"The Gun is Good"

Has anyone (else) seen the movie Zardoz?  It's title character is an enormous flying head, apparently made from stone, which is God or at least represents God in yet another post-apocalyptic world of the kind we like to envision now and then.  Although it has an angry look, it floats about serenely, coming to rest eventually among a crowd of men riding horses and shouting its name.  From its mouth it more or less vomits firearms among its worshippers, bellowing "The Gun is Good!" among other things.  This is, as I recall, the opening scene.

The movie stars Sean Connery, wearing a very silly costume, and Charlotte Rampling "as a bit of tail" as Monty Python would say, and others.  Zardoz provides guns to men who keep slavish serf types in line while they grow food for a group of women and less than virile men (compared to Sean) who rule over them.  I forget why, or how, and most of the movie.  I am fond of the big stone head, however, which you may find easily enough via Google or some other browser.  It appears sad in some way, but very angry because it is sad, and so seems to simultaneously cry and roar ferociously.  I sometimes wish I could find a Zardoz mask to wear.

The head sticks in my mind, as does the phrase "The Gun is Good!"  It seems to express a sentiment which many hold today in our Great Republic, that Americans should own guns.  Why some of us have this sentiment is something I'd like to explore, however briefly, in this post.

I'm the owner of a shotgun, with which I shoot clay pigeons or discs.  I enjoy owning and shooting this firearm.  I even enjoy cleaning it, more or less.  I like the way it looks, feels and handles.  Based on these feelings, I suppose it would be appropriate to say that I find it "good" to own and use the gun, in a fairly limited sense.  The "good" I would refer to, though, would merely express my pleasure in its ownership and use.  It would be "good" in the same sense food would be "good" in my opinion if I enjoyed it.

No doubt other gun owners feel much the same about their firearms.  But the sentiment I refer to now is plainly more than that. 

Guns in America are not merely enjoyable.  Owning a firearm is considered a right, established in the Constitution, of course, but the fact that one has a right to own a firearm doesn't mean one should own one.  That, however, is what is now being claimed. 

The Second Amendment plays its part in the conception of the gun as good.  This is because it's thought that grants us a right which, unlike other rights, is not paired with an obligation or duty to others, but instead is derived from a perceived need.  The need is no longer associated with keeping us from hunger, so the gun isn't good because we need it to survive.  We need to have a legal right to own firearms in order to protect ourselves, not from others but from the government itself.  Owning guns has somehow become essential to our liberty.  The gun is good not just to put food on the table as once was the case, or because it may be used in hunting or sport.  It is good as laws limiting the power of government are good, to prevent tyranny.

By virtue of this conception of the Second Amendment, the gun has become a kind of totem.  It is a peculiarly American emblem of freedom.

Although many of those urging us to buy guns are associated in various respects with gun manufacturers, and so may be considered mere shills and salesmen, the "sales pitch" made isn't typical given the great status of the gun in our society.  We're not being told we should buy a gun because we'll enjoy having one as we can engage in sport shooting or hunting.  Those doing the urging aren't trying to exploit our sense of pleasure, or that is in any case not the focus of their efforts.   They tell us we should have guns to protect ourselves and our families.  Of course, we have a duty to protect our families.  Having a gun is good as well as it allows us to comply with that duty.

More than this, they tell us we should have them so that we may participate in the effort to stop assorted bad people who would shoot us; terrorists and the mentally ill, and perhaps even common criminals, all of whom have guns themselves.  Even certain members of law enforcement now claim that we should have guns, as we cannot rely on law enforcement to protect us fully, or can aid them by using guns before they arrive on the scene.

So, the gun is not a tool it's good to have, or something good to have so that we may use it to enjoy hunting or sport shooting.  It's good to have because it is associated with America itself, and the founding of America.  It's good to have because it protects our liberties and our families.  It's good to have because it will allow us to become active participants in the struggle against evil.  For these reasons, we should have guns. 

Are they good reasons?  As to the Second Amendment, I don't think it can be ignored that at the time of its adoption, the likelihood is that most everyone had guns and most everyone used them.  However, it's unlikely that, after the Revolution, they were used for the purpose it's being claimed led to its adoption.  They were probably used to hunt, for food, and to kill vermin.  They may have been used now and then during duels.  They could well have been used to kill Native Americans.  They were very useful in ways in which they're for the most part no longer used.  Far more useful than they are now.

Everyone having guns, the demand being at least as great if not greater than the supply, I doubt the Second Amendment served the purpose of motivating the acquisition of guns, as it's being used now.   To the extent there was a concern over government tyranny, I think the concern was related to the possible confiscation of guns already possessed, not the need to acquire more guns.  It was good to have guns, but not necessarily good to get more guns.

As to the need to protect ourselves, our families, and participate in the struggle against evil, one would think that in order to do so effectively something more than the mere possession of guns would be required.  We would have to learn something about using them and trained to use them well.  Those urging us to get guns don't seem inclined to urge us to do that, though certain of them want us to carry them around with us.  The lack of emphasis on responsible and efficient use of firearms is disturbing.  There also seems to be a lack of evidence that citizens owning guns, or even carrying them, prevents gun violence or inhibits evildoers.

If the gun is good as claimed, shouldn't there be good reasons for that claim?

The Christmas Conglomerate

Let's escape, however briefly, the vast Fun house of our national politics and the distorted images of human beings (the candidates) lurking there for our amusement and dismay.  It's time, once again, to consider--or at least appear to consider, or say we're considering--the True Meaning of Christmas.

Just what the True Meaning of Christmas (TMOC)  is may be a subject of some dispute.  Generally, though, it's thought to have something to do with Jesus Christ, or Christianity in one form of another, and may actually be about them for that hour or two many of us attend church services.  They of course are also subjects of some dispute, and have been from the beginning.

So the popular claim we should "put Christ back in Christmas" provides little guidance to those seeking or saying they seek TMOC.  It's unclear, though, that those who demand Christ be "put back" believe they require any guidance in this respect, and it's likely they're unaware of any dispute regarding Christ or Christianity.  Arius, Pelagius and the many others disputants are probably unknown to most of them.  We may be reasonably certain they've heard of Martin Luther and John Calvin, however, and some even of John Wesley.

Also generally, TMOC is thought to have something to do with peace on earth and good will towards men, possibly even by those who don't think Christ needs to be put back in Christmas or anywhere else.  In any case, TMOC is normally believed to have little if anything to do with Santa Claus or anything commercial, as such things, though they may have meaning in themselves and indeed are prevalent, even omnipresent, at this time, nonetheless lack True Meaning.  In fact, TMOC is said to be significant because it has nothing to do with them.

But it's hard to ignore what has become increasingly clear regarding Christmas, its celebration, iconography and mythology.  That is, that we humans have been involved in celebrating this time of the year for countless thousands of years and were doing so long before Jesus or even Abraham were heard of, and that those celebrations had much in common with what takes place now.  Christmas is a relatively new development with very old features.  Christmas is in fact a relatively new way of characterizing a very old tradition and celebration; one that was old when Christianity came to exist.

It's doubtful anyone living believes Jesus was actually born on December 25.  It was decided his birth should be celebrated on that date long after he died.  The early Christians were diligent, even ruthless, in their suppression of pagan beliefs, but could do nothing to alter the arrival of the winter solstice or the fact that it had been celebrated for many, many years as the time at which Light inexorably began its triumph over Dark, and the Sun born or reborn.

The winter solstice had long been considered for obvious reasons a time for celebration of Helios, Sol Invictus, Mithras and other gods associated with the Sun.  These gods were worshiped during Christianity's development in the Roman Empire; other Sun gods were worshiped outside the Empire, and before it.

Early Christian leaders and thinkers were no doubt aware of the fact that Mithras was claimed to have been born on December 25th, in the presence of shepherds and three kings.  The Church Fathers were disturbed by many things about the worship of Mithras, which included a sacred communal meal of bread and wine, the bread marked with crosses according to certain depictions of the ritual.  They were also no doubt aware the winter solstice was a time for gift-giving, for the Saturnalia in fact, when the roles of master and slave were reversed.

I'm not one who thinks that but for an accident or two, Mithras would have become universally worshipped in the West rather than Christ.  Males only were allowed to become initiates to his mysteries, and it seems clear women played a significant role in Christianity's triumph over its rivals.  I don't think we would be setting up figurines of Mithras and his bull, Helios, Cautes and Cautopates instead of manger scenes if things went a bit differently 1700 years ago.

So I doubt December 25 was chosen as the day of Christ's birth solely because it was the birthday of Mithras.  But as the winter solstice was a time for universal celebration in the society in which Christianity was born and, as it were, raised, it made considerable sense for the early Church to choose it as the time at which Christ's birth would be celebrated.  It was plainly a major social and cultural event already, with significant religious overtones; it was ideal for the purpose.  And like Christianity itself, Christmas took on aspects of pagan worship and culture.  In a sense, Christ was put into Christmas, or Christmas-time, long ago.  There was a time when Christ was new to the party; a latecomer.  The Christmas we know is a conglomerate, as is Christianity.

