I must assume Christmas is not the best time to visit this remarkable metropolis. To do otherwise would be unfair, I think.
I will say, though, that I am glad to have escaped it before New Year's Eve (no comparison with Snake Plissken or his New York is intended). I am no stranger to big cities, and the holiday crowds which can infest them, and am enormously fond of the city of my birth, Chicago, which I will say with Norman Mailer is a great American city--indeed, I will go so far as to say Chicago is the great American city. But unless you are fond of being part of a vast, slow moving, confused, and often unresponsive herd (there is no better word) of people, you would be well advised to avoid certain parts of Manhattan during the festive holiday season.
Well advised to do so if it is your desire to walk, that is, from one location to another. The mere presence of crowds was not surprising. What I found surprising was the fact that so many in the crowds seemed to have no intention of going somewhere.
For all I know, the herds roaming the streets and sidewalks of the wonderful town between the Bronx and the Battery this time of year are made up primarily, if not entirely, of tourists. So, they may be taken up with gaping at the sites, or photographing the many signs in Times Square. Real New Yorkers may find them appalling, and avoid parts of the city during this season like the plague. One has to make exception, though, for the many vendors and hawkers who block passage so effectively. They, presumably, are not mere tourists.
There is something perverse, I think, in simply being on a sidewalk, stationary, preferably in the middle of it, generally encumbered with a large backpack, or perhaps holding onto a stroller encasing an infant catatonic with fear or confusion, while those who want actually to walk try to do so by bouncing off you and others like so many pinballs. Perhaps worse yet are those who seek to walk but do so in a horizontal file which often extends the entire width of all available space.
This is something I haven't experienced before. For example, even on Michigan Avenue at its most crowded the majority of people using the sidewalk walk north and south with genuine regularity, and according to a discernable pattern--those going north use one portion of the sidewalk, those going south use another. During the Christmas season in New York, though, they seem to move, or stand, without purpose or intent; if they move, they do so sporadically, and then in various directions which cannot be anticipated, causing collisions.
I was reminded horribly of an episode of the original Star Trek series, about a planet so over-populated that they created a mock-up of the Enterprise (who knows why) and sent Kirk there where he encountered the usual beautiful female alien who was placed with him in the hope and expectation that he would pass along to her some kind of disease which would kill some of them off. Every once in a while he would get a glimpse of the people of the planet, pressed up against one another, slowly trying to move but being nearly prevented from doing so. That's what I was reminded of, tripping over people, if not the lights fantastic, on the sidewalks of New York.
A CICERONIAN LAWYER'S MUSINGS ON LAW, PHILOSOPHY, CURRENT AFFAIRS, LITERATURE, HISTORY AND LIVING LIFE SECUNDUM NATURAM
Wednesday, December 30, 2009
Thursday, December 17, 2009
The World is Too Much with Us?
I've always wondered about these words of Wordsworth. How is the world "too much" with us? Is it too much with us? Or, too much with us? And, "too much" implies the existence of some sort of standard by which "with us" or "with us" can be measured. What is it?
Reading the poem, of course, gives one the impression that he is very simply and plainly complaining about us--we humans. We get and spend, and lay waste our powers, whatever that may mean. We see little in nature, or little in nature which is ours (nature is ours? Or, there is little we see that is ours, in nature?) And what's that about the sea baring her bosom to the moon? Was it simply needed to rhyme, so sublimely, with "boon"?
That aside, he seems to be complaining about what we do to, or with, the world. Imagine what he would write now, poor fellow.
I think there has always been in us a tendency to consider nature as something apart from humans. Sometimes, the tendency is to romaticize nature, as something better than humans, or at least better without humans. Sometimes, the tendency results in philosophers concluding that we cannot really know if there is an external world, or, if there is one, whether we can ever really know what it is like. Sometimes, it results in the view that nature or the world, as something distinct from us, is something we can do with as we please. In each case, I think, this tendency deludes us.
I tend to think, as I believe Dewey did, that we are not separate, at least not in any significant sense. We're all there, with everything else; we're part and parcel, as it were, of "ordinary day to day life", interacting with other humans and creatures and things. Nature, or the world, or the universe, includes humans.
One would think it a rather elementary inference from this that it is in our interest to act accordingly. i.e. to ascertain and anticipate how we interact with everything else, determine the results of that interaction, and analyze the benefits and costs of certain kinds of interaction, ultimately selecting those which result in benefits. I don't think we can do so, intelligently, when viewing nature as an idyllic paradise we soil, or something distinct from us we cannot really know, or something which is ours to do with as we please.
Reading the poem, of course, gives one the impression that he is very simply and plainly complaining about us--we humans. We get and spend, and lay waste our powers, whatever that may mean. We see little in nature, or little in nature which is ours (nature is ours? Or, there is little we see that is ours, in nature?) And what's that about the sea baring her bosom to the moon? Was it simply needed to rhyme, so sublimely, with "boon"?
That aside, he seems to be complaining about what we do to, or with, the world. Imagine what he would write now, poor fellow.
I think there has always been in us a tendency to consider nature as something apart from humans. Sometimes, the tendency is to romaticize nature, as something better than humans, or at least better without humans. Sometimes, the tendency results in philosophers concluding that we cannot really know if there is an external world, or, if there is one, whether we can ever really know what it is like. Sometimes, it results in the view that nature or the world, as something distinct from us, is something we can do with as we please. In each case, I think, this tendency deludes us.
I tend to think, as I believe Dewey did, that we are not separate, at least not in any significant sense. We're all there, with everything else; we're part and parcel, as it were, of "ordinary day to day life", interacting with other humans and creatures and things. Nature, or the world, or the universe, includes humans.
One would think it a rather elementary inference from this that it is in our interest to act accordingly. i.e. to ascertain and anticipate how we interact with everything else, determine the results of that interaction, and analyze the benefits and costs of certain kinds of interaction, ultimately selecting those which result in benefits. I don't think we can do so, intelligently, when viewing nature as an idyllic paradise we soil, or something distinct from us we cannot really know, or something which is ours to do with as we please.
Sunday, December 13, 2009
The Dangers of Rereading
I suppose it's not unusual to find that authors you once were fond of, particularly during your adolescence, are not what you thought they were on a second reading. I remember reading a good deal of Nietzsche, once. Now, I'm not sure why I took the time to do so. I suppose he can be said to have proclaimed quite a few things, some of them interesting, but it seems he did not think it significant to explain his many assertions in any reasonable manner. As I grow older, I tend to think explaining is important; it's a good indication that one has actually thought about what one is contending. There was a time I read Ayn Rand with something approaching pleasure, delighting in some perverse sense in her solemn and relentless sermonizing. Now, I find it hard to read her without giggling.
I was surprised, though, to find myself disappointed when reading Mark Twain's Innocents Abroad. I recalled Twain as being an insightful and thoughful critic of human affairs, and as a great American comic writer. It was depressing to read his little sketches about this trip to Europe by what appeared to be a number of stock American comic characters, some of whom were characterized as mere buffoons, all of whom were uninteresting. They seemed to lack all credibility. Was Twain playing up to some readers back home, who actually found such stuff amusing? Even his description of the sights of the Azores, Gibraltar and Tangiers, for example, were uninspired. The foreigners are dirty and smelly, and so for that matter are their cities.
Now, I must confess that I simply stopped reading. I found myself dreading to read any more, after a time. It's quite possible that he eventually gave up his hackneyed descriptions of the antics of his fellow voyagers, and that he came to make interesting observations on the people and places he visited. If so, I didn't have the patience to read on. This work, and his other works, are apparently the subject of intense study by academics and creative writers. Perhaps I'm at fault.
But it seemed shoddy stuff, and even if the quality of his writing is attibutable to the fact that he was writing on a deadline, as a journalist, I think he comes off looking rather shabby. Mencken would have done far better with such subject matter. Some creative writers can be outstanding journalists as well, e.g. Stephen Crane. Did they have more respect for the intelligence of their readers, and their own intelligence, than old Sam? I wonder if he came to be a tiresome parody of himself in time--the folksy humorist. For that matter, Thurber would have done a better job making the characters amusing.
I was surprised, though, to find myself disappointed when reading Mark Twain's Innocents Abroad. I recalled Twain as being an insightful and thoughful critic of human affairs, and as a great American comic writer. It was depressing to read his little sketches about this trip to Europe by what appeared to be a number of stock American comic characters, some of whom were characterized as mere buffoons, all of whom were uninteresting. They seemed to lack all credibility. Was Twain playing up to some readers back home, who actually found such stuff amusing? Even his description of the sights of the Azores, Gibraltar and Tangiers, for example, were uninspired. The foreigners are dirty and smelly, and so for that matter are their cities.
Now, I must confess that I simply stopped reading. I found myself dreading to read any more, after a time. It's quite possible that he eventually gave up his hackneyed descriptions of the antics of his fellow voyagers, and that he came to make interesting observations on the people and places he visited. If so, I didn't have the patience to read on. This work, and his other works, are apparently the subject of intense study by academics and creative writers. Perhaps I'm at fault.
But it seemed shoddy stuff, and even if the quality of his writing is attibutable to the fact that he was writing on a deadline, as a journalist, I think he comes off looking rather shabby. Mencken would have done far better with such subject matter. Some creative writers can be outstanding journalists as well, e.g. Stephen Crane. Did they have more respect for the intelligence of their readers, and their own intelligence, than old Sam? I wonder if he came to be a tiresome parody of himself in time--the folksy humorist. For that matter, Thurber would have done a better job making the characters amusing.
Sunday, December 6, 2009
Speculations on the Cause of Stupidity
The plight of the Great Golfer, Tiger Woods, leads me to wonder whether sexual desire is the primary, if not the only, cause of stupidity--at least among males. One can't avoid the onslaught of "news" regarding what are apparently his many mistresses and affairs. In the face of this relentless assault, I've decided not to succumb to mere amusement or boredom (which strive for dominance of my attitude when faced with such circumstances), but to ponder its implications for the study of our idiocy.
One notes that this sort of thing happens fairly often to famous or infamous males, that it is normally found out, and found out in most cases because the man involved has been in some sense spectacularly stupid. I suspect it happens quite often to less than famous men as well, and that stupidity plays its part in their discomforture.
I'm not going to cite examples (and there are many), but submit for your consideration that this urge has at one time or the other turned all men into gibbering, drooling idiots, and likely will continue to do so. Further, I submit that all men know this, and many are horrified to find that this knowledge counts for nothing at all. We must be stupid in this case, and then, having been stupid, and knowing the consequences, we are stupid in our efforts to hide or mitigate our stupidity. There is something truly pathetic, indeed tragic, about this incapacity.
I wonder if women are subject to the same kind of volunteered imbecility. One hears of women being stupid when it comes to sex, of course, but it doesn't seem one hears of them going to the extemes men are capable of, except, perhaps, in the case of that astronaut who made herself ridiculuous.
