted merely to describe the circumstances in which a physician may or may not be penalized if an abortion is performed. There being two reasonable interpretations according to the majority, Law 2 was ambiguous.

The majority then looked to legislative history.  It decided from that history that Law 2 was adopted in response to the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Roe v. Wade.  It opined that the Arizona legislature only adopted Law 2 because it had to do so to avoid running afoul of that Supreme Court decision.  According to the majority, Arizona never really wanted there to be a right to abortion.  So, Law 2 can't be construed to that effect.  Also, Roe v. Wade now being overruled, Law 2 must be considered inapplicable and Law 1 thereby must be applicable.

It's clear that Law 2 must be deemed ambiguous in order for this opinion to have any basis.  But the grounds on which the majority decided it to be ambiguous strike me as decidedly unreasonable.  If a law says X may be done in certain circumstances, but may not be done in other circumstances, I'm at a loss to interpret it to say X may not be done in certain circumstances, and may not be done in other circumstances as well.  X is allowed, or authorized, in one case and prohibited in another. 

I'm uncertain whether the majority is contending that being allowed or authorized by law to engage in certain conduct doesn't mean one has a right to do so, or something else.  If the former, I don't know how to characterize a legal right except as providing that something may be done without incurring a governmental penalty.  Under Law 1, abortion was penalized in any circumstances if not needed to save the life of the mother.  Law 2 is clearly inconsistent with Law 1.  Law 1 had no effect after Law 2 was enacted.  This would seem to be an implied repeal.  The fact that there are statements which appear in the record that it isn't really intended to be a repeal, which the majority notes, doesn't detract from the plain language of Law 2.  The fact that Roe v. Wade was overturned does not render Law 2 invalid, which the majority seems to believe, as Dobbs doesn't hold that a law like Law 2 is unconstitutional.  So, it's necessary that Law 2 be repealed to be ineffective.

The sad lesson is that the rules of statutory construction, though useful, can be used to support more than one interpretation of the law.  In the end, a judgment must be made regarding when those rules can reasonably be applied.  The Arizona Supreme Court's determination that Law 2 is ambiguous seems to me to be contrary to a common sense reading of that law.  A real effort is required to construe it as saying abortion is not allowed in the first 15 weeks, and construing it to say merely that abortions will not be penalized in some circumstances would amount to codifying a decision not to enforce the law under certain circumstances.  

 

The Modern Eclipse

It wasn't just any eclipse, was it?  I've never witnessed a total eclipse of the Sun, I admit.  So, however enthralling that experience may be, it hasn't been within my experience.  But I was alive when the last totality was visible in these United States, and even know of someone who witnessed it and spoke to him about it.  I saw media accounts of it as well.  But my recollection is that the accounts of that eclipse were not nearly as bewilderingly exclamatory and rhapsodic as the accounts I've seen of the one that took place yesterday.

Media accounts I saw addressed, live, such things as the reactions of those who gathered at a particular location in which totality could be observed to be married during the eclipse; the reactions of various animals in a zoo to the eclipse; the remarks made by people witnessing the eclipse when questioned; and even claims made by employes of Fox News that immigrants were donning black clothes and taking advantage of totality to illegally cross into our Great Republic unobserved, somehow, presumably during the approximately four minutes the totality lasted.  All who spoke agreed the eclipse was wonderful.  There can be no question of that.  But as much as this was emphasized, and repeated--and thus the reference to "rhapsodic" accounts--somehow, the descriptions made were uninspiring in the end.

The media representative assigned to witness the impact of the eclipse on people getting married during the eclipse unsurprisingly declared that doing so was a unique expression of love, and this declaration was confirmed repeatedly by those getting married.  Love was mentioned more than once during that broadcast.

At the zoo, we were told that birds were being noisy, a giraffe was being trailed by a zebra, an ostrich may or may not have laid an egg in the run up to totality, and flamingos and penguins began grouping together as they apparently do at night.  The ominous, and frankly silly, statements regarding immigrants dressing in black to take advantage of the totality on Fox News were made in a clip I saw.  Whether it occurred to them that the same could be done every night, and it was unnecessary and indeed foolish for anyone to await a solar eclipse and a four minute period of near darkness for this purpose, I don't know.

My guess is that most would know that temperature will drop during a total eclipse, at least if they thought about it, in addition to it growing dark, so remarks to that effect didn't strike me as newsworthy.  But I don't doubt that the eclipse itself was newsworthy, as a total eclipse isn't something visible regularly, nor do I doubt that witnessing one personally can be a remarkable and even spiritual experience.  What I do doubt, however, is that successive broadcasts taking place along the path of the eclipse, during which the same amazement was expressed, the same questions were asked,  the same responses were made and the same observations noted, were needed or interesting.  In fact, I think this rendered the eclipse mundane.

We're told that in ancient times in all cultures eclipses were wonderful, magical, supernatural, awe-inspiring and fear-inspiring events which profoundly influenced people and events.  Most of us no longer believe in magic, and know that eclipses are not supernatural.  But wonder and awe still seem appropriate reactions to a full solar eclipse.

Some remarks were made regarding the eclipse which indicated that certain people appreciated the event as reflecting the wondrous nature of the universe,  its sublime workings, its vastness and our small place in it although we are nonetheless part of it.  I think that's what would strike me if I had the good fortune to be present; that together with the acknowledgement that our disputes, conflicts and wars are petty, and our conceit boundless.

But in the main it was clear that coverage was the essential purpose of the media accounts of the event; coverage of everything. What took place, everywhere, over and over again; what was said over and over again; and what the feelings were of those who were witnesses.  The purpose was to describe the same event which took place over and over in different locations and to do so in much the same way in each case.

There's nothing wrong about doing this, but there's nothing significant about it either.  Nothing positive is achieved.  Curiously, this extensive and repetitive exposure diminishes an eclipse.  Our technology allows each of us to have a say about everything that takes place in the world, to express our feelings about them, and plainly most of us think it's important for us to speak and be heard.  Our society caters to this, as does the media.  Unfortunately, though, in most cases what we feel, and think, and say isn't remarkable or insightful or interesting.  