Helios/Sol Invictus/Mithras/Jesus and their predecessor gods have been part of what we call Christmas-time for thousands of years.  The religious tone of the time is well-established and unquestionable.  More interesting is the association of Christmas-time with "peace on earth, good will towards men."

That phrase is claimed to have been part of a statement made by angels to duly astonished shepherds during the Annunciation; the announcement of the birth of Jesus.  Here there is also a dispute, however.  The dispute is over the correct translation of what was said by the angels from the original Greek of the New Testament.  Pagans of the time thought the Gospels to have been written by persons whose Greek was very bad, but I don't know if that was truly the case or whether it would make a difference in this case.

It seems that more ancient versions of the text are believed by scholars to be more appropriately translated as "peace to those men with whom God/Jesus is pleased" or words to that effect.  Peace, therefore, is bestowed on those who have the good will of God/Jesus.  This is a different sentiment of the season than that with which most of us are familiar.  If we're to have good will towards men (instead of God having that good will), it may be we shouldn't have good will towards all men at Christmas-time, but only to those men who please God.  As the statement is made in connection with the birth of Jesus, it would seem those who please God are those who believe in Jesus as God.

If this is correct, TMOC wouldn't be good will, friendliness towards, or tolerance of all, but only of Christians.  A sobering thought for those of us who have believed good will was to be extended to all at this time of the year, but one that may make more sense given the context in which the Gospel was written.  Is this in fact the True Meaning?

Merry Christmas to all.  Perhaps.  But whether the good will we're supposed to feel at this time of the year is towards all or only a portion of humanity, we may be grateful, as the great Tom Lehrer sang regarding National Brotherhood Week, that Christmas-time doesn't last all year.

Fear is an Idiot

Fear is much on my mind these days, or I should say the prevalence of fear.  More specifically, the prevalence of fear here, in God's favorite country.

I suppose this is to be expected now, as we are in the midst of a seemingly endless political campaign for the presidency.  The great Sage of Baltimore, H.L. Mencken, noted that it is the goal of practical politics to keep the people alarmed, and our politicians, practical or not, are busy doing so, none so diligently than Mr. Trump.  Mencken also knew (and said) that people value security more than liberty.  Napoleon commented that the two levers which move mankind are fear and self interest.

One can of course find other quotes about fear with considerable celerity, thanks to the Internet.  But one which seems particularly appropriate at this time is the statement by Ambrose Bierce to the effect that fear has no brain, and is an idiot.

Bierce was no stranger to fear, having fought in several battles of the Civil War, including the battle of "Bloody Shiloh."  He seems to have been reasonably successful in keeping his wits about him during combat, but there's every reason to believe he was correct in concluding, as I think he did, that those overwhelmed by fear are thereby overwhelmed by stupidity as well.

These are fearful times; quite literally fear-full.  The fear seems to arise more and more from the random violence which results from, or is inspired by, terrorism.  If the fear is also caused by random violence otherwise inspired, though, it seems that fear is given less attention, particularly if that fear relates to the use of firearms by those who are not terrorists.

The surplus of fear  may be due to the fact that in the politics of the moment, simple answers are sought, but not sought as much as simple characterization of problems.  Good and bad, black and white, Muslim and Christian, Americans and immigrants.  It's desirable to characterize these problems in a simple manner as by doing so our politicians--and media--may better maintain that they may be answered simply as well, and whine when they aren't answered quickly.  Simple answers to complex problems are stupid answers, but stupid answers appeal to the fearful, fear being, as Bierce noted, an idiot.

Sadly, among the Republicans, many seem enamored of a man whose political ability and acumen (for all I know he is a very able businessman) seem to me equivalent to that of the know-it-all one may always find at the local bar, and who is likely to respond much as that know-it-all would to questions after perhaps three drinks.  That is to say, loudly and without thought.  His popularity may be attributable to the fact fear has no brain. It's to be hoped that such an individual won't become president, but fear being an idiot anything is possible.  It's disturbing that it seems many understand him to be dangerous, but it doesn't seem to matter.  It must be wondered whether Mencken was correct about democracy and that we will, inevitably, eventually elect a moron to the presidency. 

That fear is an idiot may work to the advantage of our politicians, but provides us with little hope of resolving the problems we face.  It may instead lead to more problems, or rather an increase of problems of the kind we experience.  Events such as that which took place in San Bernadino seem to have at least one predictable result; the increase in the sale of firearms.

The possession of firearms isn't, to me, objectionable in itself.  But I think when fearful people have firearms, it's likely they will use them and use them ineptly, accepting as I do Bierce's description of fear.  I question whether those who buy firearms out of fear will go to the trouble of learning how to use them well and safely. I also think it likely that angry people will use them if and when they can, if they're very angry.  Anger may be an idiot as well.

FDR famously noted in those bleak times that we had nothing to fear but fear itself.  Sadly, fear itself gives us good cause to fear in these all too interesting times.

Anachronism, Stupidity and Futility

Certain of the more self-righteous and, I think, tiresome students (and professors?) at some institutions of higher education in our Glorious Republic, who evidently are not preoccupied by their studies, have taken to demanding that the names and statues of significant historical figures be removed from sight.  At Princeton, for example, the name and likenesses of Woodrow Wilson offend them; at The College of William and Mary and apparently elsewhere, that of Thomas Jefferson should be purged, or so it's urged.  They were racists, you see.

It must be wondered whether The College of William and Mary should be required to change its name as well, as it's quite certain that both William and Mary were racists under the current definition. The George Washington University, of course, is particularly problematic. 

I should note that I'm not very fond of either Wilson or Jefferson.  Wilson was a pompous ass in many respects, an egotist and a pretentious one to boot.  Lloyd George and Clemenceau made him look like a fool at Versailles nonetheless.  His messianic conceits so annoyed those in Congress that most of his plans came to naught. By all rights he should have resigned due to his incapacity after his return to the United States, but instead allowed his wife to act as President.

Jefferson was without question a man of genius, but he was also without question a hypocrite of the highest order, who did his best to rule as a tyrant once he obtained the presidency.  Although himself adept at defamation, he objected to criticism of any kind, and at one point even sought to change the law so that truth was no defense to libel.  His conduct in the matter of Aaron Burr was reprehensible for its disregard of the law.

It happens they were also racist.  But while I dislike Wilson and Jefferson (and racism) I dislike anachronism as well, except sometimes in works of science fiction.

What is interesting about this interest in erasure of references to figures of the past is that but a short time ago, relatively speaking, all or most people were racist.  Many still are.  If all who were racist are unworthy of honor, then it's arguably the case that nobody except some of those who have been alive in the past 50 years are worthy of honor, because only certain of those people would not be deemed racist by those who employ that term now.  Though it may be a surprise to those who seek to purge college campuses at this time, racism isn't exclusively European in origin.  All peoples have, at one time or another, thought strangers inferior and contemptible.

So those qualities of Wilson and Jefferson which cause students to fume at this time were likely shared by everyone in recorded history, except some of those of the current generation and possibly some of the last generation. The question arises:  Is it appropriate to condemn all those who have ever lived, or at least not to display them on university grounds, except those who lived recently, because they failed to believe as some of us do now? 

Curiously, it's probable that those who presume to judge those of the past by the standards of the present wouldn't dream of judging those living now by any standard.  They've been taught not to judge.  At least, they've been taught not to judge those living now because they believe or think differently.   Differently, that is, from those who are European or of European descent, whom the naive believe are the only racists ever to live on this planet.

There's apparently something about the dead that renders them subject to judgment due to their failure to recognize what has only been recently recognized by we the living.  And we came to recognize the evil of racism only after a long, hard and continuing struggle, usually by those who are dead as well.  We have no cause to be self-righteous; our enlightenment isn't our achievement, and it's fundamentally unfair to blame those who didn't have the benefit of our knowledge for failing to have our knowledge.

It is stupid to apply the standards of the present to the past because that is simply to fail to know and understand the past, thus dooming ourselves to repeat it, as Santayana put it.  It is futile to do so because it achieves nothing of significance now.

Wilson and Jefferson and the billions of others who have lived are not honored, or even thought of, for their racist views if they are thought of at all.  Those who do think of them for any extended period of time are most likely professors and students, who are of course exempt from criticism being the critics themselves and presumptively free of racism.  Taking names off buildings and pulling down statues won't make anybody less racist or more tolerant, as satisfying as those acts may be to those who deal in appearances and little else. 

"In Times of War, the Law is Silent"

Cicero, in his speech normally referred to as Pro Milone, spoke the words which serve as the title to this post.  Well, being a Roman of the first century B.C.E., he actually said "inter arma enim silent leges" or at least that is how his words have come down to us.  The speech was given and the words were spoken in favor of the Roman politician Milo (Titus Annius Milo) and against Publius Clodius Pulcher (not to be confused with Publius Claudius Pulcher, who as I've mentioned before I admire for his treatment of the sacred chickens).

The speech was given during a time when both Clodius and Milo were inflaming the Roman mob, driving it to a most impressive spree of violence in favor of the political factions they represented.  They also hired armed mercenaries to threaten one another, and we're told gladiators were brought to sessions of the Senate to cow senators into compliance.  Clodius was eventually killed, and Cicero defended Milo, who was charged with the murder of Clodius.  In his defense, Cicero did not bother claiming Milo was not involved in the killing, and instead claimed that it was necessary, and lawful self-defense, in a time of emergency.  In fact, "war" wasn't referred to by Cicero, but arms were (arma) and in Latin silent doesn't mean "silent" but rather "mute."