Now, because the human capacity to be stupid is immense, it makes no sense to postulate a single cause of stupidy. We are capable of being profoundly stupid for various reasons, and in circumstances where sex is not involved. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that sex causes us to be stupid in particular ways, e.g. clownishly stupid, or too often, cruelly stupid.
Would we be better off without it? Chemical castration, anyone?
One notes that this sort of thing happens fairly often to famous or infamous males, that it is normally found out, and found out in most cases because the man involved has been in some sense spectacularly stupid. I suspect it happens quite often to less than famous men as well, and that stupidity plays its part in their discomforture.
I'm not going to cite examples (and there are many), but submit for your consideration that this urge has at one time or the other turned all men into gibbering, drooling idiots, and likely will continue to do so. Further, I submit that all men know this, and many are horrified to find that this knowledge counts for nothing at all. We must be stupid in this case, and then, having been stupid, and knowing the consequences, we are stupid in our efforts to hide or mitigate our stupidity. There is something truly pathetic, indeed tragic, about this incapacity.
I wonder if women are subject to the same kind of volunteered imbecility. One hears of women being stupid when it comes to sex, of course, but it doesn't seem one hears of them going to the extemes men are capable of, except, perhaps, in the case of that astronaut who made herself ridiculuous.
Now, because the human capacity to be stupid is immense, it makes no sense to postulate a single cause of stupidy. We are capable of being profoundly stupid for various reasons, and in circumstances where sex is not involved. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that sex causes us to be stupid in particular ways, e.g. clownishly stupid, or too often, cruelly stupid.
Would we be better off without it? Chemical castration, anyone?
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
Regarding Assumptions and Afghanistan
Assume, arguendo, that the armed forces of the U.S. should be in Afghanistan. Use of the word "should" implies the existence of a good reason, so let's further assume there is one, e.g., their presence prevents the Taliban from dominating that nation, or their presence prevents the use of that nation as a staging ground for terrorist attacks.
Rather significant assumptions, some might say.
If they are made, though, the addition of 30,000 soldiers to that presence may make very good sense, if that addition is necessary to the continued success of the desired good outcome. Let's assume that's the case as well.
Adding 30,000 soldiers while telling the world that you will be withdrawing soldiers as of 2011 doesn't seem to make sense, even given the assumptions made, unless one makes further assumptions. Those assumptions would be, I think, along the lines of (1) the danger of a Taliban resurgence or of the use of that nation as a haven for terrorists intent on wrecking havoc will diminish as of 2011, or (2) there will be a decreasing need for an American military presence to assure the desired good outcome commencing in 2011.
There would seem, though, to be little reason to believe either is likely to occur. It would appear probable that the Taliban won't be leaving Afghanistan as of 2011, or that, if they should do so, they will return. It would also seem probable that a steady decrease in the American military presence will not make the nation less a haven for terrorists. It becomes more and more difficult to make assumptions on top of assumptions.
What then is the likely purpose of proclaiming that the U.S. will add 30,000 soldiers to its military presence and will begin withdrawing troops as of 2011? It's difficult to think of any legitimate purpose. As a result, it is natural to wonder if the purpose is not legitimate, or is an indication that those in power have no idea what to do, and are therefore willing to tread water, as it were, while they try to come up with a course of action. Treading water in these circumstances, though, would seem to preclude adding soldiers; instead one would simply maintain the status quo. So, does it make sense to infer that the 30,000 are being sent in an effort (vain, one would think) to placate political opposition?
Rather significant assumptions, some might say.
If they are made, though, the addition of 30,000 soldiers to that presence may make very good sense, if that addition is necessary to the continued success of the desired good outcome. Let's assume that's the case as well.
Adding 30,000 soldiers while telling the world that you will be withdrawing soldiers as of 2011 doesn't seem to make sense, even given the assumptions made, unless one makes further assumptions. Those assumptions would be, I think, along the lines of (1) the danger of a Taliban resurgence or of the use of that nation as a haven for terrorists intent on wrecking havoc will diminish as of 2011, or (2) there will be a decreasing need for an American military presence to assure the desired good outcome commencing in 2011.
There would seem, though, to be little reason to believe either is likely to occur. It would appear probable that the Taliban won't be leaving Afghanistan as of 2011, or that, if they should do so, they will return. It would also seem probable that a steady decrease in the American military presence will not make the nation less a haven for terrorists. It becomes more and more difficult to make assumptions on top of assumptions.
What then is the likely purpose of proclaiming that the U.S. will add 30,000 soldiers to its military presence and will begin withdrawing troops as of 2011? It's difficult to think of any legitimate purpose. As a result, it is natural to wonder if the purpose is not legitimate, or is an indication that those in power have no idea what to do, and are therefore willing to tread water, as it were, while they try to come up with a course of action. Treading water in these circumstances, though, would seem to preclude adding soldiers; instead one would simply maintain the status quo. So, does it make sense to infer that the 30,000 are being sent in an effort (vain, one would think) to placate political opposition?
Saturday, November 28, 2009
"Climategate", Emails and Critical Thinking
The fact that one's email messages may be gathered up and relocated, as it were, to some "place" one would rather they did not appear is rather troubling. There are those who seem to stop thinking when they use electronic mail. Lawyers involved in e-discovery can find a great deal which may be useful to their clients, because there is, apparently, a tendency to become unguarded when at the keyboard; even to become stupid. It's as if we feel somewhat liberated because there is no the need to look at or directly confront others personally. We feel we are not accountable, and are among friends, but we are making marks which can always be found, and will always exist in one form or another.
It's easy to understand, then, the dismay of those whose emails which apparently indicate they have been doing some fudging or disregarding data are upset by this development, and are inclined to blame the "enemy" (who is, of course, unscrupulous and acting contrary to our best interests). But it also is easy to understand why those who can grab emails and publish them widely do so on this issue, and difficult to understand how scientists, or others, can be so unthinking as to make electronic records of this kind.
Like seemingly most everything else these days, climate change is a battleground. "Climate Change" seems a much shrewder description than "Global Warming" by the way. One is not thereby committed to the prediction that things will get warmer, and it seems there are those who say, now, that it isn't at all clear that warming will occur, and that greenhouse gases may in fact result in global cooling, or something else. One may also thereby dissociate oneself from Al Gore, who seems as incapable of appearing at ease and amicable in public as Richard Nixon, for what seem to be different reasons.
Those who claim that global climate change is not occurring, or at least that it is not occurring because of us, can be rather disconcerting. I recently saw an article in which it was claimed that Copenhagen will be the start of a one world government, and that the President intends to enter into a treaty of some kind without consultation with or approval by the Senate which will, inevitably, bankrupt us (further?) and leave us subject to claims by the Thirld World which will be enforced against us in some fashion, presumably by the infant global government which will be spawned.
Knowledgeable scientists may disagree more than we have been led to believe, but it seems to be the case that climate change has taken place in the past, and that its effects were dramatic. Some claim civilization would not have resulted but for the end of the last great Ice Age. What is called the "Little Ice Age" which ended in the mid-19th century did not destroy us, but apparently could have done so if things were a bit different, and caused quite a few serious problems in any case.
It would seem to make sense, then, to study climate change and take steps to avoid its serious effects. That would seem to mean that we should identify the causes of climate change (a single cause of such a complicated phenomenon seems unlikely). We should do so, obviously, using the best science possible. Political and other considerations should not be allowed to influence the study (they always do to some extent, but we should do our best to eliminate politicians and true believers of all sorts from the process). It would seem to make sense to pool our resources to make the study, and may be equally wise to do so based on the results of the study. The problem is that there are many who feel that no complete study has been made.
It makes no sense in any debate, let alone scientific study, to make certain positions sacrosanct, or certain information unavailable, or to actively attempt to silence disagreement. The response that "everything points to it" or "the evidence is overwhelming" has not been satisfactory. If the scientists who are making such claims have been reckless enough to do what their emails appear to indicate, they have only themselves to blame if they are distrusted. All information should be made available (it apparently can be, these days) and subject to dispute. For good or ill, elites can no longer dictate policy with the same ease as they have in the past because nothing is hidden. So, as there is to be a battle, why not get everything out in the open? How else can a reasonable decision be made?
It's easy to understand, then, the dismay of those whose emails which apparently indicate they have been doing some fudging or disregarding data are upset by this development, and are inclined to blame the "enemy" (who is, of course, unscrupulous and acting contrary to our best interests). But it also is easy to understand why those who can grab emails and publish them widely do so on this issue, and difficult to understand how scientists, or others, can be so unthinking as to make electronic records of this kind.
Like seemingly most everything else these days, climate change is a battleground. "Climate Change" seems a much shrewder description than "Global Warming" by the way. One is not thereby committed to the prediction that things will get warmer, and it seems there are those who say, now, that it isn't at all clear that warming will occur, and that greenhouse gases may in fact result in global cooling, or something else. One may also thereby dissociate oneself from Al Gore, who seems as incapable of appearing at ease and amicable in public as Richard Nixon, for what seem to be different reasons.
Those who claim that global climate change is not occurring, or at least that it is not occurring because of us, can be rather disconcerting. I recently saw an article in which it was claimed that Copenhagen will be the start of a one world government, and that the President intends to enter into a treaty of some kind without consultation with or approval by the Senate which will, inevitably, bankrupt us (further?) and leave us subject to claims by the Thirld World which will be enforced against us in some fashion, presumably by the infant global government which will be spawned.
Knowledgeable scientists may disagree more than we have been led to believe, but it seems to be the case that climate change has taken place in the past, and that its effects were dramatic. Some claim civilization would not have resulted but for the end of the last great Ice Age. What is called the "Little Ice Age" which ended in the mid-19th century did not destroy us, but apparently could have done so if things were a bit different, and caused quite a few serious problems in any case.
It would seem to make sense, then, to study climate change and take steps to avoid its serious effects. That would seem to mean that we should identify the causes of climate change (a single cause of such a complicated phenomenon seems unlikely). We should do so, obviously, using the best science possible. Political and other considerations should not be allowed to influence the study (they always do to some extent, but we should do our best to eliminate politicians and true believers of all sorts from the process). It would seem to make sense to pool our resources to make the study, and may be equally wise to do so based on the results of the study. The problem is that there are many who feel that no complete study has been made.
It makes no sense in any debate, let alone scientific study, to make certain positions sacrosanct, or certain information unavailable, or to actively attempt to silence disagreement. The response that "everything points to it" or "the evidence is overwhelming" has not been satisfactory. If the scientists who are making such claims have been reckless enough to do what their emails appear to indicate, they have only themselves to blame if they are distrusted. All information should be made available (it apparently can be, these days) and subject to dispute. For good or ill, elites can no longer dictate policy with the same ease as they have in the past because nothing is hidden. So, as there is to be a battle, why not get everything out in the open? How else can a reasonable decision be made?
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
Ezra Pound and Speculations on Monomania and Madness
I've been trying to read certain of the essays of Ezra Pound. I find it's not an easy task.