It seems that our media, if not our society or culture, is premised on the belief that what every person thinks or believes or says has equal significance, important and value, and should be known.  Our technology certainly encourages each of us to express our thoughts and feelings by ourselves, without the assistance of anyone else.  I'm uncertain, though, that this premise is useful, and suspect it deadens our appreciation of important things in life.

The Allure of What Might Have Been

John Greenleaf Whittier, in addition to writing the words appearing above, was a poet, abolitionist and Quaker of some note in 19th century America.  Being disturbed by what might have been would seem to be the epitome of what should be avoided by a would-be Stoic.  What didn't happen shouldn't be of concern to a Stoic except perhaps as a learning tool, as one of the rules of Stoicism is not to disturb yourself with matters beyond your control.

Whittier may nonetheless be right in stating that the words he refers to are sad, and perhaps even the saddest words.  The trick, if one can call it that, is to acknowledge they're sad but not to be saddened by them.

Regardless, speculation concerning what might have been can be fascinating in some senses.  Alternate history seems to be something authors of fiction like to write about.  Harry Turtledove appears to specialize in it.  I've read some of his novels based on alternate histories regarding the American Civil War, World Wars I and II and other periods.  I don't know how many he's written and how much of our history remains for him to reimagine, but think we've done enough in, say, the last 100,000 years to keep him and others busy for some time yet.

I myself find it fascinating to speculate on what would have happened if we left each other alone.  That requires some explanation, I know.  Let me try to do so.

We humans have developed separate cultures and societies throughout our history.  In some cases, differences between them are especially pronounced as to those which developed over time in separate areas of the world.  Of all the peoples of the world, Europeans have been most assiduous in NOT leaving other people alone.  They colonized most of it, conquered most of it, subjugated most of it.  They radically changed most of it.  What if that had not happened?

There are still those who believe that in doing so, they improved the lot of other peoples.  Reference is made to improvement in technology and medicine which resulted.  It is to be hoped that improvement in religion, meaning Christianization for the most part, isn't claimed by many anymore.

But it's interesting to wonder how the people of the pre-Columbian North and South America would have developed over time, if time was allowed them, and the Polynesian peoples, and sub-Saharan Africans, and others would have fared and what they would have accomplished but for European intrusion.  How would their technology, science and arts have changed?  If they hadn't changed, or changed differently from the way in which they changed in Europe, what of it?

It's difficult for me to maintain that the changes which actually took place are necessarily or inherently better than what would have occurred without European conquest and influence.  One can't do so without assuming European culture and society are superior and better than all others, and that would be a difficult assumption to make.  If people want to remain hunter-gathers, or nomads, for example, why not let them do so?  Is it appropriate to compel them to do otherwise?  The great pre-Columbian civilizations of the Americas were remarkably sophisticated in various respects.  If they had continued as they were, or developed in ways Europeans would have found strange, what of it?   I think the world would have been far more interesting than it is now if people had left each other alone.

Profound change isn't something which should be compelled.  This isn't to say that there should be no contact between peoples and cultures.  Trade, communication and travel would have influenced the peoples of the word and worked changes, but those changes wouldn't be forced or imposed, but accepted or rejected.  People would be different and, more importantly, the differences wouldn't be seen as strange but instead natural. 

Of course, humans being humans, some people would think they were superior to others or their ways of living better than others, but in the best case scenario of this alternate history they wouldn't feel it necessary or desirable that others become just like them or think it proper to make that happen.

An Ancient Roman Perspective on Good Friday

Today is Good Friday.  It's been a long time since I've been in a church to "celebrate" the gruesome death which we're taught took place that day in the Roman province of Judea.  I wonder how it's celebrated by the One Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church these days.  If I recall correctly, proceedings in my days as an altar boy were appropriately solemn.  Are they still, or has the effort to make observances cheery and attractive resulted in a kinder, gentler version of the crucifixion? 

Even as idealized in El Greco's painting shown above, a crucifixion must have been a horrible death.  Just how the Romans crucified people is a matter of some dispute, but there's no doubt it took place.  Some question whether the nails were placed as depicted here; sometimes the crucified are shown as tied to a cross.  

Presumably, this particular crucifixion, if it took place as described in the Gospels referring to "Doubting Thomas," involved the use of nails as Thomas is shown the wounds which resulted.  Whether it took place is disputed by some, of course.  

Unless one is a Christian believer and accepts the Gospels, the story of the Passion, the death and resurrection, isn't immediately acceptable.  Some parts of it, though, seem credible.  By this I mean that based on information available, some of what is said to have taken place could have taken place, though very little.  We can conclude that if we take a Roman view, and make reference to non-Christian sources.

We know at least that Pontius Pilate (Pontius Pilatus, properly) existed, and was a prefect governing the province of Judea around the time in question.  This has been confirmed by the so-called "Pilate Stone" which is a damaged block of limestone found in Caesarea Maritima (modern Caesarea), bearing an inscription in which he is named as making a dedication to Augustus and Livia.  Caesarea Maritima was the Roman administrative capital of the province and so would have been where Pilate stayed and from which he governed.  However, he no doubt travelled to and stayed in Jerusalem from time to time and as appropriate, and it makes sense he would have been there at an important period of time such as Passover.

Tacitus refers to both Pilate and "Christus" when he writes of the fire which destroyed much of Rome while Nero was Emperor.  Tacitus relates that Nero sought to blame Christians for the fire, and also notes that "Christus, from whom the name [Christians] has its origin, suffered the extreme penalty during the reign of Tiberius at the hands of one of our procurators, Pontius Pilatus...."  So, there is a non-Christian source which, though it indicates Pilate was a procurator instead of a prefect/governor, states that such persons existed and "Christus" was put to death by a Roman official.

There seems to be no contemporaneous Roman account of the crucifixion, however.  Flavius Josephus makes a reference to it, and Pliny the Younger while a governor famously wrote the Emperor Trajan regarding how to treat Christians, but Josephus and Pliny, like Tacitus, wrote long after these events were said to have taken place.  By the time they wrote, Christians were known of and deemed suspicious and anti-social among the Roman elite.  No sources are cited by any of these writers, and what they knew may have been based on rumor, or have formed part of the "backstory" of the Christian faith for many years at that time.  For that matter, the Gospels were written decades later as well.