Cicero himself, while consul, with the approval of the Senate condemned Roman citizens to death without trial during the time of the Cataline conspiracy against the Roman Republic.  No doubt he felt the law was silent at that time as well. 

It must be acknowledged that since these words were spoken, they and the rule they state have often come to mind and been relied on by those in power (and others) whenever there is armed conflict and the belief is that laws applicable in times of peace must stand mute until the conflict is resolved.  That was the case after 9/11, and long before that.  It's likely that will be the case again regarding the terrorist attacks in Paris.

Do these attacks indicate that this is a time when law, or some laws, should be silenced?  This should be decided as soon as possible, I think.  Otherwise, response to the threat will be haphazard, and it's likely nothing will be achieved of lasting effect.  Our leaders will end up doing what they always do, and blame one another for the lack of success while people die.

Anyone with due regard for the rule of law must find the claim made by Cicero to be disturbing.  I for one am disturbed, but not merely by the fact that the claim, if true, allows for the waiver of the laws, but because such waiver--a deliberate failure to enforce or honor the law--may actually be necessary, or at least prudent, in extreme circumstances.  There is a danger that those who waive the law may do so unwisely, or solely for their own benefit, or as part of scheme of oppression, or maliciously  There is also a danger that a failure to waive legal restrictions may lead to grievous harm.

It seems clear that Cicero didn't mean that all laws are silent in times of conflict or emergency, and there is no reason to believe that is how the statement should be interpreted.  But depending upon the nature of the emergency, it's unsurprising and not necessarily wrong if certain laws are deemed not to apply in certain circumstances.  Whether that should be the case and, if so, what laws are to be disregarded, is a matter of the greatest significance and should be the subject of careful consideration.

It's unlikely there will be careful consideration, though, or indeed intelligent consideration of any kind, with respect to any response.  Responses to attacks of this kind are visceral, and this also is understandable.  They cannot be tolerated or justified; they must cease.  Perhaps the world at large will finally understand, now,  the magnitude of the evil of these primitives and their death cult and make a unified effort to rid us of them, setting aside selfish concerns and quests for power.

If it is decided that laws should become silent, it should be recognized that this should be the case only because a crisis is of such significance that it should be deemed war or the equivalent of war.  Is that a commitment we wish to make?  It seems we've been putting that off, at least as to the current threat, and possibly as to others if by war we mean a national devotion to the conflict. If we are willing to commit to it, what will we do in pursuing the war?

The tendency is to demand that the threat be destroyed through the use of "any means necessary."  This is a thoughtless response, and generally merely indicates we don't know what means to employ.  Thus we've sanctioned torture in the past, and some still do and will, despite the fact that it's usefulness (if not its morality) has been questioned even by those who have not hesitated to make war, like Napoleon.  Sometimes, it seems, we're impressed by responses only if they're ruthless.  But it shouldn't be the ruthlessness of a response that is valued.  It should be valued only if it is effective, and a thoughtless response is bound to be ineffective.  One remembers the boastfulness behind the "shock and awe" tactics employed not all that long ago.  Those tactics seem to have had no useful result.

So chest pounding and loud, flashy tactics will do us little good.  If this is the great fight of our times, then it should be treated as such, and a sustained and devastating response made, not a piecemeal one.  However, it's doubtful there will be such a response unless it becomes a coordinated effort by all nations with an interest in the area, and that for good or ill should include those nations which maintain they are Islamic.  If they refuse to contribute, though, the response must still be made.  Either that, or we continue to be subject to such attacks, doing the best we can to avoid them.

What of the law in all this?  Well, it's unclear just what laws would be subject to consideration and waiver at this time, except those applicable to privacy and those related to the conduct of war and the treatment of prisoners.  We've already evidenced a disregard for laws impacting those issues, though, without putting the nation on a war footing.  However, it's conceivable that others, such as those prohibiting discrimination, would come under scrutiny.   Is there such a thing as "profiling" at a time of crises?  is there a legal obligation to take in refugees?  To what extent are the boundaries of sovereign nations to be honored?  Should we restrict or prohibit immigration?

If this is the great fight of our times, then it is inevitable that laws will be found to conflict with war aims.  We must be prepared to address that conflict as well.  But all this comes into play only when we've decided what our response will be.

For a response of such magnitude that it will bring the law into scrutiny and require a national commitment, it seems clear to me that Congress must be involved.  That would be a "real war", and it is the Congress which has the power to declare a real war, though it has shirked this terrible duty often in the past by granting war powers to the Executive.  All our elected representatives should be held responsible for such a decision.

Tempus Fugit

The title to this post is also that of one of my favorite Miles Davis tunes.  It means, of course, "time flies" but may have been derived from a line in Virgil's Georgics--Fugit Irreparabile Tempus.  That line has a darker meaning.  Time passes swiftly, and once it passes, is irretrievable.

The past is the great and inaccessible storehouse of our lives, and contains all our mistakes, our achievements, our actions, thoughts, and too often loved ones and friends.  It is the quintessential thing not in our control; there's nothing we can do about it.  Yet it haunts us, rides us like a hag.  It also, though, has made us what we are.  If we can control ourselves, why can't we control our past?

Well, because it's not here, though we are.  What we may say, employing metaphor, "made us" need not be here with us.  We remember the past; we don't possess it.  Remembering the past doesn't consist of living the past.  We did that already.  We can, in a sense, repeat the past, which is merely to say make mistakes we made before.

Just what the past consists of is, like so much else it seems is apparent, a subject of philosophical debate.  I doubt if it can be intelligently claimed to be anything but things that happened.  Nobody thinks the past is taking place now; nobody confuses it with what takes place now.  There seems little need to debate this, but it has been made a subject of debate.  The past isn't the books, films, sounds about the past we read, see and hear.  Again, this is an obvious conclusion.  We know the past can be misrepresented.  So can what takes place now.  There is no reason to believe the past is or is not exactly what common sense indicates is the case.  For some, of course, this only makes it a more attractive subject for consideration, common sense being prima facie deficient to certain of us.

The past is a concept regarding which I think it would be useful to apply the pragmatic maxim:  "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."

Peirce, the maker of the maxim, seems to have reconsidered it over time, and there have been those who have different ways of looking at it just as Wallace Stevens noted we may have thirteen ways of looking at a blackbird.  But it appears to me that Peirce thought of it most consistently as a method by which to make ideas clear; particularly ideas that are bandied about in philosophy.

The "past" has practical bearings to the extent it is thought of, studied, used by us, here and now.  There are various ways in which it can have practical bearings, on us and on others and on the rest of our world, which is to say that it has consequences.  There is no need that it be defined any further than that requires.  To the extent we define it otherwise, we're engaged in flights of fancy.  Such flights of fancy usually involve our tendency to think in terms of things.  Thinking of the past as a thing naturally leads one to treat it as a thing, an object regarding which we speak.

What has practical bearings is not the thing which is past, it's what happened in the past and its effects we encounter today. 

We need no flights of fancy in order to acknowledge the significance of the past.  The past is hugely significant, as it effects how we think, feel and act.  Our past, though, is in particular irretrievable and because it necessarily involves things we did or did not do, those we knew but no longer see, it is inevitably a source of regret though it may also, sometimes, be a source of be a source of fondness.  There are good memories as well as bad.  But we humans tend to do or not do more that we regret than we are proud of, and when we regret what we did or did not do that regret arises from our sense of responsibility.

What's done cannot be undone.  This is the tragedy of the time-bound.  We can't avoid the mistakes we've already made and the consequences of those mistakes can only, at best, be mitigated. 

Reason and its Enemies

Richard Wolin, a professor of history and comparative literature at City University of New York, has written an interesting book entitled The Seduction of Unreason:  The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism.  Although its title is cumbersome (it seems authors these days must include explanatory subtitles, as it were, following colons, in every book title) the writing is not.  It's a lengthy book, but unfortunately there's much to tell.

The title of the book is, shall we say, suggestive of its argument.  If it had been written by an American or English philosopher, continental philosophers and their followers here would likely ignore it.  But perhaps the author's status as a professor of comparative literature will lure them into reading at least summaries of the book, comparative literature buffs being far more capable philosophers than actual philosophers almost by definition as far as postmodernists are concerned.

It's not clear to me that the romance of intellectuals with autocracy began with Nietzsche.  I think certain philosophers have always had a fondness for "enlightened" despotism.  Even J.S. Mill in his more Romantic moments thought this would be beneficial, and under the influence of such as Coleridge dreamt up a kind of elite, a "clerisy", which would govern humanity wisely.  This pernicious view has been with us since Plato, at least.

But fascism is a peculiar, modern form of autocracy, a hodgepodge of political, racial, quasi-religious, quasi-philosophical and nationalistic mumbo-jumbo, and as such grew out of what I think can fairly be called the "unreason" which resulted from the reaction to the Enlightenment which has been called (not very creatively) the Counter-Enlightenment.  I personally prefer calling it the Un-Enlightenment.  Some thought that because reason, in and of itself, didn't produce a paradise here on Earth, it's opposite should be unleashed upon the world.