Pound was, by all accounts, a monumental figure in literature during the 20th Century. He was extraordinarily generous to many authors and poets of the time. He was clearly able and erudite, and this should be evident to any person who reads his work.
Reading his essays, though, (at least those I've read so far) I can't help but get the impression that something is very wrong with the author. I wonder if anyone shares this same impression, or if I'm merely so used to reading certain things, in certain ways, that I miss some essential point or pattern.
Pound was, of course, hospitalized for mental disease, and it may be that the essays I'm reading were for the most part written during that period. If that's not the case, though, I wonder if his manner of writing is peculiar to those who are monomaniacs, as it seems he was.
I'll refer to his essay on the letters exchanged by John Adams and Thomas Jefferson as an example. The essay celebrates them as indicative of the fact that America was, at least at one time, civilized, or at least was home to two civilized men (Pound seems to think America lost whatever civilization it possessed shortly after their deaths). So he begins the essay, and then something happens. Various other persons are referred to, from Henry Adams to Romulus Augustulus to Flaubert to Thomas Aquinas. They are either cited with approval, as it were, or disapproval, as are certain institutions. Banks, as institutions, don't meet with approval. Sometimes, but not often, Jefferson and Adams are quoted, though it's not clear if their correspondance with each other is the source of the quotations. Sometimes, it is clear that it is not the source. When quoted, they refer to money and interest on money, except at the very end of the essay, where it is noted (approvingly) that John Adams, I think it was, wrote that they should not die without explaining themselves to each other.
It is a very rambling work, and I finish it feeling that the author intended to say something about Adams, Jefferson and civilization, but just what he intended to say about them is unclear.
Pound was very concerned with usury, and it keeps popping up oddly in the essays I've been looking at, and not merely in those which are actually about usury and economics. He thinks it is a very bad thing. He seemed to feel that it is the cause of most, if not all, of the world's problems, and was the primary cause of both world wars. He said as much on the radio in Italy during WWII, and made anti-semitic statements apparently feeling that the Jews, if they did not create usury, practiced it more than others.
This concern seems to have been an overwhelming one, which he held for most of his life. When one becomes obsessed, does the object of the obsession become of such significance that it is always there, somehow always relevant to what we are thinking, doing and writing that must be mentioned, regardless of its relevance? And, is this a peculiarity of brilliant people, or particular kinds of brilliant people? One thinks of Bobby Fisher, and others--geniuses who are consumed by a very narrow and precise concern, unable to break away from it entirely, anywhere or anytime. Is this a necessary function of genius?
Pound was, by all accounts, a monumental figure in literature during the 20th Century. He was extraordinarily generous to many authors and poets of the time. He was clearly able and erudite, and this should be evident to any person who reads his work.
Reading his essays, though, (at least those I've read so far) I can't help but get the impression that something is very wrong with the author. I wonder if anyone shares this same impression, or if I'm merely so used to reading certain things, in certain ways, that I miss some essential point or pattern.
Pound was, of course, hospitalized for mental disease, and it may be that the essays I'm reading were for the most part written during that period. If that's not the case, though, I wonder if his manner of writing is peculiar to those who are monomaniacs, as it seems he was.
I'll refer to his essay on the letters exchanged by John Adams and Thomas Jefferson as an example. The essay celebrates them as indicative of the fact that America was, at least at one time, civilized, or at least was home to two civilized men (Pound seems to think America lost whatever civilization it possessed shortly after their deaths). So he begins the essay, and then something happens. Various other persons are referred to, from Henry Adams to Romulus Augustulus to Flaubert to Thomas Aquinas. They are either cited with approval, as it were, or disapproval, as are certain institutions. Banks, as institutions, don't meet with approval. Sometimes, but not often, Jefferson and Adams are quoted, though it's not clear if their correspondance with each other is the source of the quotations. Sometimes, it is clear that it is not the source. When quoted, they refer to money and interest on money, except at the very end of the essay, where it is noted (approvingly) that John Adams, I think it was, wrote that they should not die without explaining themselves to each other.
It is a very rambling work, and I finish it feeling that the author intended to say something about Adams, Jefferson and civilization, but just what he intended to say about them is unclear.
Pound was very concerned with usury, and it keeps popping up oddly in the essays I've been looking at, and not merely in those which are actually about usury and economics. He thinks it is a very bad thing. He seemed to feel that it is the cause of most, if not all, of the world's problems, and was the primary cause of both world wars. He said as much on the radio in Italy during WWII, and made anti-semitic statements apparently feeling that the Jews, if they did not create usury, practiced it more than others.
This concern seems to have been an overwhelming one, which he held for most of his life. When one becomes obsessed, does the object of the obsession become of such significance that it is always there, somehow always relevant to what we are thinking, doing and writing that must be mentioned, regardless of its relevance? And, is this a peculiarity of brilliant people, or particular kinds of brilliant people? One thinks of Bobby Fisher, and others--geniuses who are consumed by a very narrow and precise concern, unable to break away from it entirely, anywhere or anytime. Is this a necessary function of genius?
Sunday, November 22, 2009
H. L. Mencken and the Art of Journalism
Reading Mencken's articles makes me wonder how it was possible, then, for someone with his intelligence and lucid, interesting and sometimes even learned style to be a journalist, and even-it seems-a journalist who was widely read. I know of no journalist or columnist (or even blogger!) of our time who can compare. Were those who read and wrote newspapers in his era simply more intelligent, or better writers or readers, than we are now? If so, why?
It's important to note that I am speaking of articles in newspapers, not essays or articles in sophisticated journals. He wrote for newspapers in Baltimore, of course, but also in New York and Chicago (and probably elsewhere also). And, he wrote (I think) very well indeed, on a number of topics. I confess to a fondness for the great "bathtub hoax", but he obviously could and did write on many serious subjects.
Unlike Ambrose Bierce (another personal favorite), he did most of his writing for newspapers in the 20th century, so one would think his audience was wider than was Bierce's, and not so much of an identifiable "elite." Do current journalists and those others who feel they must tell us their opinions, and are allowed to do so by various media, feel they must talk down to us, or is it simply the case that they know no better?
It's important to note that I am speaking of articles in newspapers, not essays or articles in sophisticated journals. He wrote for newspapers in Baltimore, of course, but also in New York and Chicago (and probably elsewhere also). And, he wrote (I think) very well indeed, on a number of topics. I confess to a fondness for the great "bathtub hoax", but he obviously could and did write on many serious subjects.
Unlike Ambrose Bierce (another personal favorite), he did most of his writing for newspapers in the 20th century, so one would think his audience was wider than was Bierce's, and not so much of an identifiable "elite." Do current journalists and those others who feel they must tell us their opinions, and are allowed to do so by various media, feel they must talk down to us, or is it simply the case that they know no better?
Thursday, November 19, 2009
Trials in which "Failure is not an option"
With some frequency, I find myself grateful for the fact that I don't practice criminal law. I have some basic knowledge of it, though, and have tried civil cases, to judges and juries.
One of the few things I know about criminal law in the U.S. is that prosecutors face an extremely heavy burden of proof; that being, of course, to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. One of the things I know about juries in civil trials (which of course involve a lesser burden of proof) is that they can be unpredictable.
Now, there is disagreement over whether or not those we call the "9/11 defendants" should be tried in a U.S. District Court or a military tribunal. An argument may be made that the rights accorded American citizens under our criminal law should be restricted to those who can say civitas Americanus sum. But let's assume (that is to say, I will) that the Obama administration's determination they should be tried in District Court is appropriate. If that is the case, should the Attorney General be making statements such as "failure [to convict] is not an option" and should the President be predicting that convictions are forthcoming, and the death penalty will be imposed (without prejudging the matter, of course)?
I think not. Clearly, such statements give the impression that the outcome of the trials is preordained, an impression which those in authority are normally very careful to avoid, with good reason. And, making such statements seems to fly in face of the supposed purpose for holding the trials in District Court, which appears to be to assure fair trials, and to induce the world to marvel at the impartial nature of American justice and its care for the rights of defendants, even loathsome ones (who will, we are assured, be convicted).
So, it seems appropriate to wonder just what the administration thinks it is doing, and whether it is trying to do something it cannot do--assure fair and impartial trials and assure convictions. Already we see reference to "show trials." The effort to please all in politics is futile. It's likely this will result in trials which will please no one, and which will defy description.
One of the few things I know about criminal law in the U.S. is that prosecutors face an extremely heavy burden of proof; that being, of course, to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. One of the things I know about juries in civil trials (which of course involve a lesser burden of proof) is that they can be unpredictable.
Now, there is disagreement over whether or not those we call the "9/11 defendants" should be tried in a U.S. District Court or a military tribunal. An argument may be made that the rights accorded American citizens under our criminal law should be restricted to those who can say civitas Americanus sum. But let's assume (that is to say, I will) that the Obama administration's determination they should be tried in District Court is appropriate. If that is the case, should the Attorney General be making statements such as "failure [to convict] is not an option" and should the President be predicting that convictions are forthcoming, and the death penalty will be imposed (without prejudging the matter, of course)?
I think not. Clearly, such statements give the impression that the outcome of the trials is preordained, an impression which those in authority are normally very careful to avoid, with good reason. And, making such statements seems to fly in face of the supposed purpose for holding the trials in District Court, which appears to be to assure fair trials, and to induce the world to marvel at the impartial nature of American justice and its care for the rights of defendants, even loathsome ones (who will, we are assured, be convicted).
So, it seems appropriate to wonder just what the administration thinks it is doing, and whether it is trying to do something it cannot do--assure fair and impartial trials and assure convictions. Already we see reference to "show trials." The effort to please all in politics is futile. It's likely this will result in trials which will please no one, and which will defy description.
Wednesday, November 18, 2009
Tolerance and Hypocrisy
Is it possible to take position "A" and, at the same time tolerate position "not A" (-A)? If so, to what extent may one tolerate, without being hypocritical, or at least so inconsistent as to be justly criticized?
These seem to be questions we may be compelled to address with greater frequency in these increasingly contentious times. And, though I've posed them abstractly here, they're intended to address disputes we must deal with, or are at least confronted with, on a day to day basis, e.g. political, social and religious issues. "Confronted" in the sense that they are hurled at us by eager adherents of opposite positions from almost every side given the technology of communication.
X claims that God exists (or perhaps that a particular God does so; say a God worshipped by an established institutional religion). Y disagrees. May X and Y tolerate each other despite their disagreement? Should they respect each other in spite of their disagreement?
If X begins hectoring Y, trying to induce him to accept X's God, or if Y begins hectoring X to accept that there is no God, it would seem that in either case the one being hectored could legitmately resent it. If either sought to impose his/her position on the other, it would be legitimate to object. This seems obvious enough.
