As Flies to Wanton Boys

The belief in a loving deity, one that created the universe and we humans, one that is good, one that responds to prayers, intervenes in the universe and our lives, has always posed a certain difficulty to any thinking person.  The difficulty arises from the fact that a thinking person cannot help but feel that the universe is in some respects, perhaps in many respects, not good at all.  Bad things happen.

Most importantly as far as we're concerned, bad things happen to us.  Those bad things are not necessarily caused by other people, and so it can't be said that some person or persons are to blame.  The blame for natural disasters, if it's appropriate to speak of blame in connection with them, clearly must lie with something more than human, or at least other than human.

The "Problem of Evil" as it has been called necessarily arises in regard to this belief.  Why would such a God allow evil things to exist, to happen?  There have been several responses to this problem.  One has been to respond as does Shakespeare's Duke of Gloucester in King Lear, and to maintain that there is no such God, and there is instead a God or gods for which we are nothing more than flies are to wanton boys, and who kill us for their sport.

Another response is to ascribe the evil of the world to a supernatural being such as the devil.  This doesn't do much to address the issue, though, if that being is subject to God; a lesser being.  Then the question simply becomes why does God let the devil cause evil?  If such a being is claimed to be an equal--a kind of rival--to a loving God, God isn't necessarily responsible for evil directly or indirectly.  However, in that case God isn't all-powerful, either, and God's omnipotence is something most believers revel in; so, this Manichean approach isn't favored by most.

Then there is the option which posits that we are the cause of evil.  Perhaps we brought it into the world, or Adam and Eve did, and we are tainted by their Original Sin.  This approach isn't entirely satisfactory, though, as it doesn't account for the evil (suffering) which results from natural disasters.  But there are some, of course, who think we cause those as well, usually by being bad in some fashion.  Sexual misconduct seems preferred as a cause for hurricanes and fire from the sky, but in any event we act wrongly in some sense and God punishes us through manipulation of natural forces, and such punishment is just.

A kind of catch-all or what perhaps may be called a default response is that what we perceive as evil isn't evil in fact.  It is actually good for some reason we're too dense or limited to comprehend, but is manifest to God.  Thus there is no "Problem of Evil" as there is no evil.  There is merely the working of God which will eventually, perhaps in a time so far distant as to be beyond the insight of humanity, result in good.

There is a problem even with this latter response, though, and that is probably a consequence of the fact that what we tend to think of as "good" is what would be good for us humans, i.e. what we perceive to be good.  What good, so to speak, would what God may have determined is a good result for the universe do us if it is millennia or millions of years in the future, when we may not even be around as a species?

Perhaps we can get around that problem by believing the universe was made just for us or with us being utmost in God's mind.  In that case, what is ultimately good must be good as far as we are concerned.  Or perhaps we can claim that once dead, we become immortal, and will experience and benefit from the ultimately good outcome of the universe.

Clearly, the belief in a personal God possessing human characteristics or concerns regarding fate, good and evil, results in complications of this kind.  The more speculations and arguments are required to explain or justify what happens in life from such a perspective, the less justifiable such a belief becomes, it would seem.  Or the more mysterious life and the deity become.

Perhaps the recent popularity of Stoicism as a quasi-religious view is in reaction to the manifold machinations required to make sense of the universe given belief in a personal, human though superhuman God.  A God immanent in the universe wouldn't necessarily create the universe for a particular purpose or end.  Being immanent in a universe of unimaginable size, such a God wouldn't have peculiarly human concerns or desires and wouldn't be concerned in any particular sense with humanity.  But as a part of the universe ourselves, we participate in God and by exercising our reason, our peculiar ability, we act in accord with our nature and that of the universe.

Such a belief at least prohibits us from thinking ourselves flies to wanton boys, and other things.

The Problem of Good

We're all familiar enough (perhaps all too familiar) with the Problem of Evil.  Some, like Mr. Santorum, will attribute at least part of the responsibility for evil to Satan, who for one reason or another is evil and so seeks to do evil, avidly, and who for one reason or another is allowed to do evil by an all-powerful God who is not at all evil.  Some will maintain evil is but the result of God's goodness, as that goodness would not be recognizable but for evil.  Some will argue that it is the result of free will, with which we are endowed, again, for one reason or another.

To the extent that evil is associated with the undeniable fact that things that do us harm happen, and creatures including our fellow humans exist and do us harm, however, most of us will agree at least that there is evil and it is a problem.  Most of us will also agree that there is good, but will not think of it as a problem.