It turns out reason's opposite could be all kinds of things when considered by European intellectuals.  The emotions, the instincts, Jungian collective unconscious, the erotic, the spirit inherent in a particular race or purported race or nation.  Whatever was unreasonable in human beings was glorified at least as much as reason, or what was thought reason, was glorified by other European intellectuals during the Enlightenment.  This intellectual environment was ideal for the growth of fascism, a political/social/cultural philosophy dependent on the unreasonable, dismissive of moderation and tolerance, devoted to the irrational in humanity.

This led to what was extremely goofy in some cases, as Wolin points out.  There is Georges Bataille, for example, a follower of Nietzsche who was fascinated with human sacrifice.  He and others formed a little society which was devoted to the idea, if not the practice, of human sacrifice.  It seems its members were willing to be sacrificed but not inclined to perform the sacrifice, sadly.  Bataille was an influence on Foucault, who favored the Iranian revolution and the religious fascism of the Islamic clerics who took control after the Shah was overthrown, and others.  I'm not sure what was going on in the case of Bataille and sacrifice, but suspect he thought this was the sort of thing unreasonable people would and should do, which is undeniable, and that there was something mystic and pagan involved in it.

Goofiness aside, though, the emphasis on unreason motivated the endorsement of Hitler's Nazism and Mussolini's fascism by a number of thinkers dissatisfied with liberal democratic politics and values.  This is pretty well documented, and Wolin of course goes into some detail regarding famous Nazis and fellow travelers such as Heidegger and Paul de Man.

Mussolini's Italy and  Hitler's Germany were once considered models of efficiency and, it's hard to believe, physical and mental health.  It was thought that these nations had a vigor and intensity lacking in liberal democracies, for what may be considered spiritual reasons.  They were one, a people united, not chaotic in the manner of the democracies and especially the Weimer Republic.  Most importantly it seems to their intellectual devotees, they had abandoned liberal values as well; freedom, individuality, the conflict of ideas and worst of all, materialism.  Money and business have always been the subjects of contempt for the learned as well as the aristocratic.  Of course, the learned were also inclined to  associate them with Jews, themselves yet another subject of contempt.

It's quite possible to overestimate reason, and to impute too much importance to it.  It's also quite possible to underestimate the significance of the irrational in our lives.  Man cannot live by reason alone, and it may be said that the Enlightenment thinkers erred in their zealous emphasis and reliance on it to the exclusion of all else.  I think sometimes that those of the Enlightenment were drunk on their sudden freedom from the dominance of the Church.

But I find it impossible to blame the Enlightenment for the ills of our society, as it seems members of the Un-Enlightenment are inclined to do.  It isn't reason or science which motivated the Holocaust, for example.  Essential to that horror were concepts of the Volk and German Romanticism and mysticism.  They were also essential to German expansionism and sense of mastery and special  purpose; to rule the world and thereby save it.  Heidegger warned against technology but eagerly joined in the glorification of Hitler and in according him the status of a demigod.

We're at out best when we think, and as Dewey said we think when we're presented with problems.   Thinking involves problem solving and is essential to it.  We don't think when we rely on mysticism, our so-called inherent nature, our "being", our vigor, our unity, religion, our race in making decisions.  It's when we abandon reason as a means to solve problems that we produce monsters and follow them.  We become followers only, in fact, as we don't think but rather feel; followers only follow, some better than others.  Reason provides the best chance of understanding and solving the problems we face in life.

Unreason doesn't require justification.  There's no process by which those seduced by it test its results, no questions are asked as unreason isn't subject to question or for that matter definition.  Questioning, defining, testing have no place when reason isn't employed, but is instead shunned.  The result is certainty, but at a terrible price, as the certain are thoughtless, intolerant and cruel.

Now, the World Really is too Much with Us

Wordsworth's poem The World is too Much with Us is I think an admirable one.  I'm afraid that I can't normally think of Wordsworth without envisioning Bullwinkle reciting "I wandered lonely as a cloud"; but I think this Romantic English poet did a good job in the case of this one poem, at least.

The poem has been construed as being a condemnation by Wordsworth of a materialistic culture resulting from the Industrial Revolution, and the resulting disconnection of people, and civilization, from nature.  I can't complain about love of nature; as a Stoic, or struggling Stoic, I seek to live "in accordance with nature."  But I suspect most Romantics of having aristocratic, even elitist, leanings, and so tend to believe that their disgust with industry and "trade" was combined with a contempt of the "common folk."  Those folk were no longer content to be the simple, jolly peasants the Romantics dreamt they were, dancing around the Maypole when not tending the grounds and flocks of their betters through hard and uncompensated labor.  They were becoming men of business, and business was an abomination to those wandering lonely as clouds, swooning over daffodils.

What exactly Wordsworth meant by "with us" is unclear to me.  However, I feel the world is much more "with us" than it was in his day, when the world intruded upon him and others via printed word, or through trains and the telegraph.  By the world being "with us" I refer, even if Wordsworth did not, not merely to our access to information about people, places, things, events, acts, opinions, beliefs, but that such information is foisted on us by others regardless of our desires.

No doubt the ubiquity of newspapers and journals, travel and communication by train and telegraph, was remarkable to many living in the first half of the 19th century.  It may well have felt to them that the world was growing too small as a consequence compared to how it felt when travel and communication was by horseback, or perhaps by semaphore.  Perhaps they also felt that something more was lost to them than their relative isolation.

If so, they would be horrified by the accelerating reduction of the world we experience in our time.  I'm not sure they could even imagine a world in which people can obtain whatever information they seek in a matter of seconds and communicate whatever thoughts, desires, opinions, feelings they have to everyone else in the world in roughly the same period of time and in the same manner.

The world is there, with us, at all times unless we make the effort to disengage from it.  All of the world, good and bad, but most especially the bad because of the media, our politicians and the pundits who are professionally outraged and have the means to tell us so.  They seem to delight in telling us what is bad, why it is bad, and what it is they think someone else should do about it.

There certainly is bad in the world, but is there more bad than there has been in the past?  More people, more bad; this seems an unobjectionable inference, at least to a cynic.  But if one accepts such a conclusion, is there proportionately more bad now?  I don't think we can make that assumption (which is what I think it must be, absent evidence).  Because we can learn, or are told, of bad people, bad things, all over the world, constantly, and because bad people can make themselves known to others with great ease, and this was not the case not all that long ago, there may have been just as many bad people and things in the past.

 In the past, however, we did not know of them as we didn't have the means to know of them.  We knew of some, but had neither the capacity nor the desire to know of others, nor were we as vulnerable--exposed--to them as we are now.  They can appear before us at any time.  We need only participate in a social network, or expose ourselves, as it were, via Twitter, or read or make comments on some media post or blog post, to be subjected to people at their worst.

We humans seem to be unable to improve ourselves to any significant extent except in extraordinary circumstances, or indeed to change ourselves at all for good or ill, so I doubt we are any better or worse now than we have been in our relatively long and bloody history.  The difference is that when we are bad now, as we are all too frequently, it is nearly impossible for people throughout the world to be ignorant of our evil thoughts and deeds.  We, or someone else, will intrude upon their blissful ignorance and tell them all about it.

Knowledge may be good.  It may even be power, sometimes.  But knowledge of everything done or thought by other people, everywhere, is oppressive, and can lead to despair, which can in turn lead to danger.  Philosophical considerations aside, I think Stoicism as a way of life provides a means by which we can avoid being overwhelmed and unduly influenced by the world which is constantly with us.  There are so many things beyond our control which should not disturb us.  We must do the best we can with what we have and take the rest as it happens.

The Banality of our Responses to Evil

I've read that there are some who feel that Hannah Arendt, in referring to "the banality of evil" in her book regarding Eichmann in Israel, fiddled somewhat with the facts and the record to better support the accuracy of that neat little phrase describing what took place in Nazi Germany.  It wouldn't be the first time someone has altered facts to support a theory, or arrived at a theory and found facts, or something less than factual, to support it.

Arendt's taste in men may certainly be questioned in light of her fondness for her morally and physically repulsive seducer, Heidegger.  But what I've read of her work seems to me to indicate she was sensible and insightful in various other respects, so I reserve judgment on her claim about evil specifically as it relates to what took place in the twelve years the Nazis ruled Germany and wrecked havoc on Europe and its non-Germanic peoples.  I think, though, that evil need not be banal and often is not banal.  What seems clearly banal is our response to it here in God's favorite country.

The statements we're hearing from the media and the politicians and pundits who beset us regarding the deaths and injuries in Oregon due to the shootings at a community college yesterday are examples of this banality.  What is being said is determined by the political stance of the person/entity making the statement, and is easily inferred once that stance is known.  The stance is already known, of course, in many cases.  There are calls for more gun laws.  There are calls for more guns.  There are calls for more people carrying more guns.  There are claims current laws are not being enforced.  There are claims that no existing laws would have prevented the violence, and that no other laws will, or that other laws which would succeed in preventing gun violence cannot be adopted as they would violate the Second Amendment. 