What if X asks Y to attend some religious ceremony, or Y asks X to accompany him to a speech by [insert name of prominent atheist]? I'd say there is nothing a priori objectionable in either case, and the manner of the response would, I think, vary with the circumstances, and how the request is made. In other words, if Y decided to attend the ceremony, or X the speech, I would contend that neither are necessarily hypocrites, or being untrue to themselves or their beliefs, by doing so. If either chooses to do as they are asked out of friendship, or respect, for example, they are not legitimately subject to criticism.
To criticize in such or similar circumstances seems to me a function of absolutism, regardless of the nature of the request made or position taken. It also would seem to be the result of needless concern with things beyond our control, which should be anathema to stoics, but also, I think, to any reasonable person, and (by definition, of course!) to any pragmatist, who will make decisions based on an an intelligent consideration of each situation, not according to some preset standard which is unquestioned. Generally, religious, political or social beliefs and positions will not be objectionable in and of themselves (there can be exceptions, obviously). Instead, the conduct of those who accept them may be objectionable.
There is no reason why X who accepts A must object every time -A rears its head.
These seem to be questions we may be compelled to address with greater frequency in these increasingly contentious times. And, though I've posed them abstractly here, they're intended to address disputes we must deal with, or are at least confronted with, on a day to day basis, e.g. political, social and religious issues. "Confronted" in the sense that they are hurled at us by eager adherents of opposite positions from almost every side given the technology of communication.
X claims that God exists (or perhaps that a particular God does so; say a God worshipped by an established institutional religion). Y disagrees. May X and Y tolerate each other despite their disagreement? Should they respect each other in spite of their disagreement?
If X begins hectoring Y, trying to induce him to accept X's God, or if Y begins hectoring X to accept that there is no God, it would seem that in either case the one being hectored could legitmately resent it. If either sought to impose his/her position on the other, it would be legitimate to object. This seems obvious enough.
What if X asks Y to attend some religious ceremony, or Y asks X to accompany him to a speech by [insert name of prominent atheist]? I'd say there is nothing a priori objectionable in either case, and the manner of the response would, I think, vary with the circumstances, and how the request is made. In other words, if Y decided to attend the ceremony, or X the speech, I would contend that neither are necessarily hypocrites, or being untrue to themselves or their beliefs, by doing so. If either chooses to do as they are asked out of friendship, or respect, for example, they are not legitimately subject to criticism.
To criticize in such or similar circumstances seems to me a function of absolutism, regardless of the nature of the request made or position taken. It also would seem to be the result of needless concern with things beyond our control, which should be anathema to stoics, but also, I think, to any reasonable person, and (by definition, of course!) to any pragmatist, who will make decisions based on an an intelligent consideration of each situation, not according to some preset standard which is unquestioned. Generally, religious, political or social beliefs and positions will not be objectionable in and of themselves (there can be exceptions, obviously). Instead, the conduct of those who accept them may be objectionable.
There is no reason why X who accepts A must object every time -A rears its head.
Sunday, November 15, 2009
Montaigne, Dualism and Christianity
I was reading Montaigne's essay On Presumption, and was struck by his rejection of the distinction between mind (or, more properly, soul) and body, which is something of a favorite of certain philosophers, poor fellows. I was impressed by the fact that he argued that such a distinction cannot even be properly sustained without the use of "hypocritcal monkey tricks" (why monkey?).
For some reason, I thought that someone of his time would be inclined to make the distinction. I thought the rejection of such dualisms was more of a modern point of view. Dewey, for example, famously rejected the many dualisms which litter the philosophical landscape. I've personally felt that those who profess dualism are being in some respects disingenuous as their conduct in life belies the dualisms they cling to, so I had a certain sympathy with Montaigne's view that they rely on hypocritical tricks, though as noted above I'm not sure they are monkey tricks, whatever that's intended to mean.
Montaigne also writes that the rejection of the soul-body distinction is very Christian, which I confess also took me by surprise. This is due to what used to be called the "resurrection of the body" (who can guess what it is called now?) which it is believed will happen in due time, at least according to the Catholic Credo. Soul and perfect body reunite for eternity.
I thought the rejection of dualism was a modern tendency, prompted in part by the development of the sciences. It's a bit humbling to encounter it in Montaigne, backed up by Catholic doctrine. Nothing new under the sun, indeed.
For some reason, I thought that someone of his time would be inclined to make the distinction. I thought the rejection of such dualisms was more of a modern point of view. Dewey, for example, famously rejected the many dualisms which litter the philosophical landscape. I've personally felt that those who profess dualism are being in some respects disingenuous as their conduct in life belies the dualisms they cling to, so I had a certain sympathy with Montaigne's view that they rely on hypocritical tricks, though as noted above I'm not sure they are monkey tricks, whatever that's intended to mean.
Montaigne also writes that the rejection of the soul-body distinction is very Christian, which I confess also took me by surprise. This is due to what used to be called the "resurrection of the body" (who can guess what it is called now?) which it is believed will happen in due time, at least according to the Catholic Credo. Soul and perfect body reunite for eternity.
I thought the rejection of dualism was a modern tendency, prompted in part by the development of the sciences. It's a bit humbling to encounter it in Montaigne, backed up by Catholic doctrine. Nothing new under the sun, indeed.
Wednesday, November 11, 2009
On Our Fascination with Disaster
We're being deluged (it seems an appropriate word) with TV shows regarding 2012 and our impending doom rather regularly these days. The latest broadcasts predicting our awful fate late in that year and detailing the many horrible ways we may perish were, of course, preceded by various other programs regarding Notradamus, supervolcanos, asteriod or comet strikes, etc., which seem make up a significant part of the fare available on the Discovery, History, National Geographic and Science channels.
We have, of course, been amusing ourselves for many, many years by claiming that our end will most certainly come at various times certain, but have been disappointed so many times in the past that it's difficult to understand why we continue to do so.
What is it about us that leads us to anticipate our violent end so frequently, and with such apparent...delight? Pleasure? For that matter, what prompts us to find portents of our doom in ancient Sumerian or Mayan works, or the Bible, or the scribblings of a 16th century pharmacist?
We certainly are capable of being very stupid, but are we really so stupid that we can persist in this kind of delusion over so many centuries, despite the fact that we have always been wrong? Granted, the great majority have refrained from giving away all their possessions, or drinking poisoned kool aid, in the past, but there seems always to be some group willing to accept, and anticipate, disaster without reservation.
I don't think stupidity is an adequate explanation. Perhaps we are doomed in the sense that we are never content; we're always unsatisfied. There always is something which makes us miserable. Rather than accept what life brings or (worse yet) trying to resolve our problems, we hope for an end to them. And, if we must end, why shouldn't everyone else?
We have, of course, been amusing ourselves for many, many years by claiming that our end will most certainly come at various times certain, but have been disappointed so many times in the past that it's difficult to understand why we continue to do so.
What is it about us that leads us to anticipate our violent end so frequently, and with such apparent...delight? Pleasure? For that matter, what prompts us to find portents of our doom in ancient Sumerian or Mayan works, or the Bible, or the scribblings of a 16th century pharmacist?
We certainly are capable of being very stupid, but are we really so stupid that we can persist in this kind of delusion over so many centuries, despite the fact that we have always been wrong? Granted, the great majority have refrained from giving away all their possessions, or drinking poisoned kool aid, in the past, but there seems always to be some group willing to accept, and anticipate, disaster without reservation.
I don't think stupidity is an adequate explanation. Perhaps we are doomed in the sense that we are never content; we're always unsatisfied. There always is something which makes us miserable. Rather than accept what life brings or (worse yet) trying to resolve our problems, we hope for an end to them. And, if we must end, why shouldn't everyone else?
Sunday, November 8, 2009
Reasonable and Unreasonable Responses in the Wake of Fort Hood
The responses to the murders at Fort Hood continue to interest me, from the outrage expressed over the apparently flippant attitude of the President on national TV shortly after the shootings, to the concerns expressed regarding anti-Muslim backlash, to the efforts of some to use them as a basis on which to question American foreign policy.
It may be argued that each response is understandable, given human nature. That may well be true. But such responses also raise questions regarding what response is reasonable, and what should be of primary concern.
After stopping the killer, the first concern, obviously it would seem, should be taking care of the wounded. That is being done. It's even possible that all may agree this is the case, even in this curious, disconnected world. Determining why and how this happened is a legitimate concern, correcting mistakes made which could have prevented it from happening, if any, is another; taking steps to prevent such things from occurring in the future is yet another. The law should take its course. Those seem to be reasonable responses to the killings.
One might feel outrage that the President acted inappropriately on national TV, and say so. That may at least be an understandable immediate response. Continuing to express such outrage, and writing about it repeatedly, or commenting on it before cameras repeatedly, however, doesn't seem a useful response, and clearly is not intended to address the event itself and its aftermath. Concerns regarding anti-Muslim backlash may also be understandable. However, such concerns as well do not address what happened, or how to prevent such things from happening in the future. The same may be said regarding criticism of foreign policy.
As to the latter two, it may be argued that they do address potential causes of such killings. Some are claiming that the shooter was reacting to being harassed for being a Muslim, or that such things are to be anticipated when we are in conflict with Muslim countries. However, neither such harassment, if it occurred, or the foreign policy involved, can reasonably be said to justify the killings. People who feel they have been verbally abused in some fashion, or disagree with U.S. policy, should nevertheless not kill people. The fact that they do so is not in any legitimate sense caused by the verbal abuse, or foreign policy, unless we are to take the position that murder is a legitimate, or somehow necessary or probable, response in those circumstances. Why, then, emphasize such things in responding to the killings? What purpose does it serve to do so?
When not directly involved in a horrible event, we generally, and those in the media in particular, tend to use it in some fashion to make points we/they consider important in some sense, but which ultimately fails to address the event. We lose sight of the event itself; it diminishes in importance, and our often disconnected opinions and concerns take priority.
It may be argued that each response is understandable, given human nature. That may well be true. But such responses also raise questions regarding what response is reasonable, and what should be of primary concern.
After stopping the killer, the first concern, obviously it would seem, should be taking care of the wounded. That is being done. It's even possible that all may agree this is the case, even in this curious, disconnected world. Determining why and how this happened is a legitimate concern, correcting mistakes made which could have prevented it from happening, if any, is another; taking steps to prevent such things from occurring in the future is yet another. The law should take its course. Those seem to be reasonable responses to the killings.
One might feel outrage that the President acted inappropriately on national TV, and say so. That may at least be an understandable immediate response. Continuing to express such outrage, and writing about it repeatedly, or commenting on it before cameras repeatedly, however, doesn't seem a useful response, and clearly is not intended to address the event itself and its aftermath. Concerns regarding anti-Muslim backlash may also be understandable. However, such concerns as well do not address what happened, or how to prevent such things from happening in the future. The same may be said regarding criticism of foreign policy.