We have a reasonable basis on which to say that Pilate existed and was prefect/governor of Judea during the reign of Tiberius.  There is reason to think Judea was a difficult province to govern,  Herod the Great was a client-king of Rome, but the Jews were thought even then to be peculiar and the Herodian dynasty was known to be made up of people who wouldn't hesitate to kill each other as needed.  Augustus once remarked that he would rather be Herod's pig than one of his sons.  After his death Judea was split into smaller kingdoms, and Rome assumed rule of the area after the death of the last Herod, Herod Antipas, circa 39 CE.  The Jews revolted against Roman rule 30 years later.

Herod Antipas is the Herod referred to in the story of the death of Jesus.  Pilate supposedly sent Jesus to be judged by Herod.

So, there is a basis to believe Pilate lived and was the Roman governor of Judea.  We can probably infer that people were crucified while he was governor.  We have a single source which indicates one of those crucified was the "Christus" from whose name "Christians" has its origin.  That's a bit of stretch, perhaps, but it's arguably correct.  That would seem to be the most that can be said based on Roman, non-Christian sources.

From that perspective, we can plausibly infer that there was a person crucified under Pontius Pilate, presumably in accordance with Roman law or the authority of Pilate as governor, for some reason.  That person, if he existed, was decades later associated with the Christianity.  About three hundred years later Christians, of which there were several varieties, made up the ruling class of the Roman Empire.

If the death took place, it likely did so as part of a normal "day at the office" for Pilate, and would have been treated as such by him and his staff.  It probably wasn't even known of by other Romans.  Over the years the death, if it happened, became very important of course.  But again from the Roman perspective, by the time it became important, it simply didn't matter whether it took place or not.  

For someone who isn't a believing Christian, that seems the most sensible way in which to think of Good Friday, given the lack of evidence.  One can dispute with believers about whether the crucifixion took place, but it makes no difference.  It makes a difference to some of them, however, as it seems they hope to find some corroboration for their beliefs.  Perhaps "Doubting Thomas" has had more of an influence than has been suspected.

Politics and Zugzwang

As I've noted in the past, zugzwang in chess refers to a position in which the player obligated to make a move cannot do so without being placed at a disadvantage, which may be serious or even "fatal."  An example of zugzwang appears above.

I've also opined in the past that a particular presidential election was similar to zugzwang in chess, as any vote--at least for a candidate likely to win--placed the voter at a disadvantage.  Are we in a similar situation as to the presidential election coming in November?  Probably, though I think the disadvantages which will result if one of the candidates is elected will far exceed those which will result from the election of the other.  But I begin to wonder whether zugzwang has come to characterize or will characterize most if not all elections in our Glorious Union.  In other words, I begin to wonder whether any choice to be made in any election will necessarily be disadvantageous.

That's a rather broad and gloomy statement, I know.  But our politics and politicians have become so debased I fear it is or will be true.

I think we have to acknowledge that there is less and less about our politics which makes worthy people interested in participating in it.  In fact, it has become so divisive, rancorous and corrupt that anyone with morals or intelligence will want to avoid any involvement in what is becoming to seem a cesspool.  We see even veteran members of Congress, who should be hardened souls, eager to escape the circus it's become.

The proceedings in Congress are already largely futile on important issues, as there is little urge to compromise or, it seems, even to govern if that means reasonably accommodating conflicting interests and positions, which is to be expected in any functioning democracy or republic.  Those who've noticed the anti-democratic leanings of many politicians on the right and fear their prominence may be prescient.  Those who think they know and serve the will of God, or what is truly good and right, have no patience with doubt or questions and won't compromise.  The simple-mindedness which underlies such intolerance is spreading.  People want to be told what to do.  Most of all, I believe, people don't want to think unless they must do so--it's better if others do the thinking for them.

As Congress fails to govern, people will look for other ways to "get things done."  They'll find someone who will at least appear to "make the trains run on time."

If the worthy among us refuse to participate actively in the politics of our Great Republic, the unworthy will quickly take their place.  The venal, the fanatic, the ignorant, the stupid will run for office or determine who will or will not be candidates for them, or obtain them.  Elections and the governmental bodies which those elected will grace with their presence will become freak shows of sorts.  The performers in the shows will be the scraps and leavings of our population, thralls to the rich or corporations, or grim and stunted followers of intolerant ideologies or political "leaders."

It's an old story.  We've seen it all before.  Though we know the past, we may still be doomed to repeat it, as we don't change or refuse to do so.

About the Great American Novel

 

The Atlantic recently published a list of 136 books under the title The Great American Novels: 136 books that made America think.  It focused on books published in the last 100 years.  I thought it somewhat disappointing.  I thought it puzzling.  

I'm disappointed by the fact that I must admit that I've only read 7 of the 136 "Great American Novels."  It's true that as I've grown older, I've become less inclined to read novels, except as a means of escape from these dark times.  A novel need not be great to provide such escape.  I'm puzzled because it seems that these "Great American Novels" according to the magazine itself are not Great American Novels as I conceive them to be.  

Clearly, as I haven't read most of the novels on the list, I may be unqualified to opine on whether they're great, or American, or either or both.  But the problem I have arises from the way in which they're characterized by The Atlantic as "Great American Novels."  They're described as novels that made America think.  In what sense does that make them "Great American Novels"?

I think it's probable that there are and have been novels that "made America think" that aren't about America or Americans, and were not written by Americans.  Shouldn't they be "Great American Novels" as well, given such a definition?  Is War and Peace a Great American Novel?  Something by Proust? If not, why not?

Wouldn't the definition of a "Great American Novel" make more sense if it comported more directly with the qualifying word "American"?  Obviously, a novel may be great and have nothing to do with America or Americans or be written by an American. 

I assume that the authors of the books on the list are all Americans.  Is the fact that a great novel is written by an American sufficient to make it a "Great American Novel"?   Why wouldn't it be instead a great novel written by an American?   In what sense are A Wizard of Earthsea and The Dispossessed  Great American Novels, if not for the fact that they were written by Ursula Le Guin and Octavia Butler, both Americans?  The stories told in each don't even take place on Earth.  Is it claimed that they deal with themes that are uniquely American?  How do we determine what those are in the first place?