I've made it clear already in this place that I think those in charge of the NRA (not necessarily all those who are members of it) are mere shills for the gun manufacturing industry, and so are interested primarily if not solely in the selling of all guns which are manufactured by that industry.   I've also made it clear I feel that those who believe the Second Amendment establishes an absolute right to bear arms of any kind are foolish if not deluded, and that those who think the government is plotting to take away their firearms are clearly deluded.

I've also noted I think those who feel that if teachers and other "regular" people carry guns (i.e. not merely police and other law enforcement offices) they will be able to protect themselves and others indulge in a fantasy.  Trained law enforcement personnel have problems with accurately shooting firearms.  Untrained people involved in a tense and frightful situation like a firefight will more likely be a danger to anyone near them than to a determined shooter. 

As well rely on Elmer Fudd coming to the rescue.

But I don't want to dwell on these arguments.  Instead, I write regarding the numbingly stupid, futile, ordinary, predictable nature of the debate which takes place after one of these sadly frequent events.  Fox News, which always may be relied on to say something silly, seems to be characterizing this event as part of the "War Against Christianity" it keeps maintaining is taking place.  Indeed, what else would it say under the circumstances?  Certainly nothing which is not superficial and not good for a headline.

Some pathetic, deranged, perhaps narcissistic loser/loner has firearms and uses them against others and away we go, off on the merry-go-round of rhetoric.  Though all those involved in the posturing which takes place are banal in their response, one can at least sympathize with those who seek an answer, who want some king of substantive response to be made.  Those who say such things just happen, or sell more guns, however, are despicable in their complacency and presumption.

I'm now a gun owner.  I have a shotgun, with which I try to blow flying clay discs out of the air.  It's a pastime requiring a certain skill, and which I enjoy.  I don't feel that in owning a shotgun I'm exercising some sacred right, however.  I find the thought of using my shotgun to defend myself from a tyrannical government laughable.  My ownership of a firearm has not imbued me with the desire that all should own one, or the belief that they should not be regulated.  Why should it?

Tired rhetoric is no effective response to evil, but it's the only response we seem to have to evil of this kind.  What does it say about our country when murder and massacre are grounds only for more of the same posturing?

The Things that are Caesar's

Dr. Ben Carson is one of the candidates for what seems to me to be the increasingly undesirable office of President of our Glorious Republic.  It is at least being sought by undesirables if it is not undesirable in itself.  In any event, Dr. Carson is at the center of the most current tempest in the teapot of our politics, which is largely devoted to expressions of outrage against one thing or another.

He has given the various pundits, media types and politicians who infest our country yet another opportunity to pontificate while on their way to their respective troughs, this time with respect to his comment that a Muslim should not be President.  The Presidency is a position which arguably should not be held by anyone who seeks to be President, their sanity or their motivations being prima facie suspect.  But declaring that a believer in a particular religion should not be President is of course problematic, or would be were in not for the fact that the particular religion in question is unpopular.

The good doctor has stumbled about while enlarging upon his statements, to the extent that he begins to appear incoherent.  However, one of the things he has said seems to make a great deal of sense, to me at least.  And that is, to paraphrase him, that someone whose religion conflicts with the Constitution should not be President.  He has also made (in explanation of his comment specifically against a Muslim President) some encouraging statements against theocracy; not only Islamic theocracy but Christian theocracy.

The position that one should not be President if one cannot be faithful to the Constitution due to religious conviction is I think very defensible, and one which should apply in the case of any official charged with enforcing and implementing the law.  The fact a Muslim was referred to has given some the irresistible urge to make claims of prejudice, and others an equally irresistible urge to elaborate on their belief that Christianity, or perhaps the Judeo-Christian belief system, is superior to Islam. For me, the histrionics engaged in by such people in claiming bigotry or (their) superiority are characteristic of the lamentable state of our political discourse (and our intelligence), and distract from the very significant point at issue, which may even have been the point Dr. Carson intended to make.

Put simply, religious believers should not be allowed to hold office if their religious convictions render them incapable of complying with their duty to enforce and implement the law.  This may not be a position religious believers of any kind will be willing to accept, including some purported Christians, as we have seen.  No distinction should be made among the religious convictions involved.  If a religious conviction is such that those holding it believe themselves to be bound to flout secular law, they should not hold a position which requires them to comply with secular law.

This would not violate the prohibition against a "religious test" being used as a qualification for public office.  That is because the rule of law itself is in question.  Whether one is willing to comply with the law is not a "religious test"; it addresses whether one is willing to accept the rule of law.  The law is not, and should not be, religious law; should not be religious, in fact, though it may in some cases be consistent with religious beliefs.  In some cases it may not.

One of the more interesting statements to be found in the Bible is that of Jesus regarding rendering unto Caesar that which is Caesar's and unto God that which is God's.  It's possible he may have simply been having a bit of fun at the expense of his questioner; it's a clever riposte, certainly.  But laws are essential to government.  They are peculiarly Caesar's in other words.  They may be draconian, but when reasonable they're our best hope of living free from the dictates of others.  There are few who are more eager to dictate to others than those who believe they have God's sanction to do so.

Those making the claim "freedom of religion" mandates the flouting of the law will, unless they are entirely stupid, eventually have to accept that this claim can be made equally by those who have religious beliefs which are radically different, which they would be unwilling to accept.  It will not do for them to claim that believers in certain religions must comply with the law while believers in the religion they believe need not do so.

This particular controversy should serve to make this clear even to those politicians and pundits of the meanest understanding.  But it's doubtful they'll take the time to address the issue thoughtfully.  Thought is not encouraged or rewarded in these dark times.

"A Child of the Earth and the Starry Heavens"

The words of the title of this post are the words initiates of the Orphic mysteries were taught to say when asked to identify themselves in the afterlife.  It's a rather wonderful statement, I believe; a characterization to be proud of, poetic in nature.

The Orphic mysteries were what some might call a watered-down version of those of Dionysus; others might call them a far more reasonable version.  The worship of Dionysus could be rather excessive, best characterized by the maenads, the female followers or priestesses of the god who worked themselves into a frenzy while paying homage.  It apparently involved (so it's said), in some cases at least, tearing a poor animal to pieces and feasting on its raw flesh.  The unfortunate beast thus was treated as Dionysus was by the Titans.  The Orphic mysteries were much more subdued.

During the Roman period, the worship of Dionysus along with others, such as Magna Mater and Attis, Isis and Osiris, was fundamentally the worship of a god who died and was reborn, whose death and regeneration was for the salvation of humanity.  Initiates of these cults were spoken of as having been "born again."  If that is a somewhat familiar phrase, it should be.  The similarity between Christianity and the ancient pagan cults popular in the time Christianity was born and became popular itself is remarkable.  The extent to which Christianity is based on the ancient pagan mysteries would probably be even more stunning if the initiates of the pagan cults had been less faithful to their vows of secrecy and the early Church less successful in stamping them out.

But the Orphic identification has an additional significance, I think.  Not because it speaks of men and women as part earth and part heaven.  This view is something familiar to us through the dualism which has been fundamental to Western culture through the centuries; the distinction between body and soul.  Rather, because of the use of the word "and" in the formula, if it may be called such.  No distinction is made in this case.  We are, therefore, children of earth and the heavens, as we are children of a man and a woman. 

This isn't dualism in the traditional sense, at least as I interpret the phrase.  A child of earth and heaven doesn't necessarily have two aspects, one inferior or of less worth than another, e.g. a body which is unimportant and a soul which is all-important.  That's how we're conceived of by the Church and Plato before it.  It's a point of view which consigns the world and living in it to insignificance, if it doesn't result in a view of our lives as being fraught with evil or impurity.  It's a life-hating and world-hating perspective.

In my interpretation, the statement is one which acknowledges that the earth and the starry heavens are parts of a single whole, as are we.  There is no reference to or reliance on something or some being which transcends the universe (and is therefore unimaginable and inconceivable).  At the same time, though, there is an acknowledgment that the universe includes not "merely" us and the world as we know it, but may include much more that we have yet to encounter and will encounter someday, perhaps even after death; something among the "starry heavens."

As science indicates more and more that life exists throughout the universe, and that life here may be the result of the transmission of the elements favorable to life to our planet from other places, the reference to being a child of the starry heavens may be even more appropriate than the followers of Orpheus knew.  Regardless, the phrase speaks to a form of religion or spirituality which is naturalistic, and a divinity which is immanent, also a part of the universe.

This seems to be the Stoic view, if Stoicism is as some claim a kind of religion, or a religious philosophy.  It seems to have been to such to Epictetus and even Seneca, though the "thoughts" of Marcus Aurelius are ambiguous in this respect.  Nevertheless, Stoicism generally at least in ancient times accepted the idea of Providence and a Divine Reason, present in the universe as a kind of matter.

There is a basis for a spirituality, a religion perhaps, which involves reverence for the universe and its creatures and is not dependent on a belief in something apart from the universe, i.e. apart from all we know and can know.  I think one religion, one God, may be considered more reasonable than another even if not subject to proof.  One that doesn't require acceptance of what cannot be experienced is prima facie more reasonable than one which does.