As to the latter two, it may be argued that they do address potential causes of such killings. Some are claiming that the shooter was reacting to being harassed for being a Muslim, or that such things are to be anticipated when we are in conflict with Muslim countries. However, neither such harassment, if it occurred, or the foreign policy involved, can reasonably be said to justify the killings. People who feel they have been verbally abused in some fashion, or disagree with U.S. policy, should nevertheless not kill people. The fact that they do so is not in any legitimate sense caused by the verbal abuse, or foreign policy, unless we are to take the position that murder is a legitimate, or somehow necessary or probable, response in those circumstances. Why, then, emphasize such things in responding to the killings? What purpose does it serve to do so?
When not directly involved in a horrible event, we generally, and those in the media in particular, tend to use it in some fashion to make points we/they consider important in some sense, but which ultimately fails to address the event. We lose sight of the event itself; it diminishes in importance, and our often disconnected opinions and concerns take priority.
Friday, November 6, 2009
Explanation, Justification and Blame in the Modern World
An army major kills several of his fellow soldiers at Fort Hood. Instantly, efforts are made by the media and bloggers, and others, not simply to report what happened, but to "explain" it. Indeed, it seems that very shortly after such an event occurs, reporting becomes a secondary concern. With "explanation" comes blame, and justification. Technology is now such that this all occurs instantly, as well.
The speed with which this all occurs discourages critical thinking. Analysis is instant as well and, because it is instant, it's not thoughtful, and may be misinformed. But, it is there, and exists permanently, in cyberspace, for all to see.
One must be well-informed, and have the opportunity to think, in order to think well. Because time is of the essence (to use a well-known legal phrase) in today's media and culture, and on the Internet, not only is critical thinking discouraged--thinking itself is discouraged. There simply is no time to think. One must get one's thoughts and words out there, as quickly as possible. Ultimately, nothing else is as important.
Does the speed and ease with which we can all now communicate induce us to express our thoughts, desires, hates, etc., without taking the time or trouble to actually think about them? In other words, does it encourage us to proclaim to the world at large what is most irrational in us? If this is the case, we may become completely reactive in our participation in the world, and react unthinkingly. Conduct will be blamed, or justified, without reasonable basis. We may come to judge the appropriateness of our own conduct with the same thoughtless speed as we judge the conduct of others, and as we see others judge the conduct of others. Then, we may act accordingly. That is something to be feared.
The speed with which this all occurs discourages critical thinking. Analysis is instant as well and, because it is instant, it's not thoughtful, and may be misinformed. But, it is there, and exists permanently, in cyberspace, for all to see.
One must be well-informed, and have the opportunity to think, in order to think well. Because time is of the essence (to use a well-known legal phrase) in today's media and culture, and on the Internet, not only is critical thinking discouraged--thinking itself is discouraged. There simply is no time to think. One must get one's thoughts and words out there, as quickly as possible. Ultimately, nothing else is as important.
Does the speed and ease with which we can all now communicate induce us to express our thoughts, desires, hates, etc., without taking the time or trouble to actually think about them? In other words, does it encourage us to proclaim to the world at large what is most irrational in us? If this is the case, we may become completely reactive in our participation in the world, and react unthinkingly. Conduct will be blamed, or justified, without reasonable basis. We may come to judge the appropriateness of our own conduct with the same thoughtless speed as we judge the conduct of others, and as we see others judge the conduct of others. Then, we may act accordingly. That is something to be feared.
Wednesday, November 4, 2009
The Legal Significance of "Gay Marriage"
Specifically, what would be its significance, in the law? In what respect would it make a difference, in the law?
Certain unions in addition to those traditionally recognized between a man and woman would be recognized as having certain legal characteristics. Certain legal rights and obligations between the partners, and the between the union and third parties, would apply in the case of the union, or partnership (which is what a marriage is, as to money, property and contracts) of two humans of the same sex in addition to two humans of the opposite sex (why "opposite", by the way?). There would be more work for lawyers (we keep creating such work, on an almost daily basis, and yet complain that there are too many). More work for the courts, as there is no reason to believe such unions between two of the same sex will be any more successful than those between two of the opposite sex. And that would, as they say, be that--for the law.
There are dangers in legislating morality. Sometimes, morality figures in the creation of law. The law, once in place, is not moral, however. It is a functioning system, often of great complexity.
The law shouldn't concern itself with the morality of marriage. Let religions treat as "marriage" whatever they deem appropriate. Let the law treat "marriage" as it already treats it--as a partnership, nothing more, nothing less. If ideas associated with the word "marriage" create problems in the law, eliminate it from the law, and let all such unions be called "domestic unions" (or partnerships, or whatever) and be done with it.
Certain unions in addition to those traditionally recognized between a man and woman would be recognized as having certain legal characteristics. Certain legal rights and obligations between the partners, and the between the union and third parties, would apply in the case of the union, or partnership (which is what a marriage is, as to money, property and contracts) of two humans of the same sex in addition to two humans of the opposite sex (why "opposite", by the way?). There would be more work for lawyers (we keep creating such work, on an almost daily basis, and yet complain that there are too many). More work for the courts, as there is no reason to believe such unions between two of the same sex will be any more successful than those between two of the opposite sex. And that would, as they say, be that--for the law.
There are dangers in legislating morality. Sometimes, morality figures in the creation of law. The law, once in place, is not moral, however. It is a functioning system, often of great complexity.
The law shouldn't concern itself with the morality of marriage. Let religions treat as "marriage" whatever they deem appropriate. Let the law treat "marriage" as it already treats it--as a partnership, nothing more, nothing less. If ideas associated with the word "marriage" create problems in the law, eliminate it from the law, and let all such unions be called "domestic unions" (or partnerships, or whatever) and be done with it.
Tuesday, November 3, 2009
Ayn Rand, Romanticism and Napoleon
The recent publication of new biographies of Rand prompts me to express some thoughts about her and her status, or perhaps I should say etiology.
Like so many, I read The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged and was impressed by them on first reading. I was, however, an adolescent at that time. I was also impressed by the works of Nietzsche in those days. Now, though....
She chose to call her philosophy "Objectivism." She seemed to consider herself something of a realist. But, I think of her as being very much in the Romantic tradition. There is something Napoleonic about her fictional characters (although Napoleon would never have had the time or the patience to indulge in the lectures her characters indulge in, all too often) and the legend of Napoleon, if not the man himself after his youth, was a Romantic creation. She doesn't just favor the individual and expound the importance of individual rights--she glorifies the individual, who is invariably a genius of some kind in her fiction.
Her vision is a very unrealistic vision, I think. Wisdom involves the rational acknowledgement of limitations. This doesn't mean the unthinking acceptance of them, but a recognition that they exist. To deny their existence is stupidity, and ultimately is of no benefit; one must know a problem in order to solve it, and solving it may involve cooperation with others. Goethe, if I recall correctly, said of Napoleon that he was as intelligent as a man can be without wisdom, and as great as a man can be without virtue. For all his ability, he cannot be said to have been great benefactor of humanity. That seems to me a fair description of the Randian Ideal Person. Rand was a Romantic, and Romantics are not known for their thinking. Philosophy involves more than chest-pounding.
Like so many, I read The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged and was impressed by them on first reading. I was, however, an adolescent at that time. I was also impressed by the works of Nietzsche in those days. Now, though....
She chose to call her philosophy "Objectivism." She seemed to consider herself something of a realist. But, I think of her as being very much in the Romantic tradition. There is something Napoleonic about her fictional characters (although Napoleon would never have had the time or the patience to indulge in the lectures her characters indulge in, all too often) and the legend of Napoleon, if not the man himself after his youth, was a Romantic creation. She doesn't just favor the individual and expound the importance of individual rights--she glorifies the individual, who is invariably a genius of some kind in her fiction.
Her vision is a very unrealistic vision, I think. Wisdom involves the rational acknowledgement of limitations. This doesn't mean the unthinking acceptance of them, but a recognition that they exist. To deny their existence is stupidity, and ultimately is of no benefit; one must know a problem in order to solve it, and solving it may involve cooperation with others. Goethe, if I recall correctly, said of Napoleon that he was as intelligent as a man can be without wisdom, and as great as a man can be without virtue. For all his ability, he cannot be said to have been great benefactor of humanity. That seems to me a fair description of the Randian Ideal Person. Rand was a Romantic, and Romantics are not known for their thinking. Philosophy involves more than chest-pounding.
Sunday, November 1, 2009
In Praise of "In Praise of Doubt"
I'm reading a rather nice book called In Praise of Doubt by Berger and Zijderveld. Critical of what they call "Fundamentalism" and "Relativism", which they characterize as two forms of escape from the uncertainty of modern life, the authors seem to propose a kind of middle course or path (where have I heard that before?) which seems to be a species of pragmatic (my word) skepticism.
Intelligent doubt (my words) is useful as its application prevents fanaticism which can result from the acceptance of certain ideas as absolute. Intelligent doubt is not, however, the kind of absolute doubt that relativists and postmodernists indulge in. Their escape from uncertainty takes the form of an absolute belief that nothing is, or can be, "true"; all thoughts, ideas are equally invalid narratives. So, in effect, who the hell cares? Choices may have to be made, but one is relieved from the hard work of thinking. No choice, or decision, is better than another. The authors note that both forms of escape may be harmless when confined to sects or university faculties, but become problems when their true believers try to impose them on others.
The emphasis on the usefulness of doubt strikes me as a pragmatic point of view. Dewey criticized famously the "quest for certainity." However, like Peirce, he rejected the kind of futile or faux "doubt" professed by some philosophers and other intellectuals because, I think, he recognized that such "doubt" has nothing to do with, and is belied by, the way we live, i.e. how we conduct ourselves, and how we meet and resolve questions and problems we encounter in life.
Intelligent doubt (my words) is useful as its application prevents fanaticism which can result from the acceptance of certain ideas as absolute. Intelligent doubt is not, however, the kind of absolute doubt that relativists and postmodernists indulge in. Their escape from uncertainty takes the form of an absolute belief that nothing is, or can be, "true"; all thoughts, ideas are equally invalid narratives. So, in effect, who the hell cares? Choices may have to be made, but one is relieved from the hard work of thinking. No choice, or decision, is better than another. The authors note that both forms of escape may be harmless when confined to sects or university faculties, but become problems when their true believers try to impose them on others.
The emphasis on the usefulness of doubt strikes me as a pragmatic point of view. Dewey criticized famously the "quest for certainity." However, like Peirce, he rejected the kind of futile or faux "doubt" professed by some philosophers and other intellectuals because, I think, he recognized that such "doubt" has nothing to do with, and is belied by, the way we live, i.e. how we conduct ourselves, and how we meet and resolve questions and problems we encounter in life.
Thursday, October 29, 2009
Imperialism and Philosophy
I wonder if a study has ever been done, or a book or article ever written, regarding whether there is a connection between European imperialism and European Philosophy. Certain European philosophers have tried to create great philosophical systems which encompass, and purportedly explain, most everything. They appear to have a desire, so to speak, to conquer and dominate the world of thought, and perhaps in supposedly explaining humans, society and history, to know all if not to control all. This is a tendency which isn't necessarily limited to philosophers, however. Freud seemingly sought to explain all conduct by reference to sexual experiences. The gigantic systems which are constructed seem to be based on relatively simple premises or causes from which all else is said to follow.
