The responses to the murders at Fort Hood continue to interest me, from the outrage expressed over the apparently flippant attitude of the President on national TV shortly after the shootings, to the concerns expressed regarding anti-Muslim backlash, to the efforts of some to use them as a basis on which to question American foreign policy.
It may be argued that each response is understandable, given human nature. That may well be true. But such responses also raise questions regarding what response is reasonable, and what should be of primary concern.
After stopping the killer, the first concern, obviously it would seem, should be taking care of the wounded. That is being done. It's even possible that all may agree this is the case, even in this curious, disconnected world. Determining why and how this happened is a legitimate concern, correcting mistakes made which could have prevented it from happening, if any, is another; taking steps to prevent such things from occurring in the future is yet another. The law should take its course. Those seem to be reasonable responses to the killings.
One might feel outrage that the President acted inappropriately on national TV, and say so. That may at least be an understandable immediate response. Continuing to express such outrage, and writing about it repeatedly, or commenting on it before cameras repeatedly, however, doesn't seem a useful response, and clearly is not intended to address the event itself and its aftermath. Concerns regarding anti-Muslim backlash may also be understandable. However, such concerns as well do not address what happened, or how to prevent such things from happening in the future. The same may be said regarding criticism of foreign policy.
As to the latter two, it may be argued that they do address potential causes of such killings. Some are claiming that the shooter was reacting to being harassed for being a Muslim, or that such things are to be anticipated when we are in conflict with Muslim countries. However, neither such harassment, if it occurred, or the foreign policy involved, can reasonably be said to justify the killings. People who feel they have been verbally abused in some fashion, or disagree with U.S. policy, should nevertheless not kill people. The fact that they do so is not in any legitimate sense caused by the verbal abuse, or foreign policy, unless we are to take the position that murder is a legitimate, or somehow necessary or probable, response in those circumstances. Why, then, emphasize such things in responding to the killings? What purpose does it serve to do so?
When not directly involved in a horrible event, we generally, and those in the media in particular, tend to use it in some fashion to make points we/they consider important in some sense, but which ultimately fails to address the event. We lose sight of the event itself; it diminishes in importance, and our often disconnected opinions and concerns take priority.
A CICERONIAN LAWYER'S MUSINGS ON LAW, PHILOSOPHY, CURRENT AFFAIRS, LITERATURE, HISTORY AND LIVING LIFE SECUNDUM NATURAM
Sunday, November 8, 2009
Friday, November 6, 2009
Explanation, Justification and Blame in the Modern World
An army major kills several of his fellow soldiers at Fort Hood. Instantly, efforts are made by the media and bloggers, and others, not simply to report what happened, but to "explain" it. Indeed, it seems that very shortly after such an event occurs, reporting becomes a secondary concern. With "explanation" comes blame, and justification. Technology is now such that this all occurs instantly, as well.
The speed with which this all occurs discourages critical thinking. Analysis is instant as well and, because it is instant, it's not thoughtful, and may be misinformed. But, it is there, and exists permanently, in cyberspace, for all to see.
One must be well-informed, and have the opportunity to think, in order to think well. Because time is of the essence (to use a well-known legal phrase) in today's media and culture, and on the Internet, not only is critical thinking discouraged--thinking itself is discouraged. There simply is no time to think. One must get one's thoughts and words out there, as quickly as possible. Ultimately, nothing else is as important.
Does the speed and ease with which we can all now communicate induce us to express our thoughts, desires, hates, etc., without taking the time or trouble to actually think about them? In other words, does it encourage us to proclaim to the world at large what is most irrational in us? If this is the case, we may become completely reactive in our participation in the world, and react unthinkingly. Conduct will be blamed, or justified, without reasonable basis. We may come to judge the appropriateness of our own conduct with the same thoughtless speed as we judge the conduct of others, and as we see others judge the conduct of others. Then, we may act accordingly. That is something to be feared.
The speed with which this all occurs discourages critical thinking. Analysis is instant as well and, because it is instant, it's not thoughtful, and may be misinformed. But, it is there, and exists permanently, in cyberspace, for all to see.
One must be well-informed, and have the opportunity to think, in order to think well. Because time is of the essence (to use a well-known legal phrase) in today's media and culture, and on the Internet, not only is critical thinking discouraged--thinking itself is discouraged. There simply is no time to think. One must get one's thoughts and words out there, as quickly as possible. Ultimately, nothing else is as important.