Thou Shalt Not Issue Certain Marriage Licenses

The recalcitrant Ms. Davis, arbiter of who may or may not be married in Rowan County, Kentucky, has this date been jailed, appropriately enough I think, for contempt of court.

As all know, she claims God Himself decrees that she refuse to follow the law.  This is, presumably, the same God who decreed she should be divorced from three previous husbands, leaving one to wonder why God, who apparently takes marriage so seriously that He will suffer it to take place only in certain cases, has no problem with it being entered into and then dissolved so frequently.  Serial marriage is it seems perfectly fine with the Deity, provided it is between a man or a woman.  This particular county clerk evidently has no problem with it either.

Now as far as I am concerned, Ms. Davis may divorce her current husband and his successors, if any, and this won't necessarily mean she is a bad person or even a sinner.  I don't mean to castigate her or others who claim that they may ignore or break the law whenever they think God wants them to as immoral.  But I do mean to say that she and they are seriously misguided and thoughtless, and that such a belief is potentially dangerous.

It's difficult to know where to begin in addressing this kind of belief.  It seems almost self-evident that if people are allowed to refuse to follow the law as it impacts others and the rights of others because of their religious beliefs, the rule of law doesn't exist.  I don't address laws which apply only to the rights of believers.  In that case, there may be some basis for asserting a First Amendment right.  But I don't think the First Amendment contemplates the religious limiting the rights of other persons by virtue of claimed religious beliefs.  Thus, I doubt any court will hold that someone whose religion mandates that, e.g., someone of a certain race, or disabled people, cannot marry need not issue marriage licenses.  Happily, we haven't reached that point (yet?).

I  think a religion the free exercise of which requires that legal rights be denied to others is a curious religion indeed.  I suspect that if this woman was Muslim, and maintained that she could not comply with her legal duties because of some Islamic belief, neither Mr. Huckabee nor Mr. Cruz nor anyone else would be claiming her rights were being violated.

But at this time I wish to focus on what I think is an issue which must be addressed before others when such claims as those made by Ms. Davis are made.  For such as me, an initial question is...why would God care who gets married according to the law?  Assuming it's God's law that certain people shouldn't get married, and God's law is superior to that of the law of humans, why does it matter if the law of the United States or any other nation allows them to marry?  The marriage would be valid only as far as the secular authority is concerned; it wouldn't be truly valid; what's valid is what God decides is valid.  So, the marriage licenses issued by the state would be bogus in the eyes of God, and God's eyes are the only eyes that matter.

Why would God decree that clerks shall not issue licenses which are clearly bogus?  None of those prohibited by God from being married would really be married in any case.  Even if God is the highly officious being contemplated by the Abrahamic religions, God isn't likely to be concerned regarding anything which is not the case.

It would seem that God, or those who believe that they stand in the shoes of God, as it were, should be concerned with marriage licenses only if they result in marriages God has prohibited.  If they don't, there should be no concern.

As there plainly is a concern, however, it would seem that God and those who claim to serve him in this respect believe that the marriage licenses in fact create a forbidden marriage.  That is problematic for the religious though, as that is to impute some kind of validity to secular marriage even if it is contrary to God's will.  In other words, the refusal to issue marriage licenses would arise from the belief that the licenses are valid regardless of the will of God.  I doubt that's a position anyone who would claim that gay marriage is forbidden by God would want to take.

Ms. Davis and others in similar governmental positions don't cause people to be married, they don't bless the marriages of people.  They merely issue licenses.  They process certain paperwork when certain fees are paid and certain requirements set by the law (not by them) are met.

So is it God's directive is we cannot issue marriage licenses to gays, regardless of the fact those licenses are not valid...are in fact invalid?  That would be to claim the processing of certain paperwork is in itself sinful, against one's religion.  God becomes in that case a kind of Divine Bureaucrat.

It's astonishing the extent to which certain of those who claim to believe in God and follow his laws manage to demean God when they do so.

The New Dark Ages

News of the destruction of the Temple of Balshamin in Palmyra by the foremost of today's barbarians, the merciless and self-righteously ignorant members of IS or whatever they may call themselves now (did someone tell them "Isis" is a pagan goddess?), and their murder of an elderly and respected archaeologist, leads me to wonder whether we regress, and why.

To be sure, we're not all barbarians, but it seems those of us who are increase.  And it seems, to me at least, that they do so because there is an active tendency in the here and now to close the mind, particularly those parts of it which may be used to think intelligently.  There is in fact an impulse not to think; to refrain from thinking.  There is a kind of fear of thinking (or so I think, being unafraid).

Unthinking adherence to a few simple rules has grown attractive to many of us.  It's particularly attractive when we bring ourselves to believe that those rules are the mandates of a peculiarly demanding God who rewards those who adhere to them and punishes--and expects us to punish, and will punish us if we don't--those who fail to do so.  Since adherence is unthinking, the rules are not questioned.  They are not to be questioned in any case, being God's rules.  Those who question will be punished, and should be punished.  Punishment was highly important in the Dark Ages, and is now on the edge of what may be the New Dark Ages.

As God was the catalyst of the Old Dark Ages, it appears God may serve the same purpose for the New.  I should refer to the concept of God, however; a particular concept and a particular God.  The mind closes when it accepts that there is only one truth, one path.  The God of the close-minded is an intolerant, exclusive, jealous God, even as the close-minded are intolerant, exclusive and jealous.  The truth having been established, there is no need to think; in fact, it's wrong to do so.  Thinking becomes something to be punished.

Now it seems that some are convinced that God decrees that remnants of our past be blown up.  Specifically, I suppose, relics of the past which predated the Prophet Mohammad, that portion of the past being of no significance.  But perhaps that isn't entirely the case.  Islam being an Abrahamic religion, it may be that part of the past is relevant, and may even be preserved.  Only all other parts of the past must be destroyed; in particular those parts that are representative of inappropriate religion.

Christians of course treated pagan temples in much the same way once Christianity became predominant in the Roman Empire, though they were denied the use of helpful explosives.  The closed mind is remorseless.

It's curious that our reaction to the close-minded is to close our minds, though.  It's natural to defend what we think is right, but it's unclear that in doing so we should accept other rules as being unquestionable.  That is what seems to be occurring.  Religious zealotry inspires religious zealotry, intolerance inspires intolerance, barbarity inspires barbarity.

Our Great Republic is a creature of the Enlightenment, created by men of the Enlightenment, yet in facing the barbarians of our time we seek out and employ simple, absolute rules and truths and cloak them with a divine mantle.  We fall back on unreason.  We also fear to think, and resort to unthinking adherence to the rules we find satisfying.  We fear and despise whatever is incompatible with our divinely inspired rules.

The fear of thinking in today's world is pervasive, and is remarkable because this fear is apparently being encouraged by some who are employed to educate us.  Reason and science are subject to attack not merely by the religious, the ignorant, the mystical, but by certain of those who pose as philosophers and educators.

So we see the Enlightenment disparaged, and even called evil or the source of evil in the world.  Or, at the least, we see reason and science criticized as being no more good, or true, than any other method or source of belief or basis for conduct.  Religious fanatics, other ignorant zealots and postmodernists are bedfellows in the 21st century; none of them believe in science or rational thought, all act to restrict them as best they can.

A friend relates that he has had discussions with certain Muslims who criticize us of the West because we value freedom more than we value virtue.  The idea that virtue is somehow disassociated from freedom, or that freedom requires the abandonment of virtue, would seem to me to be characteristic of the closed mind.  Freedom allows for choice, and there is no choice for the closed mind.  There's nothing to chose from, as there is no choice to be made.  All is clear and settled.  Thus does thinking stop. 

I suppose I could invoke Yeats, and speak of the best lacking all conviction and the worst being full of passionate intensity.   But  it's unclear just who the best are anymore.  There's more than one way to stop thinking.  The close-minded claim all that is true already known, and has been decreed.  Other minds claim that nothing true may be known, and one thing is no more or less true than another.  If we are to believe some of intellectual and philosophical bent, who and what is best cannot be determined in any case.  It depends, presumably, on what narrative or discourse one accepts, and narrative and discourse are just that and nothing more.  As for the worst, who is to say who or what is worse?

Did this kind of intellectual indifference, even futility, help foster the Old Dark Ages?  Will it help bring about the New?

Preliminary Thoughts on an Ethics of Qualified Respect

I suppose I should make it clear at the outset that I refer to a practical ethics.  "Practical" of course implies an ethics which is intended to apply to the way we live.  Ethics in philosophy, unfortunately, seems to have little to do with our lives and how we should live them (though there seems to be a resurgence of virtue ethics and, most fortunately, stoicism even among professional philosophers).  But those who are still debating whether there is an independently existing world can't be expected to concern themselves seriously with what we should do in such a world, if indeed it exists.

They nonetheless do so concern themselves, of course; perhaps in what they would consider their free time.  Even so, making the focus of one's intellect the raising and debating of questions which either have no answer at all or have no answer which makes any difference in life is indicative of a character which thrives on the abstract and academic rather than the resolution of real-life problems.  There's nothing necessarily wrong with that, of course, but such a character is not helpful in resolving real life problems.