The question arises (that is to say, I think it does) whether there is something in the European character which encourages the tendency to philosophize in this fashion. Must philosophy account for (encompass, or rule) everything in order to have worth? Is there some latent Caesarian ideal, a remnant of nostalgia for the Roman Empire? A kind of intellectual habit resulting from centuries under absolute monarchies, and the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church, that fascinating ghost of the Empire?
What, though, of later European philosophies of existentialism or nihilism, for example? These, it seems, cannot readily be described as imperial. But perhaps they are the natural result of European loss of empire. They no longer rule the world, and that world-view has collapsed. What would be more natural than for imperialists who have lost their imperium to despair of any real order, now that their order has gone?
A bit of speculative fancy, for what it's worth.
The question arises (that is to say, I think it does) whether there is something in the European character which encourages the tendency to philosophize in this fashion. Must philosophy account for (encompass, or rule) everything in order to have worth? Is there some latent Caesarian ideal, a remnant of nostalgia for the Roman Empire? A kind of intellectual habit resulting from centuries under absolute monarchies, and the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church, that fascinating ghost of the Empire?
What, though, of later European philosophies of existentialism or nihilism, for example? These, it seems, cannot readily be described as imperial. But perhaps they are the natural result of European loss of empire. They no longer rule the world, and that world-view has collapsed. What would be more natural than for imperialists who have lost their imperium to despair of any real order, now that their order has gone?
A bit of speculative fancy, for what it's worth.
Wednesday, October 28, 2009
Thoughts on Disputation and Sabre Fencing
A stop-cut, in sabre fencing, generally consists of striking with the edge of your blade the weapon-arm of your opponent as he is in the process of making an attack--or, more properly these days as I understand it, the stop-cut is made as the attack develops, but before the attack has been established.
Sabre like foil is subject to the rule of right-of-way. An attack will always win a point if it is not first parried. So, if I fencer is being attacked, the attacker has the right-of-way and, even if the attacked fencer strikes first, the attacker scores, unless the attack has been appropriately parried (blocked) by the blade of the fencer subject to the attack.
Especially as speed is emphasized in sabre today more than it ever has been, it is difficult to make an effective stop-cut. It is particularly difficult for the older, slower, less agile fencer (that would include me, alas). I have made what I thought were perfectly nice stop-cuts only to find the point going to my opponent. An attack, it seems, develops very swiftly indeed these days. I wonder if the emphasis on speed and the attack is good for the sport. The art of defense, and therefore skill, in fencing is diminished where speed takes precedence.
There is a parellel with the art (should I say sport?) of disputation. Particularly since the arena of argument has become so all-encompassing, and so dominated by media which regularly relies on instant analysis, and also because, I think, of a reduction in attention span arising from the speed with which words and thoughts are exchanged, an attack in argument will most likely "win" in the sense that it will be remembered, and recognized, more easily and clearly than any rebuttal. An attack in fencing or in argument can be made with skill, certainly. But, an effective defense will generally require more skill, and moving from a defense to a counter attack is an ever greater test of the skill of a fencer or debater.
The result is not merely that the use of skill, and therefore intelligence, in debate of issues great or small is decreased. Attacks, though successful, are as a result less and less subject to test, and we have less and less chance to determine what argument would win out in a true test of ideas.
Sabre like foil is subject to the rule of right-of-way. An attack will always win a point if it is not first parried. So, if I fencer is being attacked, the attacker has the right-of-way and, even if the attacked fencer strikes first, the attacker scores, unless the attack has been appropriately parried (blocked) by the blade of the fencer subject to the attack.
Especially as speed is emphasized in sabre today more than it ever has been, it is difficult to make an effective stop-cut. It is particularly difficult for the older, slower, less agile fencer (that would include me, alas). I have made what I thought were perfectly nice stop-cuts only to find the point going to my opponent. An attack, it seems, develops very swiftly indeed these days. I wonder if the emphasis on speed and the attack is good for the sport. The art of defense, and therefore skill, in fencing is diminished where speed takes precedence.
There is a parellel with the art (should I say sport?) of disputation. Particularly since the arena of argument has become so all-encompassing, and so dominated by media which regularly relies on instant analysis, and also because, I think, of a reduction in attention span arising from the speed with which words and thoughts are exchanged, an attack in argument will most likely "win" in the sense that it will be remembered, and recognized, more easily and clearly than any rebuttal. An attack in fencing or in argument can be made with skill, certainly. But, an effective defense will generally require more skill, and moving from a defense to a counter attack is an ever greater test of the skill of a fencer or debater.
The result is not merely that the use of skill, and therefore intelligence, in debate of issues great or small is decreased. Attacks, though successful, are as a result less and less subject to test, and we have less and less chance to determine what argument would win out in a true test of ideas.
Monday, October 26, 2009
Regarding Arrogance, Stoicism and Global Politics
One wishes the stoic dictum that we should be indifferent to that which is beyond our control was more commonly applied in all things. It would not only make us more tranquil, in that such things would not control, excite or disturb us, but would be a healthy check on the tendency we humans have to attempt to regulate the lives of others.
The Bushian dream of bringing Western (or perhaps more properly American) style representative government to Iraq, the Middle East and beyond is, quite literally, blowing up. That dream is apparently inspired by the view that such government is to be valued and indeed preferred, in all cases. An argument can be made in support of that proposition. But, the belief that such a government may be imposed, or that it will thrive in all places and in all cases, is not well founded.
There is a certain arrogance in maintaining we know what is best for the world. But it is more than arrogance to believe that we can impose what we think is best. When we believe that, and act accordingly, we're being stupid and wasteful. Even worse, we do harm to ourselves and others.
We cannot, of course, be indifferent to what threatens us, even when it appears to be beyond our control. Then, we're justified in seeing if it can be brought into our control, even if to a limited extent. But, we must be reasonable in determining what we can and can't do. Nation-building is a dangerous, complicated and hugely expensive enterprise and should not be undertaken (especially by a debtor nation with its own problems) unless there is a probability of success. What reason is there to believe there is even a chance of success, at this time?
The Bushian dream of bringing Western (or perhaps more properly American) style representative government to Iraq, the Middle East and beyond is, quite literally, blowing up. That dream is apparently inspired by the view that such government is to be valued and indeed preferred, in all cases. An argument can be made in support of that proposition. But, the belief that such a government may be imposed, or that it will thrive in all places and in all cases, is not well founded.
There is a certain arrogance in maintaining we know what is best for the world. But it is more than arrogance to believe that we can impose what we think is best. When we believe that, and act accordingly, we're being stupid and wasteful. Even worse, we do harm to ourselves and others.
We cannot, of course, be indifferent to what threatens us, even when it appears to be beyond our control. Then, we're justified in seeing if it can be brought into our control, even if to a limited extent. But, we must be reasonable in determining what we can and can't do. Nation-building is a dangerous, complicated and hugely expensive enterprise and should not be undertaken (especially by a debtor nation with its own problems) unless there is a probability of success. What reason is there to believe there is even a chance of success, at this time?
Sunday, October 25, 2009
Religion, History, Simplicity and Intelligence
Many intelligent people have been, and are, religious. So, the former should not be precluded by the latter. But, does the latter preclude acceptance of certain kinds of religion, over time?
To use one example, there must have been something about Christianity which accounts for its engulfment of the Roman Empire and dominance of portions of the world, and history, for such a long time. There are those who maintain that its early success is the result of its absorption of aspects of various popular cults prevalent in the Empire, and that its later success is similarly based on its ability to incorporate characteristics of local customs and beliefs (through saints, for example)into its system.
Certain aspects of certain religions, though, are naturally fantastic or become so with the passage of time. God becoming man was not necessarily an unusual idea in ancient times. However, it's something that would not be expected by most these days. Similarly, religions based on images, customs and language of those living thousands of years in the past, in very different societies, may be expected to wear out over time.
The less convoluted the religion, the less dependent it is on images, customs and beliefs which are themselves tied to particular times and societies, the more likely it is to withstand challenges. Thus, the impersonal "God of the philosophers" is more acceptable in the long run, and less subject to attack, than the anthropomorphic Gods of most organized religions. Is such a God therefore more believable--more worthy of belief--than others? Perhaps, in the sense, at least, that it is not as open to the criticism that it is a purely human creation.
To use one example, there must have been something about Christianity which accounts for its engulfment of the Roman Empire and dominance of portions of the world, and history, for such a long time. There are those who maintain that its early success is the result of its absorption of aspects of various popular cults prevalent in the Empire, and that its later success is similarly based on its ability to incorporate characteristics of local customs and beliefs (through saints, for example)into its system.
Certain aspects of certain religions, though, are naturally fantastic or become so with the passage of time. God becoming man was not necessarily an unusual idea in ancient times. However, it's something that would not be expected by most these days. Similarly, religions based on images, customs and language of those living thousands of years in the past, in very different societies, may be expected to wear out over time.
The less convoluted the religion, the less dependent it is on images, customs and beliefs which are themselves tied to particular times and societies, the more likely it is to withstand challenges. Thus, the impersonal "God of the philosophers" is more acceptable in the long run, and less subject to attack, than the anthropomorphic Gods of most organized religions. Is such a God therefore more believable--more worthy of belief--than others? Perhaps, in the sense, at least, that it is not as open to the criticism that it is a purely human creation.
Saturday, October 24, 2009
The Danger of Intellectual Leisure
The danger lies in the fact that it may create time for thought, but only of a sort. Plato, if I recall correctly, and others seemed to feel that freedom from the needs and cares of normal life was necessary to achieve knowledge and wisdom. Thus, all those unlike Plato and those Plato felt admirable were very busy creatures in his horrid Republic, while the Platos had nothing more to do than think and debate great thoughts beyond the minds of normal humans. Plato's ideal state had its share of helots.
But, it's arguable that those who have nothing to do but think great thoughts will become so detached from daily cares and concerns that they come to view them as unimportant. "Great thoughts" therefore may become detached as well, uninformed by and even irrelevant to the lives of all but a few.
Intelligence is most useful when it has a purpose in view, and, unless one is interested purely in amusement or intellectual exercise (which certainly have their place in life), the most significant purpose, one would think, would be the resolution of problems we enounter in life, as individuals and communities. Thought for the sake of thought is an extremely selfish pursuit.
But, it's arguable that those who have nothing to do but think great thoughts will become so detached from daily cares and concerns that they come to view them as unimportant. "Great thoughts" therefore may become detached as well, uninformed by and even irrelevant to the lives of all but a few.
Intelligence is most useful when it has a purpose in view, and, unless one is interested purely in amusement or intellectual exercise (which certainly have their place in life), the most significant purpose, one would think, would be the resolution of problems we enounter in life, as individuals and communities. Thought for the sake of thought is an extremely selfish pursuit.