Huckleberry Finn, referred to by Hemingway as the source of modern American fiction in the quote above, is easily identifiable as an American novel.  It was written by an American, the story told takes place in America and it deals with what is unquestionably a uniquely American subject matter.  The same can be said of John Steinbeck's The Grapes of Wrath and other novels, each arguably "great."

If we are to speak of Great American Novels, it would seem to make far more sense to define them as those involving America, which take place in America, deal with themes identifiably if not exclusively American and are written by Americans.  To define them as those novels which made America think seems not to define them at all in any useful sense, unless Americans think differently than others do and about things others don't think of, which strikes me as a difficult claim to make.

The Great, Global Video Landfill

What better way is there to describe the phenomenon known as YouTube?  A vast dumping ground used by the human race as a place to put everything.  Not just garbage, though there is no doubt garbage aplenty, but everything that we take the trouble to commit to video and then install there, probably forever or as near to forever we can achieve.

Garbage itself need not be worthless.  Sometimes, items of value are put in landfills, on purpose or by error.  Most items found in them at least were valued at one time, or contained what was valued by someone and then used or broken, or aged or became beyond repair.  In time it like other landfills will be the delight of archaeologists and anthropologists, or perhaps even extraterrestrials eager to learn about us after we've killed each other or are wiped out by natural disasters.

There's no denying its fascination.  It's similar to the Internet or the Web or whatever it's appropriately called, in that you will find what you search for, no matter how trivial or exotic it may be (well, within certain limits).  I've found much related to history and my other interests, and I've hardly explored it.  But matters of historical interest must make up only a small portion of what's been dumped there and may be viewed at our pleasure at any time.  Episodes or portions of episodes of series available through other media are there; performances of all kinds; commentary on films, politics and other things by anyone who knows how to post to it....in fact, anything by anyone who knows how to post to it, regardless of its content or quality.  Videos regarding aircraft, ships, cars, cats, aliens, created by people who may or may not know something about what it is they upload.  Or is it download?

That is a concern, or should be.  The extent of the expertise of those who purport to be experts on what they put in the landfill, verification of what is claimed, what's motivated them, the veracity of what you see, are not delved into or expressed, in most cases.  If such things matter to you, they're your concern.  You must make the effort to determine the quality and truthfulness of what you see.  I suspect few are inclined to make that effort.

Some of what you see clearly constitute opinion.  There are several devoted to reviews of TV series and movies, which are amusing though generally negative.  The ones I've seen are especially critical of productions deemed "woke" or which appear to go out of their way to feature characters which are of all races and sexual preferences, at the same time damning traditional masculine characteristics.  

I've written before of my distaste for those I consider media missionaries; those who seem to feel a need to teach or show the less enlightened among us what is proper, regardless of the content of the works they seek to dramatize.  Regardless of the Lore, as it's called in the case of the sometimes obsessively liked books like Lord of the Rings, for example.  I feel a certain sympathy for critics who complain of gratuitous modification of great stories for missionary purposes of this kind.

But there's nothing I've seen to indicate that these critics are particularly knowledgeable, or that they should be watched or listened to, beyond perhaps the number of views they've accumulated.  Why shouldn't that be enough to qualify them for what it is that they do, which I would say is entertain, nothing more, nothing less?

As to such things I'm inclined not to take them very seriously.  What interests me about them is not their content, but what it is that motivates people to make them and put them on YouTube and to watch them.  I think it gives the creators, rather than the watchers, a feeling that they attain a certain fame, or perhaps even immortality given the fact that as far as I'm aware, once you're there on the Web you can never be completely deleted.  I don't think this conceit is disgraceful.  I'm aware of the fact that this blog may be considered my own effort to attain something similar, though I know that the number of views it's had is exceedingly small in comparison with those of any given cat video, which makes that most unlikely.

As to other things we see in the landfill, or on the Web, or in social media, they're to be taken seriously to the extent they influence others.  Those who make them are known now as "Influencers" apparently.  And those who watch or read or hear them are so easily influenced, that what they seek to influence and the reasons why they do so must be of concern.  

We as a species are so likely to make mistakes that the more of us there are, and the more that we're able to influence others, the more the mistakes we'll make in number and in severity.  It's curious that information and knowledge are so easily and widely available through technology, and yet we seem the worse for it.  It was once thought that the better educated and informed we become, the better we will be.  We seem to be determined to establish that is not the case, however.  Disinformation is as or even more likely to be accessed on YouTube or other sources, of course.  But information itself can be dangerous if unfiltered and unrestricted.

 

Dicta and Dictatorship

It seems to me that the majority of the current Justices of our Supreme Court are inclined to transcend, to put it kindly, the cases before them.  That is to say, they aren't afraid to do more than is required of them from the standpoint of the law, strictly speaking, but rather tend in addition to do and say what they nonetheless deem it appropriate for them to do and say.  This kind of conduct is something former, liberal, Justices were accused of by conservative commentators.  

Consider the recent decision regarding the action of the Colorado Supreme Court in disqualifying a candidate for the presidency from appearing on the ballot in that State under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  That Section states that those who engage in an insurrection contrary to the oaths of office they took to the Federal and State constitutions are disqualified from running from such an office in the future.  SCOTUS struck the Colorado decision down.  All nine of the Justices thought it appropriate to do so, but some of them thought that the opinion could do so by simply holding that the States cannot enforce Section 3 except with respect to disqualification from State offices.  The opinion does much more than that.  It contains language indicating that Section 3 can be enforced only if Congress passes legislation providing for its enforcement.  In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Congress passed legislation providing for the disqualification of non-legislative office holders and members of Congress.  No legislation has been passed regarding disqualification when it comes to the office of president, however.  The majority of the Justices apparently think such legislation is needed before such disqualification may be enforced.

Four of the Justices thought this additional language regarding the need for legislation to enforce Section 3 is the result of the court indulging in rendering an opinion, or commenting, on matters not necessary to the decision of the court.