For some time, I've thought the suggestion, or command, that we love one another an impractical one, and so no basis on which life can be lived well and morally. I think it indisputable that we love, truly, only very few people, and that the prerequisites for love simply do not obtain in most cases.  A certain intimacy with and knowledge of the loved one is required, and we don't have that with most people.  The injunction that we love one another, therefore, is foolish.  It will not happen; it clearly hasn't happened.  As a result, it doesn't serve as a foundation for a practical ethics.

I think we can, though, respect one another without great effort, ceteris paribus.  Respect may be a basis on which a "living" ethics may be based.  Such respect has a prerequisite as well, however, but that prerequisite is knowledge of others but especially of ourselves.

Self-knowledge doesn't require self-love.  In fact, it's inconsistent with excessive self-regard and egoism.  Respect is an informed attitude; it's based on reasonable assessment.  It's clearly unreasonable to regard oneself as especially and inherently favored, remarkable, significant, unique, when one inhabits a tiny world in an unremarkable galaxy in a vast universe.  It's arguably delusional. 

Even on a much smaller scale--focusing on our planet alone--it's unreasonable to think of oneself as remarkable merely because one exists.  Billions of others of the same kind exist as well.  If I am remarkable and significant simply by virtue of being, those like me are equally remarkable.  There is no reason to think of oneself as more worthy than any other person, ceteris paribus, as a consequence.  Or, for that matter, less worthy than any other person.  We begin from a position of equality when it comes to worth.  Respect involves the consideration of worth, it's based on the worth we accord someone or something.  If we are entitled to respect, others are entitled to it as well (again, ceteris paribus).

We are beings having very similar basic characteristics and needs, even desires.  We have the ability to think, and to act in certain ways.  "Know thyself" said the Delphic Oracle.  The more we know ourselves, the better we are able to determine what we are and are not capable of, what harms us and what benefits us.  By knowing ourselves we know the same as to others, again in a basic but very fundamental sense.

There are basic needs, desires, abilities, emotions, characteristics we all share, and we can and should respect them in others just as we respect them in ourselves, and prefer others to respect them in us.  This is something which is to be acknowledged, and once acknowledged this is something with which we may address questions relating to whether our needs and desires are to be given preference over those of others, which require the consideration of circumstances on a case by case basis.  The questions become complex, of course, but this simple position may be used as a guideline.  All to be worked out over time, of course, and subject to revision.

Why respect others if we respect ourselves?  Stoicism offers reasons to do so which I personally accept, e.g. the fact that we all partake in and are part of a universe worthy of reverence, for example.  From that premise, I think the ethics of respect follows with some celerity.  But there obviously are those who don't accept such a premise, so I will try to take an approach which doesn't depend on such a belief.

Respect being the result of reasonable assessment, it must be reasonable not merely in self-assessment but in the assessment of others.  We should have a reason for not respecting others.  If we cannot reasonably maintain that we are entitled to respect more than others, then there is no reason not to accord them respect.  A reason is required in order to withhold respect.  We may irrationally claim that we're worthy of respect and others are not, due to a mental condition or because our assessment of our own value and those of others is uninformed, or because we are born in more favored circumstances than others, but these aren't reasonable bases on which to withhold respect, as they are not reasons for others to be respectful of us, nor are they reasons supporting self-respect.

Why be reasonable; why not do things without any reason, without thinking?  Having reasons to act serves us well generally, much more than having no reasons.  If such considerations don't suffice, ask me as well whether there is an independently existing world, while you're at it. This is, as I indicated, practical ethics.

While we start at a position of equal worth, and equal entitlement to respect, that of course may change.  Some may through their conduct become the subject of greater or less respect, though basic respect must still be accorded to all.

What does this entail?  Well, these are preliminary thoughts, after all.

Send in the Clowns

Yes, I know, they're already here.

Although it's difficult to assess whether the politics of our Glorious Republic is comedy or tragedy, the efforts of the relentless categorizer Aristotle notwithstanding, there's something laughable about this presidential election.  I wonder if the plethora of clowns running for that sublime office is a kind of affirmation by fate that our elections have caused whatever gods may be to despair of us entirely.  Since we are beyond saving, why not turn our national politics and governance into a kind of farce, something entertaining if nothing else.

The cast is impressive in size, although the characters are stock.  The venal, disingenuous, unlikeable Clinton; the big-mouthed,  pompous ass Trump; the holy-roller Huckabee; the scatter-brained, disturbingly named Rand Paul; the oleaginous opportunist Cruz; the youthful, handsome and vacant Rubio; the excitable, apparently vindictive, Christie; the dully passive-aggressive Walker; the odd, emotional Graham; the unexciting leftover Jeb Bush; and the others, thus far unnoticeable, with the exception of Bernie Sanders, who seems to suffer from nothing more than being old in age and an old-time liberal.

And soon, perhaps, Vice President Biden may join the race.  That would be like Leslie Nielsen's Frank Drebin running for the office.

How can an intelligent, responsible individual make a choice among these undesirables?  It is not, if it has ever been, a process of choosing the best or most qualified person.  It has become an exercise in determining who is most likely to do the least amount of damage to the United States and its people, and even to the world given our propensity to rush into problems and places where angels fear to tread. 

There are of course intelligent, responsible individuals left even now here in God's favorite country, and it's likely some if not all of them vote.  But it's not at all clear that they will have any significant impact in deciding who becomes president.  We (and other, less favored, people) enjoy comparing our nation to ancient Rome, which in a way is appropriate as we borrowed so much of its form and architecture.  We have not quite made it to the point where the presidency can be bought in the way Didius Julianus bought his place as Roman Emperor, but we clearly have reached the point where money is of paramount importance, a direct if not the sole cause of success in our elective politics.  For this we must thank our Supreme Court, which decided that hurling any amount of money at our politicians in the hope if not the expectation of favors is perfectly fine in the law.  Only bribery of the most blatant kind is prohibited here in the home of the free and the brave.

We may still hope, however.  Didius Julianus reigned for only a matter of weeks, and was disposed of by the Praetorians he paid.  The auctioning of the Roman principate was shown in a Hollywood spectacular, called The Fall of the Roman Empire by someone who was its seems unaware of the fact that the empire continued in the West for another three centuries or so after that memorable event, and in the East for another thirteen hundred years, more or less.  I recall Christopher Plummer playing Commodus in that film as something of a cruel but cheerful lunatic.

But who can be said to be even the least likely to do harm to us among this rogues gallery?  We can expect such as Clinton and Jeb Bush to play the tired old game of Washington politics in a predictable if not effective manner, but the ascendancy of that caricature of a boorish rich man, the Trimalchio of our time, is it seems a sign that many have soured on business as usual, or have at least concluded that if we must suffer through it we may as well have someone who, being rich and only concerned with being rich, doesn't care about what he says or thinks.

Is it possible that Trump's popularity may indicate that we all now recognize our politicians are pandering hypocrites, ready to do or say anything to be elected and remain elected, which is to say ready to do the bidding of their paymasters?  Or indicate that we are for other reasons sick of what has become a sham?   If so, it may perhaps be a desirable development in its own peculiar way.

Creta Delenda Est

I borrow here the phrase for which Cato the Elder, that jolly fellow, is famous.  He is said to have ended each speech he made to the doubtlessly stupefied Roman Senate with the words "Carthage must be destroyed" or more accurately I would think: "Furthermore, I think Carthage must be destroyed."  In Latin, Carthago delenda est.

Substituting for Carthago in my post is Creta.  Now it seems this is the Roman name for the island of Crete, but I am not urging that Crete be destroyed.  Creta is also, as far as I can determine, the Latin word for "clay."  Perhaps the Romans considered the island of Crete to be especially clay-like.  Regardless, clay is what I refer to, or more specifically clays, as in those targets which are called "clays" by those who blow them up using shotguns.  Since creta is a feminine noun in Latin, I think the title to the post serves to state, perhaps melodramatically, that these clays must be destroyed.

As one might guess, I have recently joined many others in shooting clays, in my case with a 12 gauge shotgun.  In this post, I confess that I enjoy doing this; yes, I enjoy blowing these little orange targets apart...something I wish I could do far more often than I've managed thus far.

It is in some ways a surprising, perhaps even disturbing, admission for me to make.  I'm not a hunter.  The little shooting I've done in the past has not been with a shotgun, but with a rifle when I was a wee lad, popping what I think were .22s at cans on one occasion, and more recently with a .357 magnum handgun owned by another, on another occasion.  I found this uninteresting.  I don't like the political stance of the NRA, which seems to be run by shills for manufacturers of firearms and ammunition.  I don't think the Second Amendment creates an absolute right to own guns, any more than the First Amendment creates an absolute right to free speech.

However, I feel a certain (and undiluted) satisfaction when I manage to shoot clays, particularly when I do so in such a fashion as to cause them to explode into many small pieces.  I'm not sure why I do.

Perhaps we humans have an appetite for destruction, as the '80s band Guns 'N Roses would say.  I think of the scene in the Kubrick film 2001: A Space Odyssey in which the proto-human creature, thanks to inspiration received from the enigmatic monolith, begins to use a nearby bone as a hammer, bashing the other bones strewn about him.  Later, he uses it to beat the leader of a rival group of proto-humans.  Then, he tosses it in a fit of joy or ecstasy into the air.  We watch it fly up.  Cut to a view of a space vehicle or satellite of some kind.