Friday, October 23, 2009
The President and Fox News
I don't watch Fox News, as, when I watch cable news, I do so early in the morning, and Fox at that time shows only the annoying "Fox and Friends." I don't watch opinion shows of any kind, on Fox or other networks. What little I've seen of them disappoints, regardless of the political point of view pontificated. Olbermann seems patronizing; Beck is simply creepy. CNN's Headline News is tolerable, as commentary is largely absent. I'm indifferent to pundits generally.
I think, however, that it is no longer reasonable to classify any media as objective, if ever it was. Technology now allows and even encourages the proliferation of opinions, regardless of merit. Media seems compelled to produce supposed experts to comment and express opinions regarding virtually anything, on any occasion, and at all times.
If, therefore, there is anything special about Fox News, it's likely that it is less subtle in promoting its point of view than other networks, or that it does so more often than others.
That the President's minions seek to detract from the status and popularity of Fox News is not surprising. The Administration has its own views, and wants those views to be accepted. People are, I think, free to boycott it or any other network. Expression of displeasure, or even contempt, doesn't amount to actionable limitation on the "freedom of the press" which some, like Gore Vidal, would claim has not been a factor in our republic for quite some time in any case.
I think the administration can only take this so far, however. I think there are some in the media whose reaction to the President is extreme, and peculiar. This should be noted. But it ultimately will do him no good to engage with the mudslingers on their level.
I think, however, that it is no longer reasonable to classify any media as objective, if ever it was. Technology now allows and even encourages the proliferation of opinions, regardless of merit. Media seems compelled to produce supposed experts to comment and express opinions regarding virtually anything, on any occasion, and at all times.
If, therefore, there is anything special about Fox News, it's likely that it is less subtle in promoting its point of view than other networks, or that it does so more often than others.
That the President's minions seek to detract from the status and popularity of Fox News is not surprising. The Administration has its own views, and wants those views to be accepted. People are, I think, free to boycott it or any other network. Expression of displeasure, or even contempt, doesn't amount to actionable limitation on the "freedom of the press" which some, like Gore Vidal, would claim has not been a factor in our republic for quite some time in any case.
I think the administration can only take this so far, however. I think there are some in the media whose reaction to the President is extreme, and peculiar. This should be noted. But it ultimately will do him no good to engage with the mudslingers on their level.
Wednesday, October 21, 2009
Evil and Punishment
It's hard to understand why someone would deliberately harm a small child. It's hard to understand how someone would engage in conduct which most would find unquestionably evil, such as torturing and murdering anyone.
Whether a person can be described as evil is a question sometimes debated in philosophy, and in law. Various issues arise, e.g. whether a person is more properly considered sick than evil. Clarence Darrow, it seems, felt that no person could properly be held responsible for his actions.
Accepting that people should not be allowed to torture and murder, and that it is one of the functions of government and law to prevent this from occurring, it would seem, though, that such questions are immaterial, in the sense that whether the torturer/murderer is sick or evil he must be prevented from doing so in the future. He should therefore be isolated until it can reasonably be determined that he will not do so again. If it cannot, then he should remain isolated.
It is more a question of safeguarding others, than determining responsibility. If someone presents a danger to others, prevent him from being a danger to others, regardless of the reason why he presents a danger. Punishment need not be the end, and it seems an unnecessary consideration.
Whether a person can be described as evil is a question sometimes debated in philosophy, and in law. Various issues arise, e.g. whether a person is more properly considered sick than evil. Clarence Darrow, it seems, felt that no person could properly be held responsible for his actions.
Accepting that people should not be allowed to torture and murder, and that it is one of the functions of government and law to prevent this from occurring, it would seem, though, that such questions are immaterial, in the sense that whether the torturer/murderer is sick or evil he must be prevented from doing so in the future. He should therefore be isolated until it can reasonably be determined that he will not do so again. If it cannot, then he should remain isolated.
It is more a question of safeguarding others, than determining responsibility. If someone presents a danger to others, prevent him from being a danger to others, regardless of the reason why he presents a danger. Punishment need not be the end, and it seems an unnecessary consideration.
Sunday, October 18, 2009
The Relevance of Philosophy: A Test
Before considering any philosophical issue or problem, ask yourself: Will the consideration of this issue, or the resolution of this problem, make any difference in how I live ( i.e. how I conduct myself, or interact with "the world" or others)? If it will not, pass on to other things; or at least recognize that the issue/problem is insignificant, and engage it as you would a kind of game or exercise.
Friday, October 16, 2009
Peirce, God and Musement
I find myself fascinated by C.S. Peirce's article A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God. I fear part, at least, of the fascination results from the fact I find it so difficult to understand. I wish he had elaborated on the argument (perhaps he did in some work of which I'm not aware).
These days, it is hard to avoid encountering some book, or person, or article, or forum, or blog where the reality of God is not debated. I'm of the opinion that the debate is futile. I have trouble accepting the possibility that an argument, based on sound reasons, is available in support of God's existence. I think we lack the capacity to even create such an argument. We know, simply, what we know, and what we know is the world in which we live (or rather know it to a certain extent). We can to a certain extent explain things in that world. Our whole ability to reason, to argue, to explain is grounded in and results from that world. If God is beyond that world, we cannot truly know him, let alone explain him or his existence.
But, Peirce makes me wonder.
These days, it is hard to avoid encountering some book, or person, or article, or forum, or blog where the reality of God is not debated. I'm of the opinion that the debate is futile. I have trouble accepting the possibility that an argument, based on sound reasons, is available in support of God's existence. I think we lack the capacity to even create such an argument. We know, simply, what we know, and what we know is the world in which we live (or rather know it to a certain extent). We can to a certain extent explain things in that world. Our whole ability to reason, to argue, to explain is grounded in and results from that world. If God is beyond that world, we cannot truly know him, let alone explain him or his existence.
But, Peirce makes me wonder.
Tuesday, October 13, 2009
In Praise of (a kind of) Isolationism
Yes, it's been one of the bad "isms" for some time now. But, really, in a time of limited money and resources, it makes a certain sense to refrain from engaging in disputes around the world, especially when, in doing so, we make the huge expenditures in lives, time and money which come with military action.
The U.S. simply cannot afford to police the world. In certain cases, it should not do so for reasons not associated with the need to intelligently allocate resources. But, even setting aside the question whether the intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq is appropriate on moral grounds, it is necessary to determine whether the potential benefits of being the global policeman are such as to justify the costs.
The belief that we will create functional democracies in the style of the West in such countries doesn't seem credible. Even our ability to stabilize them is doubtful. It is likely that when American troops depart, these nations, or perhaps more properly regions, will go back to being what they have been for centuries.
The U.S. is spectacularly in debt. This will erode American power, inexorably, over the long term. It makes sense to focus on correcting internal problems. This need not mean ignoring the affairs of the world. It will merely mean refraining from trying to dominate them at all times, in all places. The U.S. must pick its spots in the future, carefully.
The U.S. simply cannot afford to police the world. In certain cases, it should not do so for reasons not associated with the need to intelligently allocate resources. But, even setting aside the question whether the intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq is appropriate on moral grounds, it is necessary to determine whether the potential benefits of being the global policeman are such as to justify the costs.
The belief that we will create functional democracies in the style of the West in such countries doesn't seem credible. Even our ability to stabilize them is doubtful. It is likely that when American troops depart, these nations, or perhaps more properly regions, will go back to being what they have been for centuries.
The U.S. is spectacularly in debt. This will erode American power, inexorably, over the long term. It makes sense to focus on correcting internal problems. This need not mean ignoring the affairs of the world. It will merely mean refraining from trying to dominate them at all times, in all places. The U.S. must pick its spots in the future, carefully.
Sunday, October 11, 2009
Tolerance of Religions
No, I don't refer to religious tolerance as commonly understood, i.e. tolerance among religions. I refer to tolerating the existence of religion, and I suppose of the religious, provided they don't foist their beliefs on others.
It seems a significant topic, given the focus on those being called (I'm not sure why) the "new atheists" and what is being called (I'm not sure why) the "new atheism." There seems to be little new about them, or it, beyond the fact that they, and it, are here now. Perhaps they proclaim more loudly, more vehemently, than their predecessors and are more antireligious than areligious.
There is nothing necessarily wrong about religion, or the religious. Some religious beliefs may seem far-fetched, silly or simply weird. But, if those beliefs and their believers cause no harm to others, then what reason is there to attack them, to publicly ridicule them?
Tit for tat, of course. When, for example, the religious demand that their beliefs be given the force of law, or be imposed on others, protest is entirely appropriate. The same may be said about certain political or social beliefs, however. Religious beliefs are not objectionable because they are religious, but if their consequences or adherents are adverse to the rights of others.
That is the sort of thing, though, to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Outright and general condemnation is more an expression of prejudice than intelligence.
It seems a significant topic, given the focus on those being called (I'm not sure why) the "new atheists" and what is being called (I'm not sure why) the "new atheism." There seems to be little new about them, or it, beyond the fact that they, and it, are here now. Perhaps they proclaim more loudly, more vehemently, than their predecessors and are more antireligious than areligious.
There is nothing necessarily wrong about religion, or the religious. Some religious beliefs may seem far-fetched, silly or simply weird. But, if those beliefs and their believers cause no harm to others, then what reason is there to attack them, to publicly ridicule them?
Tit for tat, of course. When, for example, the religious demand that their beliefs be given the force of law, or be imposed on others, protest is entirely appropriate. The same may be said about certain political or social beliefs, however. Religious beliefs are not objectionable because they are religious, but if their consequences or adherents are adverse to the rights of others.
That is the sort of thing, though, to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Outright and general condemnation is more an expression of prejudice than intelligence.
Friday, October 9, 2009
The Nobel Peace Prize
The Nobel Peace Prize has become increasingly an expression of political and social opinion rather than a recognition of achievement. So, it likely is not taken as seriously as it was in the past. However, the choice of the President, which apparently has been made purely and indeed expressly because of a feeling, and a kind of hope, makes one wonder just what the Nobels mean, anymore, outside perhaps of the sciences and medicine.
The fact that reaction to the award has generally been described as "stunned" is significant. Relatively few appear to believe the President deserves the award, at this time (I expect efforts at justification of the award will be forthcoming). So, it seems pointless to debate whether it was appropriately given. If it is to be awarded based on remarkable achievement in the cause of peace, then it seems apparent that the choice, this time, is inappropriate.
More interesting to me, I confess, is the effect to be anticipated. The President is already very well received in Europe, so the Prize cannot be said to do him a great deal of good there. I doubt it will do him much good in the country over which he presides. I suspect this will simply give greater weight to the view that he is of little or no weight, and that those who applaud him do so for no legitimate reason. And, it will make him appear to be less worthy if he fails to accomplish what he, and others, apparently believe should be accomplished on his watch. Those who award the prize may have thought to do him a favor, but ultimately I think they have merely encouraged his enemies, and increased his burden.
