Philosophy as Affectation

Gertrude Stein made the remark shown at the head of this post in connection with the death of the dancer/choreographer Isadora Duncan.  Duncan loved to wear long, flowing scarves.  She was wearing one while driving on September 14, 1927.  The scarf became entangled in one of the wheel wells of the car she was in (the wheels were open-spoked), pulling her from the car and breaking her neck (even, it seems, decapitating her or nearly doing so).  Gertrude Stein could be sardonic.

According to the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, "affectation" is "a. speech or conduct not natural to oneself: an unnatural form of behavior meant especially to impress others" or "b. the act of taking on or displaying an attitude or mode of behavior not natural to oneself or not genuinely felt."

It isn't clear to me that wearing long scarves is an affectation according to that definition.  It may be conduct intended to impress others, but I don't think it may properly be called "unnatural."  Still, we can infer what Gertrude meant in making her rather gruesome witticism without concluding wearing scarves of any sort is somehow an unnatural form of behavior.

I've remarked before in this blog that I'm annoyed by the metaphysical and epistemological efforts of some philosophers to question what is "real" and what we can "know."  Perhaps it would be kinder to describe those efforts as attempts to ascertain how or whether we can determine what is "real" and what can be "known."  It may be kinder to do so, but I think those efforts would in that case be no less annoying.

I think the fact that the claims of these philosophers are without merit has been shown by other philosophers, such as Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin.  But here I address the annoying nature to those claims; I propose that we may, reasonably, characterize their thought as irksome affectations. 

The source of my annoyance arises from a simple fact.  These philosophers, while spending their time and that of others foolish enough to read their works debating what is real and what can be known, and in creating and entertaining arguments in support of the position that we can't know anything, and in particular can't know if anything is real, blithely conduct themselves and interact with others and things in the world, treating them just as they would if they were, in fact, real and known by them.  Their conduct belies their claims, in other words.

I've always thought them to be in some sense disingenuous or dishonest as a result.  "I don't know if this chair exists" I imagine them saying "but I'm sitting on it and sit on it every day, just as I would if I knew it exists.  But I don't.  And in fact can't."  It seems rather harsh to call them brazen hypocrites, though.  We usually reserve that term for those who claim certain conduct is wrong and nonetheless engage in it all the time.  The philosophers I refer to probably aren't acting dishonestly or immorally.  

But, I think it's clear that they're saying, and behaving, in an unnatural manner.  "Unnatural" because the claims they make are plainly at odds with what they do, think and say naturally, as human beings, in the course of their lives.  For the same reason, their speech and conduct is not genuine.

I think it's also clear that their speech and conduct in this respect are intended to impress others.  After all, they purport to tell us all that we can't know what's real, or can't really know anything.  They seek to encourage doubt of things with which we interact at every moment.  They maintain, in other words, that we're foolish to think and act as we do, and we would understand that if only we were as intelligent as they are.

This kind of philosophy, which purports to doubt what is real and what can be known, is therefore an affectation.  And would be dangerous, if anyone actually took it seriously.

God Save us from Proselytizers

 

Something there is that motivates many of us to expound on our views, on a number of subjects, to others without being asked to do so.  Thomas Carlyle, as one can see in the quote above, thought that it is not merely a part of our nature but emphatically so.  Unsolicited pontification one might call it (or in any case I call it that, now).

This seems especially the case when it comes to God and religion.  An interesting question is whether this tendency has always been part of our nature, or became common at some point in our very talkative, chattering history.

I don't think it was a part of our nature until relatively recently in our history, at least as far as God and religion are concerned.  We don't see the ancient, polytheistic pagan West filled with adherents of a particular god urging people to worship that god only.  Worshippers of Dionysus didn't seek to convert worshippers of Isis; worshippers of Cybele didn't bother to convert initiates of other gods.  The Romans didn't insist that those they conquered worship Roman gods.  They generally would treat the gods of the barbarians as aspects of the gods they accepted; different versions of gods like Jupiter, Mars, and others, worshipped under different names.  Not even Christians were persecuted because they worshipped a particular god and not pagan gods, nor were the Jews.  They were persecuted, instead, when they refused to participate in the reverence owed the Roman state and its emperors, which they believed to be worship rather than a prayer or offering for their welfare.

I've come to the conclusion that proselytizing, which in most cases refers to religious hectoring, lecturing, sermonizing, and communication in general, wasn't indulged in to any great extent until some of us came to be monotheists who not only insisted there was one God only, but that worshipping that God--and no other god--was right and necessary.  That view naturally caused other views to arise, e.g. worshipping any other God was wrong, and that it was right and good that others worship the one true God in the manner appropriate according to those who worshipped that God already.  And so many unworthy, awful and horrible events began taking place and take place still.

Why else would someone want to tell others their beliefs regarding God, and what they consider the reasons for them?  The fact that one believes in God isn't enough to explain the urge to tell, and to explain, and to persuade (sometimes forcibly) others who don't, or who favor another, or perhaps to repress them for doing so.  Even the belief that the God one believes in is the one, true God isn't quite enough.  It isn't necessary that the believer in God X preach that X is God, rather than Y or Z.  That believer could merely believe and be silent.

