On Tolerance and Timidity

Tolerance can be a virtue.  But tolerance should be reasonable.  There are certain views, and conduct, which need not be tolerated.  There are even some which should not be tolerated, in a certain sense.  There are circumstances where intolerance is justified.

There would seem to be nothing prima facie objectionable about the first two sentences above, from a common-sense standpoint.  The status of the following three sentences, though, appears to be questionable, or seems at least to be questioned, in these interesting times.

Judging from conversations with my own children, they if not others are being taught that it is inappropriate to make judgments, particularly about people, religions (or religious beliefs) and what may be described, in general terms, as culture.  This is not necessarily a new development.  Indeed, judgment or the act of judging has traditionally been denigrated; one has only to visit one of the many archives of famous and not-so-famous quotations on the Internet to find quote after quote taken from the famous and not-so-famous warning of the impropriety of judging anyone, or anything.

Expressing caution regarding the making of judgments, and exercising caution in making them, seems laudable enough.  The danger is that we may come to believe that they should not or cannot be made, or that even though we cannot avoid making them, it is impossible to make reasonable judgments.

Thinking can be hard, but it can be valuable.  I confess I wonder if there is behind certain excessive views of tolerance and certain criticisms of judging a prejudice against thought, particularly against the use of reason and intelligence in thought.  One finds this prejudice particularly, it seems, among those who profess (usually loudly and continually) to be various sorts of relativists or nihilists, or to be especially learned, generally in my experience in certain academic subjects, or who frequent certain electronic forums.

Person X wonders if it is wrong to long for the deaths of millions as it would make life "better"; or if the Nazis were really evil; or if murder is wrong, or torture, or whatever.  Is it necessary to tolerate such nonsense in the sense of accepting them as entirely appropriate expressions of opinion which may or may not be valid, worthy of discussion?  Cannot one be free to reject them, denounce them, even loathe them without being considered "intolerant" or "judgmental"?  Isn't one justified by not tolerating them, in such a fashion?

This is not to say that such idiotic thoughts should be regulated or suppressed by the state.  Fools should be free to be fools, provided they do no harm (and harm should not include hurt feelings or injured pride when it comes to the exercise of governmental powers).  But at the same time, there is nothing wrong with pointing out that certain opinions and conduct are objectionable, and that they are sometimes very objectionable.  They need not be accepted, or tolerated, as no better or no worse than any other thought or action.  There seems to be a kind of intellectual cowardice involved in certain forms of "toleration."

Tolerance and Hypocrisy

Is it possible to take position "A" and, at the same time tolerate position "not A" (-A)?  If so, to what extent may one tolerate, without being hypocritical, or at least so inconsistent as to be justly criticized?

These seem to be questions we may be compelled to address with greater frequency in these increasingly contentious times.  And, though I've posed them abstractly here, they're intended to address disputes we must deal with, or are at least confronted with, on a day to day basis, e.g. political, social and religious issues.  "Confronted" in the sense that they are hurled at us by eager adherents of opposite positions from almost every side given the technology of communication.

X claims that God exists (or perhaps that a particular God does so; say a God worshipped by an established institutional religion).  Y disagrees.  May X and Y tolerate each other despite their disagreement?  Should they respect each other in spite of their disagreement?

If X begins hectoring Y, trying to induce him to accept X's God, or if Y begins hectoring X to accept that there is no God, it would seem that in either case the one being hectored could legitmately resent it.  If either sought to impose his/her position on the other, it would be legitimate to object.  This seems obvious enough.

What if X asks Y to attend some religious ceremony, or Y asks X to accompany him to a speech by [insert name of prominent atheist]?  I'd say there is nothing a priori objectionable in either case, and the manner of the response would, I think, vary with the circumstances, and how the request is made. In other words, if Y decided to attend the ceremony, or X the speech, I would contend that neither are necessarily hypocrites, or being untrue to themselves or their beliefs, by doing so.  If either chooses to do as they are asked out of friendship, or respect, for example, they are not legitimately subject to criticism.

To criticize in such or similar circumstances seems to me a function of absolutism, regardless of the nature of the request made or position taken.  It also would seem to be the result of needless concern with things beyond our control, which should be anathema to stoics, but also, I think, to any reasonable person, and (by definition, of course!) to any pragmatist, who will make decisions based on an an intelligent consideration of each situation, not according to some preset standard which is unquestioned.  Generally, religious, political or social beliefs and positions will not be objectionable in and of themselves (there can be exceptions, obviously).  Instead, the conduct of those who accept them may be objectionable.

There is no reason why X who accepts A must object every time -A rears its head.