The fact that reaction to the award has generally been described as "stunned" is significant. Relatively few appear to believe the President deserves the award, at this time (I expect efforts at justification of the award will be forthcoming). So, it seems pointless to debate whether it was appropriately given. If it is to be awarded based on remarkable achievement in the cause of peace, then it seems apparent that the choice, this time, is inappropriate.
More interesting to me, I confess, is the effect to be anticipated. The President is already very well received in Europe, so the Prize cannot be said to do him a great deal of good there. I doubt it will do him much good in the country over which he presides. I suspect this will simply give greater weight to the view that he is of little or no weight, and that those who applaud him do so for no legitimate reason. And, it will make him appear to be less worthy if he fails to accomplish what he, and others, apparently believe should be accomplished on his watch. Those who award the prize may have thought to do him a favor, but ultimately I think they have merely encouraged his enemies, and increased his burden.
Wednesday, October 7, 2009
Letterman
This is a rather odd one. Not that it is surprising an older man in his position has affairs with younger women on his staff. That seems all too common. The reaction, and especially the extent and nature of the analysis involved, is interesting and curious.
NOW's participation in the pontificating should be unsurprising. But, it was spectacularly silent regarding the liaisons of Bill Clinton, so one must wonder about its position in these circumstances. It seems that it may choose to express outrage carefully, on a case-by-case basis, with an eye towards politics, at least, if not funding.
The statements of the "experts" regarding whether he should or should not have gone public, or involved the police, and the exposure given to their views, prompts speculation regarding the extent to which we now judge not merely the acts of others (especially those of celebrities), but also the way in which they divulge, or try to avoid divulging, their faults. It isn't merely the conduct of others which merits our condemnation, it is the method by which they seek to mitigate the results of our condemnation.
There seems to be no limit to our self-righteousness.
NOW's participation in the pontificating should be unsurprising. But, it was spectacularly silent regarding the liaisons of Bill Clinton, so one must wonder about its position in these circumstances. It seems that it may choose to express outrage carefully, on a case-by-case basis, with an eye towards politics, at least, if not funding.
The statements of the "experts" regarding whether he should or should not have gone public, or involved the police, and the exposure given to their views, prompts speculation regarding the extent to which we now judge not merely the acts of others (especially those of celebrities), but also the way in which they divulge, or try to avoid divulging, their faults. It isn't merely the conduct of others which merits our condemnation, it is the method by which they seek to mitigate the results of our condemnation.
There seems to be no limit to our self-righteousness.
Tuesday, October 6, 2009
Of Human Dullness
Have we learned anything in, say, the last 2500 years, which provides any guidance in how to live? I would say not. Plato, Aristotle, the stoics, the epicureans (to refer only to the West) have not been bested, I would maintain. They and others of the ancients have pretty well described and considered the reasonable options. We persist only in considering them again and again. Sometimes, someone like Nietzsche shows up and yowls about rather far-fetched and romantic alternatives which are either unattainable, or twisted by others to become fantastic perversions of wisdom. Perhaps we're limited in our options by our nature, though, in which case this would not be so much a cause a cause for shame as for resignation.
Saturday, October 3, 2009
Absolutism
Meaning, in this case, the tendency to make absolute statements, e.g. X is always wrong, or incorrect; anyone who believes Y is ignorant, etc. I may be imagining things, but this seems to be a growing tendency, in politics, in religion, in society. Is there something about this time which engenders this folly? We only know Socrates through Plato and a few others, but if those accounts are true, he was admirable, at least, in admitting he knew nothing. But, there are so many, now, who claim to know all, at least as to certain subjects. And, they do so loudly, even belligerently. Have we actually come to believe in our own intelligence? If we were intelligent, the most we could claim is that we are justified in applying intelligence to the solution of problems.
Thursday, October 1, 2009
Polanski Again
The squabble over this becomes more interesting. Hollywood, and (worse yet) Europe v. "middle America" (whatever that may be).
30+ years on, it's difficult to even remember how this transpired. He apparently pled guilty in expectation of a particular plea bargain, and, when that did not pan out, left the country to avoid jail time. He apparently settled a civil suit brought by the victim.
One assumes he is guilty, and that he has escaped punishment for many, many years. It appears law enforcement could have picked him up long before this, so it's reasonable to wonder why it didn't do so, and why it's decided to do so now, particularly when the victim has made it clear she wants no part in the forthcoming circus.
It is silly to maintain he should not be punished, particularly for reasons based on the fact that he's an accomplished filmmaker with lots of famous friends. He should have been punished long ago. But it's not silly to wonder what will be accomplished by the ensuing expensive, time-and-resource-consuming mess, especially given the passage of time. Will wrongdoers be deterred as a result? Not likely. Less fortunate wrongdoers would have served their time by now, and very few, if any, will have the options, and be given the leeway, Polanski has had, in the future. Is this being done because law enforcement feels guilty for giving him a pass for three decades?
30+ years on, it's difficult to even remember how this transpired. He apparently pled guilty in expectation of a particular plea bargain, and, when that did not pan out, left the country to avoid jail time. He apparently settled a civil suit brought by the victim.
One assumes he is guilty, and that he has escaped punishment for many, many years. It appears law enforcement could have picked him up long before this, so it's reasonable to wonder why it didn't do so, and why it's decided to do so now, particularly when the victim has made it clear she wants no part in the forthcoming circus.
It is silly to maintain he should not be punished, particularly for reasons based on the fact that he's an accomplished filmmaker with lots of famous friends. He should have been punished long ago. But it's not silly to wonder what will be accomplished by the ensuing expensive, time-and-resource-consuming mess, especially given the passage of time. Will wrongdoers be deterred as a result? Not likely. Less fortunate wrongdoers would have served their time by now, and very few, if any, will have the options, and be given the leeway, Polanski has had, in the future. Is this being done because law enforcement feels guilty for giving him a pass for three decades?
Tuesday, September 29, 2009
On the Naming of Cats
It seems to me that Sulla (short for Lucius Cornelius Sulla) is a fine name for a cat. From what we know of the man, he was lucky (thus "Felix"), ruthless but kind and loving to friends, playful, utterly self-centered, convinced of the rightness of himself and his goals, sensual, cruel, clever and fascinating. That sounds very much like a cat, to me.
Monday, September 28, 2009
Speculations on Zugzwang
Zugzwang is a concept in chess. Essentially, it describes a position where any move taken has adverse consequences. One must move, but one doesn't want to move. The concept also has applications in other areas, such as game theory, I believe.
The concept may have application in life, as well. Consider the political status quo in this remarkable country (the USA). How is it possible for a mere citizen to analyze, let alone make reasonable judgments, concerning the issues of the day? Most are too busy with other things to give such issues any thought. So, we tend to react to them without much thought; frankly, this may be the only way we can address them, all things being equal. Consequently, the decisions we make are likely to be ill-informed, and adverse, to us and others. Nonetheless, decisions must be made. The reasonable course would seem to be to make decisions which will probably result in the least harm, to us and others.
The stoics teach us there are things within our control, and things outside of our control. The more we concern ourselves with things outside our control, the less happy, and tranquil, we shall be.
Perhaps the best we can do is strive to make reasonable decisions regarding matters within our control. For good or ill, such matters are limited. Perhaps we shouldn't try to make decisions regarding what others should or should not do. A selfish point of view, one might say. But if each tried to act reasonably in their personal lives, perhaps reasonableness would prevail in society as well.
Some hurried thoughts on how to live, and cope, in a world where so many seek to make others think, and act, as they think is best.
The concept may have application in life, as well. Consider the political status quo in this remarkable country (the USA). How is it possible for a mere citizen to analyze, let alone make reasonable judgments, concerning the issues of the day? Most are too busy with other things to give such issues any thought. So, we tend to react to them without much thought; frankly, this may be the only way we can address them, all things being equal. Consequently, the decisions we make are likely to be ill-informed, and adverse, to us and others. Nonetheless, decisions must be made. The reasonable course would seem to be to make decisions which will probably result in the least harm, to us and others.
The stoics teach us there are things within our control, and things outside of our control. The more we concern ourselves with things outside our control, the less happy, and tranquil, we shall be.
Perhaps the best we can do is strive to make reasonable decisions regarding matters within our control. For good or ill, such matters are limited. Perhaps we shouldn't try to make decisions regarding what others should or should not do. A selfish point of view, one might say. But if each tried to act reasonably in their personal lives, perhaps reasonableness would prevail in society as well.
Some hurried thoughts on how to live, and cope, in a world where so many seek to make others think, and act, as they think is best.
Sunday, September 27, 2009
Polanski
One has to wonder, regarding this arrest, whether law enforcement agents in the U.S. actually believe they have nothing better to do. Assuming the propriety of the charges, and that a crime was committed 32 years ago, is it worth the costs involved in prosecuting at this late date, not to mention the discord that is likely to result to the life of the girl, now woman, involved (one hopes she was consulted, and will cooperate, as would seem necessary to any successful prosecution; but who knows?), the media distraction, etc.? I would think this money and energy be would be better spent on other things.
The only Polanski film I know anything about is Chinatown, and it's one of my favorites. But I have no special regard for this now rather elderly man, and don't believe the crime involved is insignificant. Ultimately, though, in this and in everything it's important to establish priorities and intelligently allocate resources.
The only Polanski film I know anything about is Chinatown, and it's one of my favorites. But I have no special regard for this now rather elderly man, and don't believe the crime involved is insignificant. Ultimately, though, in this and in everything it's important to establish priorities and intelligently allocate resources.
Saturday, September 26, 2009
Salve
This is in the nature of an experiment. There is a certain narcissim involved in this, I suppose. It's a kind of display of self-regard. Or, perhaps, a kind of public diary, assuming one wants to be personal. I'm not certain I do. But, there is an attraction in doing something like this; one gains a kind of immortality in cyberspace, and that may be the only immortality attainable to us.
As the name suggests, I'm a ciceronian of sorts, in a way a follower of Cicero. I can't pretend to emulate his style, as I think Erasmus did. But, for all his faults, vanity being predominate, I admire what he managed to achieve, in writing, in law, in politics and philosophy. He managed to rise to the top of the Roman world without slaughtering tens of thousands if not more, no mean feat.
Philosophy, fencing, chess, books, society, politics are my interests and I'll address them here, if only for my own amusement. But, perhaps there'll be something more than that. We shall see, or at least I will.
For the time being, vale.
As the name suggests, I'm a ciceronian of sorts, in a way a follower of Cicero. I can't pretend to emulate his style, as I think Erasmus did. But, for all his faults, vanity being predominate, I admire what he managed to achieve, in writing, in law, in politics and philosophy. He managed to rise to the top of the Roman world without slaughtering tens of thousands if not more, no mean feat.
Philosophy, fencing, chess, books, society, politics are my interests and I'll address them here, if only for my own amusement. But, perhaps there'll be something more than that. We shall see, or at least I will.
For the time being, vale.
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