For the preaching to begin, it's necessary that the believer in X feel somehow bound to preach that X is the one, true God.   What would engender such a feeling?  The belief that X wants the believer to do so, or the believer has a duty to do so (which may amount to the same thing). 

A God who wants everyone to believe in him/her/they/it has always struck me as peculiar, though.  Why would God be so needy, so intent on being worshipped?  Perhaps it may be argued that God wants all to believe merely because it's good for us, however, not good for God or desirable to God.  If that's the case, one is prompted to wonder why that's good for us.  Then it's required that we find explanations for that claim.  Is it good for us because it's evil not to believe?  If that's so, why is it evil?  Because we'll be prompted to do evil things?  Saying it's good for us to do so because only in that case will be believe in what is True, or Good, or really is God simply begs the question.  If it's good for us to believe in God X as opposed to God Y or Z or no God at all because if we don't we'll be punished, perhaps for all eternity, raises yet another question--why would God mandate punishment of unbelievers?

The claim that God wants to be worshipped by all, or should be worshipped by all, raise questions for which there are no final, satisfactory answers.  

Proselytizing seems to have been "built into" Christianity from fairly early in its history.  That's what Pentecost is about, after all.  The Holy Spirit or Ghost descended upon the apostles and the race was on, so to speak, to convert all, and there's no question that the race was run successfully.  Sometimes by force, of course, as a host of pagans, Jews, Moslems, and indigenous people throughout the world can attest.  Islam played the conversion game as well, of course, though at times it authorities were content merely to require payment from infidels.  It's interesting that among the Abrahamic religions Judaism was and it seems still is not particularly interested in converting all the world.  While intolerant and exclusive, Judaism has been content in continuing, nurturing and cherishing its uniqueness rather than diminishing it by pursuing new believers.

The great days of Christian proselytizing are over as best as can be told.  The Crusades, the excesses of the Reformation, the Inquisition, conversion through conquest and imperialism are all in the past.  It seems the Mormons still have the missionary spirit and their zeal is such that they baptize even the dead, thus carrying their efforts to convert to a remarkable extreme.  There's no need to persecute the unfaithful when their consent is neither sought nor possible.

The urge to compel acceptance of one's beliefs has become less severe in these times, it's true, but seems to remain a part of our nature.  We see it among those who insist on proving God's existence or justifying it even when not solicited, who ostentatiously practice their religion and seek legal support for it, who believe they know what's right for all, politically and socially, and seek to impose their views on others.  It's far easier to proselytize now than it was not all that long ago, and it seems to be more successful as the physical imposition of belief is no longer required.  One may simply spew whatever view or theory one seeks to promote onto the Web, and there are always those who accept it and spread it.

I repeat myself I'm afraid, but it's the nature of our technology and means of communication, including media, to discourage thought, particularly rational thought, which takes time and effort, and encourage emotional, irrational, and above all instantaneous reaction to claims being made constantly which are ubiquitous and repeated endlessly.  We'll be lucky if there are any left who are inclined and able to reflect on what's being touted within 10 years.

Kneeling, Standing and the Law

 

I've commented before in this blog regarding the Supreme Court's decision in the Great Pray for Football case,  Kennedy v. Bremerton School District.  That was the case in which an assistant high school football coach claimed his right to freely exercise his religion was violated by a school district because it sought to restrict his ostentatious prayer-sessions after games, which took place at the 50 yard line (see the above copy of an exhibit in the case).  His religion, it seems, provides that such prayers be made.

After attempts to accommodate his desire to pray alone and silently, while in public and with others (as shown above), he was terminated.   A majority of the Supreme Court agreed with him that his First Amendment rights were violated.

As a result, he got his job back.  He has been residing in Florida for three years, however, quite a distance from Bremerton, which is in the State of Washington.  Having been reinstated, he resigned the position after a single game.  He made some vague claims in connection with the resignation regarding his feeling he was not getting from the school district what was justly due him given his status and his victory at the Supreme Court.  It apparently only took a single game for him to believe that to be the case.  He also acknowledged, though, that he's been living in Florida and has some sick relations there, and wanted to be there with his family.  His coaching position was only part-time, and he quit a full-time job at a Bremerton shipyard to go to Florida.

Since his employment with the school district, he has been photographed in various places, including before the Supreme Court building in D.C., usually kneeling.  He apparently kneels, and presumably prays when doing so, with considerable frequency and in the presence of photographers.  He's appeared in various media and talk shows, and is something of a celebrity.  He's summoned to speak at various conservative and religious events.  He's written a book.  A movie about him is said to be in the works.  He has his own Website.  