In the wide, wonderful world of the law in our Great Republic, a distinction is made between language in caselaw which constitutes the holding of a court, and what is called dicta.  Generally speaking,  dicta is language in an opinion  which isn't necessary to resolve the case before the court.  It may be a comment, an observation, a suggestion, or mere declamation.   Because it isn't necessary to the holding of the court, and thus the resolution of the case, dicta need not be followed by other courts.  It doesn't create precedent.  It's merely persuasive, if anything.  What is precedent is the holding itself, and the reasoning needed to arrive at it.  To give that reasoning its lovely Latin name, the ratio decidendi.

It's important to determine whether statements in the opinion that Congressional legislation is required before there can be disqualification from the office of president is dicta or binding precedent.  Five of the Justices claim, in responses to the concurring opinions, that the statements are part of the reasoning required to strike down the action of the Colorado Supreme Court.  This doesn't mean it isn't dicta, however.

If it isn't dicta, then it appears that it's not yet possible for someone to be disqualified from the presidency.   There must be Congressional legislation before that can be done.  In the interim, Section 3 doesn't apply.  

It would seem the language of Section 3 is sufficiently clear that additional legislation, saying essentially the same thing, isn't needed for it to apply.   In fact, in taking the position that more legislation in effect parroting Section 3 is necessary the five Justices render Section 3 superfluous, contrary to rules of construction of statutory law.

More significant, though, is the fact that the Congressional legislation supposedly required may never be adopted.  So, nobody running for president may ever be disqualified from doing so by Section 3.  A candidate for president may engage in insurrection and not be disqualified under the Fourteenth Amendment, for now.

By requiring further legislation specific to the office of president, SCOTUS runs the risk of making the application of Section 3 to the presidency a political decision.  In the decadent state of our government, it's easy enough to envision members of Congress fearful of adopting such legislation because it may be used against their party's presidential candidates.

 In the decadent state of the law, a candidate for president, or one who wins the presidency, isn't disqualified by engaging in insurrection despite the clear language of Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In the decadent state of our society, a candidate's supporters may engage in insurrection and it won't prevent the candidate from being president, even if the candidate encouraged it.

 

 

Oh, He Comes From Alabama With A Bible On His Knee

Once again, I'm unable to resist giving a silly title to a post.

A great deal is being written and said about the recent decision of the Alabama Supreme Court in the case of Burdick-Aysenne et al v. The Center for Reproductive Medicine, et al,  involving frozen human embryos.  This post relates to the opinion in that case, but not in any significant respect to the majority opinion, concurring opinion or that of the dissent.  Far more interesting to me is the "special concurrence" of the Chief Justice of that court.  

It's always fascinating to read court decisions which manage to "grab the headlines" for one reason or another (can we still use that phrase or is it too dated?).  Generally, the decisions themselves are different from the summaries or interpretations of them which appear in the major and social media.  This case was one for wrongful death and for negligence regarding the destruction of certain frozen embryos, or the killing of them as the court puts it.

Alabama law provides a cause of action for wrongful death including the death of children, born and unborn.  The primary legal issue addressed by the court was whether "unborn children" include frozen human embryos for purposes of the wrongful death law of the state.  The majority found that they are included among "unborn children."  And that was, or at least should have been, that.

Where I practice, there is no such thing as a "special concurrence."  For good reasons, I think.  A search reveals that it is an opinion of a member of the court which concurs with the decision of the majority, for entirely different reasons than those relied on by the majority.  Indeed, it need not really relate to the case itself.  It need not address any of the issues raised or addressed by the litigants or the lower courts from which appeal was made.

Simply put, it may be entirely gratuitous.  Normally, appellate judges refrain from addressing issues and arguments never raised in the courts below.  Part of the reason for refraining from doing so is that the parties and the lower courts never had the opportunity to consider and speak to them.  But this concern, it seems, need be of no concern to authors of special concurrences, and clearly was not a concern of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Alabama in this case, who authored an opinion regarding which "gratuitous" may be too mild a description.

An amendment to the Alabama Constitution adopted in 2018 provides that Alabama, as a matter of public policy, supports "the sanctity of unborn life and the rights of unborn children, including the right to life."  This provision is briefly noted in the majority opinion but isn't relied on it to any significant extent.  Notwithstanding that fact, however, the Chief Justice decides to "take this opportunity" to address its meaning and legal effect, with particular focus on the proper interpretation of "the sanctity of unborn life."

There follows a discourse by the Chief Justice 22 pages in length, in which God is referred to 41 times. That's a little less than twice on each page. God isn't referred to except by the Chief Justice.  The other opinions and Justices manage to address the case without invoking God or the fear of God, which as we'll see is called on if not summoned in support of the opinion of the Chief.  He also refers to the Book of Genesis, the Book of Jeremiah, the Book of Exodus, portions of the works of Thomas Aquinas, Augustine, John Calvin and Jonathon Edwards, as well as several commenters on the Bible.  I feel a certain compassion for the Chief Justice's clerk, who may have thought the research and writing involved in that position wouldn't address religious and theological works in such detail.

Rendered to its essence, the special concurrence amounts to an argument, or perhaps more properly a declaration, that the 2018 amendment to the Alabama Constitution must be considered, and followed, as a religious injunction.

This is made apparent from the concurrence's conclusion.  The Chief Justice concludes his opinion with language of a kind I've never seen included in a legal opinion of any court during nearly 45 years of practicing law.  It's so remarkable I must quote it:

"The People of Alabama have declared the public policy of this State to be that unborn human life is sacred. We believe that each human being, from the moment of conception, is made in the image of God, created by Him to reflect His likeness. It is as if the People of Alabama took what was spoken of the prophet Jeremiah and applied it to every unborn person in this state: "Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, Before you were born I sanctified you." Jeremiah 1:5 (NKJV 1982). All three branches of government are subject to a constitutional mandate to treat each unborn human life with reverence. Carving out an exception for the people in this case, small as they were, would be unacceptable to the People of this State, who have required us to treat every human being in accordance with the fear of a holy God who made them in His image."