Which raises the question:  Does our capacity for (and desire for?) violence lead us to develop tools, to think, to create not just weapons but everything else we create?  Another question:  What would we be without our capacity/desire for violence?  More questions:  Without that capacity/desire, what would we do, achieve, have done?

I comfort myself with the thought that the sport of shooting clays in its various forms (trap, sporting clays, skeet, etc.) involves a certain skill, and that the satisfaction felt results from the successful exercise of that skill.  But I tell others, in order to amuse them or perhaps only myself, that it is a great way to relieve stress, and that I like to imagine that I shoot not just clays but other things, even certain people.

Well, I'd rather not speculate that my enjoyment of the noise and feel of a shotgun and the effort involved in managing to shoot a flying target and watch it explode is in some sense profound, or gives me a knowledge of our animal nature, or even that it creates in me or others some kind of savage, primitive joy.  Perhaps it does. That in itself would not necessarily mean that this enjoyment will lead to the destruction of something other than orange clay discs.  I suspect that it is merely another and new way to amuse myself.  A hobby, in fact, to occupy my time.

But I wonder why I take this up now, and haven't done so before, and what it is that makes shooting a shotgun so satisfying, and how it relates to the gun violence we see and hear of with increasing frequency in these times.

Regarding "Obamaphobia"

Grandpa Munster look-alike Ted Cruz has been accused of "Obamaphobia" and we see this condition mentioned elsewhere as well.  I don't know whether this word is relatively new or whether it has been around for some time, but it seems apt in describing reactions to the president, given the definition of "phobia" as being an extreme or irrational fear of or aversion to something.

I don't find it easy to take Mr. Cruz, or any other candidate for the presidency of our Great Republic, very seriously.  This may change as this election slouches towards its rude end, but if it does I suspect that I will take them seriously only as threats, more or less significant as the case may be, to our nation.  That said, however, I doubt that even the horrifying prospect of one of them being president will cause me to declaim against them in the hysterical, even demented, manner in which our current president is being castigated and has been castigated by Republicans.

The sickening histrionics of the Republicans in this regard invokes a kind of contempt of them on my part, leading me to sympathize with H.L. Mencken, who wrote: "In this world of sin and sorrow, there is always something to be thankful for; as for me, I rejoice that I am not a Republican."

Naturally, the claim of Obamaphobia is not merely denied, but decried by those accused of it and their defenders, sometimes as being a different way of condemning them for racism.  One wonders, sometimes, at the defensiveness of this response.

I think it is futile to deny that criticism of this president has been extraordinary, not necessarily in its quantity but in its quality.  Even normally sensible people I know become frenzied at his mention.  I can't remember how many times I've heard or read the word "tyranny" used in reference to him--by people who have never experienced tyranny of the kind one finds in history and in other nations.  He's routinely criticized as being godless, or at least described as not-a-Christian (which may amount to the same thing for some).  He is of course called a socialist; this is a milder criticism, however, than others.  Those like Giuliani claim he doesn't "love America."  His efforts to provide a "universal" health care system are considered positively demonic by his opponents. 

How explain such conduct?  It's true that our nation's political history is full of examples of lurid accusations against politicians involving their character (especially by proponents and opponents of our earliest politicians; our Founding Fathers were routinely accused of crimes and moral lapses).  But I can't recall this kind of vituperation directed at recent presidents; not even the much reviled Nixon.

It may be that we simply hear and read more in the way of denunciations because technology now allows everyone to express outrage and to be heard and read, more than ever has been the case.  Anyone can, and will, let all the rest of us know what they think, unsolicited.  It doesn't matter what their qualifications, knowledge or intelligence may be, in general or in particular.  Tell us they will, and the tendency is to tell us in as excited a manner as possible.

It may be that our politics is becoming increasingly contentious.  Some of us may feel that our world is changing, and for the worse, and are rendered furious by the fact that it is doing so.  Obama would be considered a symbol of that change.  That change would seem to be that people who do not conform to what some of us feel is normal and appropriate are obtaining power and becoming prominent in America.  I think this is the case, and is at least in part a cause of Obamaphobia.  He is associated with forces that are anti-Church, anti-traditional America and, I think it must be said, non-white if not anti-white--"white" society and culture being the traditional American society and culture.

Historically, white Protestants have dominated in America.  That began to change as early as the first half of the 19th century when the Irish began arriving.  In the second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century people even "stranger" began to arrive, from southern and eastern Europe.

Gradually, these immigrants began to be tolerated and even took positions of power in America.  The change was in some respects grudging.  But there are places where even they are relatively few, in the South and the West, and it is in those places where it seems most Obamaphobes reside.

President Obama is a strange president, to many.  He doesn't act and doesn't speak as presidents have in living memory.  I personally feel that he has in many ways been ineffective, but his "strangeness" has for me no discernible influence or impact.  I think it has effected others, though, to a very significant extent.

I think we see here and in other things a profound change in what many are used to, and that this change is greatly resented.  Especially when we are relatively comfortable and not distracted by the need to see to our immediate survival, our greatest concern is that there be no change.  The old metal band The Dead Kennedys made an album called Give Me Convenience or Give Me Death.  It mocked us for our love of comfort.  Many of us are being inconvencied by the "new America" and find this intolerable.

Definition Uber Alles: The Obergefell Dissent

I am puzzled by the dissenting opinion in this case.  The majority opinion is, I think, too rhapsodic but ultimately legally sound.  The dissent on the other hand is neither, and I think borders on being weird.  I can do without rhapsody in the Supreme Court, but am disturbed by oddity in that institution.  Both rhapsody and oddity are of concern, as the appearance of either of them in a legal opinion is a sign that the opinion's author has departed from legal analysis and strayed into the Never-Never Land of the zealot.  But oddity is of particular concern when it comes to the consideration of legal rights.

The dissenters are in a difficult position because it cannot be doubted that the ability to marry has been recognized as a legal right protected by the Constitution since at least 1962.  So in order to dissent, they must necessarily maintain that legal right is not available to certain people who are as much protected by the Constitution as any other American citizen.  Normally, such rights are available to all subject to forfeiture, generally by virtue of conviction of a criminal act.  However, it can't be maintained that gay people seeking to marry have all been convicted of a criminal act (no, sodomy doesn't count as criminal anymore under the Constitution).

The dissenters are thus reduced to contending, in effect, that the legal right to marry is a right that can be exercised only by particular people, but that others are excluded from exercising this legal right not because they have forfeited that right but because of a definition.  According to the dissenters, marriage is a legal right that can only be exercised by one man and one women because that is what the definition of "marriage" requires.

The dissent acknowledges that the definition of "marriage" may be changed, though.  The dissenters think, however, that the people through the legislature must change the definition, and not the court.  Thus we find in the dissent references to democracy and the will of the people which are unusual in a Supreme Court decision, as the Supreme Court has for many years disregarded the wishes of the people in upholding and interpreting the law when it deems it necessary to do so to uphold the Constitution, and this is indeed its function in our system.  The dissenters have all of them done just that themselves.  They simply abhor doing so in this case.

By acknowledging that the definition of "marriage" may be changed at all, however, and that if changed the legal right of marriage may be extended, the dissent creates problems for itself.  It makes the existence of a legal right dependent on something that may change, first, and this is something which the dissenters may find hard to stomach in other cases.  There is in addition a danger in letting the people, or the legislature, define what constitutes a legal right, as one hopes the dissenters recognize, even if that recognition would hint that they aren't being entirely impartial in this case.  The Founders were well aware of the potential for a tyranny of the majority, and took steps to avoid it; one of those steps was the creation of the Supreme Court.

There is also a danger in sanctioning the idea that it is possible to "define away" a legal right.  If one accepts that the Supreme Court must in all cases accept what a legislature mandates as a definition, it would be easy enough for a legislature to adopt definitions which would restrict existing legal rights or create new ones by adopting a particular definition. 

Perhaps it can be argued that in the case of "marriage" the dissenters refer to a definition of long standing, not dependent on legislative whim.  But the same could be said of "property" which until recently had been defined for many years as including certain human beings. 

Now there is talk of civil disobedience, and fears of restricting religious freedom.  There is even talk of the Supreme Court defying God's law by those who think of God as obsessed with human sexual relations (God as voyeur, as it were).  But the majority opinion makes it clear that should not be a concern.  This decision should properly be considered as applicable to marriage as a legal concept, which is in effect a contract or partnership.  Religions may consider it whatever they like, and require whatever rituals they think appropriate governing what they think is a marriage.  That should not be a concern of the law.  Similarly, it should not be a concern of religions what the State provides as governing this particular kind of contract or union.

I think it likely that we will not see the same kind of hysteria we saw in the days when the courts mandated segregation.  Acceptance of gay marriage has spread with remarkable celerity, and, frankly, those who oppose it and oppose modern society generally will die off soon enough, to be replaced with the less intolerant, or will withdraw from that society to live and die in relative isolation, for good or ill.

Perhaps the times really are a-changin', this time.