I think it's understandable, then, that some suspect his desire to regain his position as assistant high school football coach was never the reason for his sojourn in the legal system, and indeed that he was never interested in doing so.  One even might suspect that he conducted himself in such a manner that the school district felt it had no option but to terminate him, as his prayers became more and more of a spectacle.  In other words, that the school district was goaded into action.  In even more other words, that there was a deliberate attempt to obtain a Supreme Court holding on the issue.

One might also suspect that the Great No-Gay Wedding Website case, 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, was similarly brought to solve what wasn't actually experienced as a problem given the fact that the person who supposedly sought to have a website devoted to a gay wedding denies having done so.  The tendency of the Supreme Court, or of any court, to decide questions which do not actually arise is troubling.

It's been the rule for a long time that a person who brings a legal action must have what's called "standing" to do so.   Generally speaking, a person has standing when the person has sustained or in the circumstances very likely will sustain an injury for which a legal remedy is available.  Legal action commenced merely to prove a point or address issues which may or may not arise, but haven't yet arisen, are to be disregarded by courts, which presumably have other things to do for people who are actually involved in existing disputes and have sustained actual damages.

The poet Wallace Stevens wrote that the imagination loses vitality as it ceases to adhere to the real.  It's the same with the law.  Where there is no real dispute to be resolved, no real circumstances to be addressed, legal decisions become detached from real disputes and real people.  They're mere abstractions.  They seek to address imagined realities.  They lack context.  They're speculations on what might or should be the case.  They're subjective declarations on what should be the case should something actually be the case.  Because they don't "adhere to the real" they're more likely to reflect the individual desires and preferences of those who make the decisions.  Also, it makes it difficult to assess when a legal decision would apply in the case of an actual injury or dispute, which can be very fact-dependent and specific.

It's to be hoped that the Supreme Court Justices will curb their apparent desire to proclaim what the law should be at least enough to require that a real controversy exist before doing so.  Otherwise, they may become political agents, and even unelected legislators, rather than judges.  There was a time when conservatives feared that was taking place.  Perhaps no longer.

The Day of the Demagogue

 If you look up the definition of the word "demagogue" or check the Wikipedia entry for it, you'll see it all there, in black and white.  The characteristics of most of our politicians, and of one of them especially, as well as their "playbook" are set forth in some detail.  Lying, fearmongering, scapegoating, personal insults and attacks--it's like a roll call of conduct engaged in by the most indicted candidate in the history of our Great Union, and likely of any other nation. 

It's easy enough to learn what demagogues are and what they do.  They're of a type and have done the same things throughout our history, beginning with the first known demagogue, Cleon of Athens, born in the 5th century B.C.E.  No doubt there were others before him, whose names we just don't know.

The most simple and succinct definition of "demagogue" of which I'm aware is that provided by H.L. Mencken:  "The demagogue is one who preaches doctrines he knows to be untrue to men he knows to be idiots."  The demagogue is a prolific liar who has learned that in certain circumstances, particularly in matters of politics, lies are important because they'll be believed by those who either cannot think or refuse to do so.  Mencken viewed democracy as so stupid a form of government that it encourages, and perhaps even requires, demagogues because so much is left to the decisions of the ordinary voter and the intelligence of the ordinary voter is minimal.  The success of demagogues throughout history makes one wonder if he's right.

A demagogue, however, isn't necessarily as stupid as those who believes the lies he makes.  A demagogue need only appear to be, or pretend to be, as much of an idiot as those who support him.  So it is a mistake to take a demagogue lightly.  A demagogue may be just intelligent enough to take advantage of others by inciting fear, or anger, or envy and promising the world to them, or posing as the only person who can save them from the evils he has conjured.  It's more likely that a demagogue is ignorant, or is a sociopath, than a fool.

One thing seems apparent.  It isn't necessary that a demagogue be physically attractive or impressive to be successful.  The most successful one of this time in our Great Republic seems to me to be an oddity.  Perhaps it's the hair.  His "mug shot" which his followers think is so beguiling makes him look as if he's about to burst into tears of frustration such as a child might do when deprived of a favorite toy or treat.  Hitler certainly wasn't an impressive looking man, though his propagandists did their best to make him so, portraying him in a knight's armor and other manly guises.  Mussolini took on the appearance of a marionette.  He would have made a fine bobble head.  Joe McCarthy looked like a small-time mafioso.

Demagogues are said to have charisma, but if that's the case it seems charisma is unrelated to physical appearance.

What accounts for the success of demagogues?  Why is it that the techniques employed by them down through the centuries are so well known, and ultimately lead to disaster, but succeed again and again?  

Clearly, there's something wrong with us.  

It's enough to cause one to despair of democracy as a viable form of government.  But the curious thing is that the aims of demagogues and their followers are not democratic at all.  They're autocratic or totalitarian, in fact.  So, democracy may itself be viable, but be subject to perversion by its nature given a propensity to accept demagogues.  This is a weakness not in the democratic form of government but in those governed.  Democracy may be a form of government that's intended only for the intelligent.

The painting shown above, by the way, is called The Demagogue and is by Jose Clemente Orozco.