The language is pontifical; thus the "We believe"--he purports to speak for the people of Alabama, much as a pope may purport to speak for Catholics everywhere in a certain capacity.  More than that, he makes what is essentially a religious claim, and maintains that all three branches of the State of Alabama are required to follow it "in accordance with fear of a holy God..."  Those who disagree with the Chief Justice, it appears, run the risk of being the subject of God's wrath. It seems that there are still those who conflate religion and the law.  History tells us this is dangerous.

I wonder, I must admit, how he defines "likeness."  But I wonder about that generally when it's claimed that God made us in his likeness.  I can't understand how anyone would want God to be like us, or would worship God if he was.

I don't know if special concurrences are accorded any weight in Alabama,  Concurrences generally are not binding precedent.  I hope that this particular one would be considered, at most, persuasive.  If it is the majority decision alone that's precedential, I don't think a theocracy has been established by it.  One may well disagree with the Alabama Supreme Court's decision regarding the unborn, but it arguably follows from the law of that state and avoids the spectacular excesses indulged in by its Chief Justice.  It must be hoped it will continue to do so.

The President as Shill

Shown above is coinage of the Roman Emperor Marcus Didius Severus Julianus, who reigned for all of nine weeks in 193 C.E.  That was long enough, apparently, for coins to be minted.

That may be all that transpired during his rule.  He's famous, or rather infamous, because he was the winner in an "auction" the Praetorian Guard held to determine who would be the successor to Commodus, an emperor also well described as infamous.  Later, he was assassinated by the Praetorians.

The auction is shown in a scene in the movie The Fall of the Roman Empire, starring Sophia Loren, Alec Guinness, Christopher Plummer, Omar Sharif, James Mason and Mel Ferrer.  Guinness played Marcus Aurelius, and Plummer played Commodus, making him appear a lunatic, which he may have been.  It was quite a cast, worthy of a picture nominally depicting the fall of Rome.  But the Empire didn't fall in the West for about another three hundred years, and in the East survived for a thousand years or so after the West.  So, the movie wasn't historically accurate in that respect, at least.  I think historical accuracy wasn't all that important to the creators of the film; they probably meant that the auction, being so absurd and contemptible, was a sign of the decay of the Empire and perhaps even hastened its fall.

H. L. Mencken, the Sage of Baltimore, is credited with saying regarding American elections that "[e]very election is a sort of advance auction sale of stolen goods."  He would have revelled in the election now taking place in our Great Republic.  

It's a truism that our elections involve the selling of a candidate in remarkably the same manner in which product is sold, and it may be said that the eventual winner of an election has been bought as a result, the accumulation and expenditure of money being essential to our politics.  But as far as I'm aware a candidate for high office here hasn't been personally involved in selling products as part of an election campaign.

Until now, of course.  Absurdly priced golden sneakers, cologne, wine, silly cards depicting him as a superhero and God knows what else, all emblazoned with his name, are being promoted by a candidate for the nation's highest office.  It's difficult to conceive of conduct which would do more to cheapen not just the office of President but the nation itself.  Not even the Praetorian auction can rival the debasing effect of these activities.

The spectacle of a candidate (a former president) selling self-promoting products of this kind makes him appear shabby.  Not that he has ever seemed more than shabby, but this makes him look peculiarly shabby. One understands he has large legal and other bills, and now has sizable judgments and fines to pay, and his unusually gullible supporters are willing to do what they can to pay them for him.  But being a shill for the purpose of making money from the sale of gaudy and tasteless momentos is a step too far, or too low, for a President of the United States.  He may as well work as a carnival barker or traveling salesman of testosterone pills.  It's typical of the man himself, who it seems is devoted to scamming people and lacks any honorable and worthy virtues; this is true.  And it seems to have become typical to many citizens as well in that they welcome and applaud his crassness.  I suspect beer or some other beverage will soon be sold as well.

Used cars are a possibility as well, of course.

Does this example (his and his followers) represent what Americans seem to be to others around the world?  Loud, ignorant, bombastic, self-pitying, resentful, crass, out to make a quick buck by any means, pushy, loutish cretins?  Or is this how we've always been viewed, and portrayed?  If the latter, are we now proud of living up to the caricature?

The Agony of the Feet

I apologize.  I couldn't resist using the title to this post.  It, and this post, is a reaction to the remarkable and disturbing commercial shown during last night's Super Bowl courtesy of the entity known as "He GetsUs."

Commercials for religions are, I suppose, to be expected in our Great Republic, where religion is itself commercial more than anything else.  I'm not a fan of them, but think it interesting to consider their merits as commercials, if not as religious.

 How explain it?  For that matter, how describe it?  One can see it in all its creepy glory easily enough, of course.  It's there and presumably will be forever, thanks to the Internet.  Perhaps its should be seen at least once, as a kind of penance, appropriately maybe, though that may not have been the intent of its creators.

Just what was the intent?  According to the Gospels, or at least some of them, Jesus washed the feet of his disciples.  It is, or at least was, something the Catholic Church made its priests do on Holy Thursday.  I remember it being done, in any case.  Not by me or to me, happily.  It's not something I would do, I admit, nor would I want it done to me.  Leave my feet alone, please, I would respond to anyone offering to cleanse them.

I imagine that the intent was to make us all reflect on the fact that we're no better than anyone else, as the foot washers depicted engaged in the solemn vignettes were generally stereotypical opposites of those depicted having their feet washed.  We are thus all equally worthy of having our feet washed and washing those of others.  It's a humbling observation, no doubt.  It's also a peculiar one.  Communal washing of feet isn't something normally done, these days, especially if it's done by some to others.  One would think there would be a less odd way of making the point.  HeGetsOurFeet?  Why?  Feet washing isn't what it used to be, it can safely be said.  Didn't people wash their own feet in the 1st century C.E., in Palestine or Judea?

My guess is that they typically do so now, most everywhere, at least where the Super Bowl is shown.

It seems not to have occurred to those who foisted the commercial on the millions watching the game that displays of feet washing, particularly lingering, loving washes, aren't attractive to most of us.  They may be very attractive to some, but I daresay those who find them so are in the minority.  That appears clear from the reactions to the commercial I've seen.  Sometimes people are appalled by it, sometimes they're amused by it.  Inevitably, the fetish associated with feet is mentioned by some commentators, with a kind of leer or giggle.  All these reactions should have been predictable.