Good is not a problem because good is consistent with the conception of God as good and desiring, or propagating, good.  If God were evil, then good would be a problem in the sense that evil is problem.  And we would likely in that case argue about the Problem of Good; how is it that an all-powerful evil God permits good things to happen?  Perhaps we would refer to a Good Satan in that event.

If evil is associated with what does us harm, though, good is associated with what benefits us.  Good can be as fortuitous as evil.  Natural events over which we have no control can benefit us as well as harm us.  So can the intentional actions of our fellow humans.

Evil becomes the "Problem" it has been referred to over the centuries because of the presumption that God and/or the universe is ultimately good.  Good would be an equivalent "Problem" if we presumed that God and/or the universe is ultimately evil.  Absent our imposition of these attributes on God and/or the universe, there would be no "problem" with which to concern ourselves.

There is a problem with the "Problem" and with similar problems.  It is that they are abstract in the worst sense of that word.  Though derived from our experience of concrete realities, they are disconnected from them.  They do not involve minimizing the harm that evil does, or maximizing the benefits resulting from evil.  Though ostensibly addressed to the determination of the cause or reason for evil, their resolution--if they can be resolved--will have no effect on the events which compel us to propound them.  We will continue to experience harm regardless of whether evil is an independent supernatural force like Satan, or due to original sin, or anything else.

Words like "maximize" or "minimize" are disdained by the great thinkers among us as they are associated with common problems, not ultimate ones.  But there are some evils we can minimize or even prevent, regardless of the ultimate origin of evil. I think it is clear that we should emphasize addressing common problems.  Perhaps we'll find that when common problems have been resolved the ultimate ones will no longer interest us.

Haiti and the Problem of Evil/Suffering

The great earthquake of Lisbon is said to have prompted a great deal of thought regarding the Problem of Evil, or Suffering.  Perhaps that of Haiti should do the same.  In any case, it's prompting thought by me.

I suppose one possible "answer" to the question would be that of the jovial Mr. Robertson.  An omnipotent, all-knowing God, very capable of intervening in his creation, cannot be blamed for what happens to those who strike deals with the devil--they are themselves to blame for what happens to them, or at best (?) the devil is to blame (though the devil, one would think, if he is as traditionally described, would be content with tormenting the souls of the Haitians throughout eternity; visiting an earthquake upon them in addition to eternal torment would seem something of a breach of contract).

Presumably, then, Robertson's response would be that God does not create evil--his erring human creations do, with or without the assistance of another of God's creations, the devil, who is very able but also, of course, doomed to failure, because God is good, not evil, and God trumps Satan.

God, therefore, has granted us free will, and if we misuse it that is not God's fault.  We create evil in the world, or evil is the result of the acts of another (but to God necessarily lesser) power.

Then again, it must be noted that except perhaps in the increasingly unusual mind of Mr. Robertson, this was a natural disaster--it was not man-made, and need not have been Satan-made.  The result is terrible, but it was not intended, by anyone.  So, it cannot propertly be said to be evil, or the result of evil intent.

I've always found such answers (and every answer to the Problem of which I'm aware) to be unsatisfactory.  If we assume that God has the power to intervene in creation, the question is not merely whether he is the cause of evil/suffering, but if he is not the cause why he allows it to happen when he could prevent it.  Let's say that certain Haitians made a deal with the devil more than two hundered years ago.  God, presumably, was well aware of the fact that this would (somehow) result in this earthquake, and could have prevented it, avoiding the death and suffering which have resulted.  He allowed it to occur, however.  Or, God well knew that the natural disaster would occur, could have prevented it but did not do so.

What are we to conclude?  That he so valued the free will of the Haitians who stuck the deal with the devil (and the free will of humans generally if that is the true cause of evil) that he feels bound to allow the resulting evil to take place?  Why, then, does he value free will to such an extent as to have allowed it to cause such pain and death throughout history?  If the devil is the cause of evil, why grant him full reign?  Why does God feel that nature must take its course even if that course causes terrible pain and the death of thousands?

The answers to the Problem usually given, then, are not answers at all, as they simply create more questions, which ultimately lead to a single question:  "Why?"  And the response to that question is an appeal to mystery, or the fact that we cannot know; or perhaps a response that everything is ultimately for the good, but we can't know how because only God can, and such.  Or perhaps that God loves us so much that he granted us free will even though he knew it would result in evil.  The Problem is thus answered by being evaded through speculation.

Or, I suppose, it would be possible to maintain that God, though Good, is indifferent to his creation.  He is a kind of divine version of Tom Lehrer's Werner von Braun ("once the rockets go up, who cares where they come down?").  Or, that he cannot intervene, in which case he is a kind of lesser God.

Not satisfying at all, are they?