This Super Bowl was in many respects unremarkable, even dull, but for the overtime portion of the game.  For someone like me, not a fan of either team and not particularly interested in the much talked about romance which was played up so extensively, the outcome wasn't welcomed; we've seen far too much of the winners already.  As to the half-time show, it was very Vegas, but in Vegas that isn't extraordinary.  

But it was remarkable in the sense that it's now apparent that one must be very rich to attend this spectacle.  It has become like so much in our society a pastime of the only very well off.  That couldn't be said even of the Roman spectacles, which gave the best seats to the rich and powerful but allowed room for those less fortunate.  The very rich  are very different from the rest of us; Scott Fitzgerald's comment is more telling now than it was then.  This is the common state of our social affairs.  

It's is also remarkable, though, because of this commercial.  This Super Bowl will be remembered as the one featuring wet, glistening, and very clean feet.

Blessings in Disguise

Every now and then, I comment in this blog on news related to the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church ("OHCAC") that took up much of my time in my increasingly distant youth, though it now does so only sporadically.  At the moment, I'm interested in the controversy surrounding Fiducia Supplicans, which it seems is a declaration on Catholic doctrine issued with the support of the Pontifex Maximus allowing priests to bless...well, I'm not sure what, frankly.  It seems, though, to allow blessings of a sort to be made to couples engaged in an irregular or same-sex relationship.  This sort of blessing doesn't constitute a validation of the relationship, however, which remains forbidden.

I admit to some confusion.  I'm a lawyer, and so am not phased by distinctions which may baffle normal people.  I can accept that a relationship may be recognized without being validated, or sanctioned.  I can also accept that those involved in a relationship may be blessed though the relationship itself may be forbidden (well, for religious purposes in any case--religions forbid so much after all).  Sinners may be blessed by my understanding, so I suppose that, if OHCAC determines being in a same-sex relationship is sinful, the sinning participant may yet be blessed by a priest.  The problem, if any, arises when the relationship itself is blessed, it seems.  That at least is the position being taken by those functionaries of the Church who object to the declaration.

Let me be clear.  I have no dog in this race.  I don't think such relationships are sinful.  Priest may and do bless pets, which I find charming.  They bless things, and places.  So be it.  I can't recall whether the Gospels or any part of what's considered the New Testament condemns these relationships.  I'd be surprised if Jesus ever directly addressed them, as I think sexual relationships and sex in general weren't matters of great concern to him.  That they are to Catholic clergy is, alas, all too obvious.  This particular kind of sexual relationship is in any case thought to be contrary to doctrine or even Scripture by those who oppose Francis in this matter. 

I think there's a problem with this position, if it is the fact that one is involved in such a relationship that constitutes the sin.  If persons A and B are sinners because they're involved in a same-sex relationship, but nevertheless may be blessed individually, what is it that forbids their relationship from being blessed?  That a relationship exists must be taken as given; that's why those involved in it are sinners (though they are no doubt sinners for other reasons as well; this is assumed by OHCAC, of course).  Is it believed that the relationship is distinct in some sense from those participating in it?   But how can that be the case?  Without them, there would be no relationship to be condemned.

I've seen it claimed that blessing the forbidden union would be like blessing an abortion clinic.  Although, according to some, a woman who has an abortion may be blessed as a sinner in some circumstances, an abortion clinic may not be blessed; such is the argument as I understand it.

The analogy strikes me as less than perfect, however.  A relationship is not a clinic.  If it is a sin to have an abortion, it must be a sin for a doctor to be involved in the abortion as well it is a sin for a woman to obtain one.  There's a doctor-patient relationship involved; both are sinners if having an abortion is a sin.  Yet it seems both, as sinners, may be blessed.  Is it the doctor-patient relationship that is condemned rather than the clinic?

Well, it's an interesting dispute, but happily one which need not concern us, or at least me, except perhaps as part of the history of an ancient and still in some ways fascinating institution. It's unfortunate that sex is so much a part of it and its concerns, and for that matter its own sins, both of omission and commission.  

 

Punishing the Dead

Above we see the corpse of Pope Formosus, put on trial by his successor, Pope Stephen VI, in the year 897.  Formosus' body was exhumed at the command of Stephen and tried for several reasons at a Church Synod which has come to be called, for obvious reasons, "The Cadaver Synod."

To the surprise of no one, Formosus was found guilty.  It seems that an unfortunate Deacon was selected either to represent the corpse or speak for it.  I wonder what kind of defense was offered by the deceased.  I like to think of the corpse and its lawyer/advocate/representative huddling together regarding strategy or how to respond to questions asked.  I suspect their conferences were either very short or very long.   I'm ashamed to admit that I've also pictured the Deacon manipulating the corpse as a ventriloquist's doll, a la Charlie McCarthy or Senor Wences, while responding to the prosecutor's examination.

The corpse was duly punished.  Three fingers of its right hand were chopped off (they were used for blessing the unworthy).  All of the Formosus' acts were annulled, and the body was ultimately thrown in the Tiber, something of a Roman tradition in pagan and Christian times.

This wasn't the only time we exhumed and punished corpses.  There are more than a few famous or infamous instances of posthumous execution.  That of Oliver Cromwell is equally notorious.  After the Restoration his body was dug up, hung in chains in public, and beheaded, in vengeance it seems for regicide in connection with Charles I.

Desecration of the dead is far more common.  If what has been alleged is true, then members of the Israeli Defense Force have done this in cemeteries in Gaza.  The body-snatching done to supply corpses to medical schools is referenced fairly often in the media, and this would seem to me to constitute desecration regardless of whatever advancement in medical care took place as a result, if any.  And of course it isn't unreasonable to claim that archaeologists desecrate the bodies of those they dig up, routinely it seems, despite the fact that it is especially clear in some if not all cases that those who once lived did not want their remains disturbed.  Desecration in the name of knowledge has been excused, for one reason or another.

Why punish the dead, though?  Why "execute" them?  In the case of Formosus it can be said that Stephen VI had practical, political goals in mind in staging the macabre trial.  The trial resulted in the annulment of the acts of Formosus as Pope, something which could have been quite useful to Stephen and his friends.  But it's unclear why it was thought that putting his corpse on trial was needed to accomplish the nullification.  Are the dead entitled to due process?

In Cromwell's case, however (or rather in the case of his corpse) it would seem that vengeance was the primary if not the only reason for the posthumous execution.  It's possible also that it was thought that the effort involved in the show was justified as it might serve to convince all of the danger of regicide--Behold, Charles II may be saying, if you kill a king even your mortal remains won't be safe from vengeance!

It's hard to believe that it was thought that the dead would be harmed in some way by what was done to their corpses, but this was apparently true in some cases.  Native Americans (if that appellation is still appropriate) are said to have mutilated the dead bodies of their enemies so they wouldn't have the use of whatever part of their bodies was mutilated in the afterlife.  In ancient Greece, the failure to grant funeral rights and treat dead bodies with respect seemingly doomed their souls to a piteous afterlife.  Achilles refused to agree to Hector's suggestion that they each promise that the victor won't dishonor the corpse of the loser.  He roped Hector's body to his chariot and dragged him around the city of Troy in full sight of his mother and father.

There appears to be no question that defiling a corpse is considered taboo in most cultures.  It must require a good deal of hate to violate that taboo.  And a kind of need as well.  When the object of your hate is dead, what would prompt you to violate his corpse except the feeling that mere death isn't enough to satisfy you?  Death is not enough in some cases, for some of us at least.

I suppose this is another way in which we humans are distinct from other living organisms.  We're not content that our enemies die, we wish to punish those we hate even beyond death and have pursued that goal in ways which are highly imaginative.  This must be why some take comfort in the belief that others are writhing in Hell, for all eternity.  

What a piece of work is man, as Hamlet would say.

Collective Lunacy

There's something about our times that brings to (my) mind the phenomenon known as mass hysteria as well as other names.  It's appeared now and then in our history.  Most examples known began to take place in the medieval period and have continued since then.  It's interesting that we don't hear much about similar events taking place in ancient times.  That fact is worthy of study, but not here, not now.

Above is a painting by Pieter Brueghel the Younger of an example of Dancing Plague which took place in the 16th century in Belgium.  There were earlier manifestation of that plague, such as the one which took place in the 14th century in Aachen, Germany.  A woman left her home in that case, and began dancing in the street (or what passed for one at that time) for no apparent reason and to no purpose.  She kept dancing for days.  Others began to dance as well.  They also kept dancing.  It's said that thousands did the same eventually.  They stopped dancing eventually, also for no apparent reason.

Sources tell us that efforts were made to stop the dancing, with no effect.  Among the efforts was hiring musicians and (normal) dancers in the hope that when they stopped playing and dancing the (abnormal) dancers would stop as well.  This makes a certain sense, if anything does.  It didn't work.

I wonder if that's what's going on in the painting by Brueghel, given the presence in it of men depicted playing bagpipes.  Men are shown trying to restrain the dancers as well; but it's possible that grabbing the arms was a part of whatever dance was taking place.

My favorite historical example of mass hysteria is the case of the Meowing Nuns of France.  One of the nuns in a particular convent began to meow like a cat one day.  Others began to meow.   Eventually, all the nuns would gather together to meow at particular times of day, as they normally would to pray together, one would think.  The association of cats with Satan was thought significant.  Soldiers were brought in, and they whipped and tortured the nuns until they agreed to stop meowing.  I wonder if they continued to meow when the soldiers left, but in secret.

Then there are the Biting Nuns of Germany.   A nun in a convent in the 15th began to bite her sisters,  They began to bite each other.  This biting behavior spread to other convents, not only in Germany but in Holland, and even to Rome.  The Biting Plague continued, it seems, for some centuries.  

Outbreaks of mass hysteria took place later than the Middle Ages.  The Salem Witch Trials are considered to be an example of it.  In the 1960s, a laughing epidemic broke out in Tanganyika, at a mission school.  The students began laughing, and continued to laugh for up to 16 days.  The laughing spread to other schools and the surrounding area, up to a radius of 100 miles from the school at which it began.  Subsequently, the laughing stopped.  The cause of the laughter is not definitely known.  I know I laugh whenever I think of nuns meowing together, but stop when I'm distracted from the thought of them.

These kind of outbreaks of hysteria are no longer attributed to demons.  Instead, anxiety, stress, psychosis and such are said to be causes.  Perhaps there's some kind of herd instinct involved.  We live in anxious and stressful times.  The hysteria, or whatever it may be, that spread centuries ago, whether by contagion or some other means, spread in a sense by contact or encounter with other people inexplicably dancing, meowing or biting.  The technology of those times limited exposure.  There's no limit now to exposure to the irrational.

So we have copycat killers or terrorists, who may find the details of the crimes of others easily.  All of us may witness the disturbing conduct of others, their speech and writing, instantly and directly, no matter how mad, unsupported, malicious, deceitful or harmful it may be.  Each of us is our own censor and guide to the lunacy on display, and how will we react to it if we haven't learned to make intelligent judgments?

To put it simply, we'll dance when others dance, bite when others bite, meow when others meow merely because others are doing it as well.  There is safety in numbers, and safety from the world when there are many we can join in disregarding it by denying it and pretending it to be otherwise.  Those who engaged in mass hysteria in the past were for the most part poorer and less educated than we are.  Their lives were shorter due to lack of good medical care and hygiene; they had much to fear, and there was much to cause anxiety.

That's not the case now, but judging from what we see and hear and do there's much to be afraid of in these times.  Perhaps that which drives people to see conspiracies everywhere regardless of evidence, consider convicted criminals as hostages for no good reason, classify slavery as something which could have been negotiated, and believe whatever it is certain people tell them to believe, is similar to what made them dance, bite, meow and do other ridiculous things.  Maybe it's a reaction in response to fear and anxiety which defies reason, and is a kind of escape.

How will artists depict the collective lunacy of our times?