Does the speed and ease with which we can all now communicate induce us to express our thoughts, desires, hates, etc., without taking the time or trouble to actually think about them? In other words, does it encourage us to proclaim to the world at large what is most irrational in us? If this is the case, we may become completely reactive in our participation in the world, and react unthinkingly. Conduct will be blamed, or justified, without reasonable basis. We may come to judge the appropriateness of our own conduct with the same thoughtless speed as we judge the conduct of others, and as we see others judge the conduct of others. Then, we may act accordingly. That is something to be feared.
Wednesday, November 4, 2009
The Legal Significance of "Gay Marriage"
Specifically, what would be its significance, in the law? In what respect would it make a difference, in the law?
Certain unions in addition to those traditionally recognized between a man and woman would be recognized as having certain legal characteristics. Certain legal rights and obligations between the partners, and the between the union and third parties, would apply in the case of the union, or partnership (which is what a marriage is, as to money, property and contracts) of two humans of the same sex in addition to two humans of the opposite sex (why "opposite", by the way?). There would be more work for lawyers (we keep creating such work, on an almost daily basis, and yet complain that there are too many). More work for the courts, as there is no reason to believe such unions between two of the same sex will be any more successful than those between two of the opposite sex. And that would, as they say, be that--for the law.
There are dangers in legislating morality. Sometimes, morality figures in the creation of law. The law, once in place, is not moral, however. It is a functioning system, often of great complexity.
The law shouldn't concern itself with the morality of marriage. Let religions treat as "marriage" whatever they deem appropriate. Let the law treat "marriage" as it already treats it--as a partnership, nothing more, nothing less. If ideas associated with the word "marriage" create problems in the law, eliminate it from the law, and let all such unions be called "domestic unions" (or partnerships, or whatever) and be done with it.
Certain unions in addition to those traditionally recognized between a man and woman would be recognized as having certain legal characteristics. Certain legal rights and obligations between the partners, and the between the union and third parties, would apply in the case of the union, or partnership (which is what a marriage is, as to money, property and contracts) of two humans of the same sex in addition to two humans of the opposite sex (why "opposite", by the way?). There would be more work for lawyers (we keep creating such work, on an almost daily basis, and yet complain that there are too many). More work for the courts, as there is no reason to believe such unions between two of the same sex will be any more successful than those between two of the opposite sex. And that would, as they say, be that--for the law.
There are dangers in legislating morality. Sometimes, morality figures in the creation of law. The law, once in place, is not moral, however. It is a functioning system, often of great complexity.
The law shouldn't concern itself with the morality of marriage. Let religions treat as "marriage" whatever they deem appropriate. Let the law treat "marriage" as it already treats it--as a partnership, nothing more, nothing less. If ideas associated with the word "marriage" create problems in the law, eliminate it from the law, and let all such unions be called "domestic unions" (or partnerships, or whatever) and be done with it.
Tuesday, November 3, 2009
Ayn Rand, Romanticism and Napoleon
The recent publication of new biographies of Rand prompts me to express some thoughts about her and her status, or perhaps I should say etiology.
Like so many, I read The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged and was impressed by them on first reading. I was, however, an adolescent at that time. I was also impressed by the works of Nietzsche in those days. Now, though....
She chose to call her philosophy "Objectivism." She seemed to consider herself something of a realist. But, I think of her as being very much in the Romantic tradition. There is something Napoleonic about her fictional characters (although Napoleon would never have had the time or the patience to indulge in the lectures her characters indulge in, all too often) and the legend of Napoleon, if not the man himself after his youth, was a Romantic creation. She doesn't just favor the individual and expound the importance of individual rights--she glorifies the individual, who is invariably a genius of some kind in her fiction.
Her vision is a very unrealistic vision, I think. Wisdom involves the rational acknowledgement of limitations. This doesn't mean the unthinking acceptance of them, but a recognition that they exist. To deny their existence is stupidity, and ultimately is of no benefit; one must know a problem in order to solve it, and solving it may involve cooperation with others. Goethe, if I recall correctly, said of Napoleon that he was as intelligent as a man can be without wisdom, and as great as a man can be without virtue. For all his ability, he cannot be said to have been great benefactor of humanity. That seems to me a fair description of the Randian Ideal Person. Rand was a Romantic, and Romantics are not known for their thinking. Philosophy involves more than chest-pounding.
Like so many, I read The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged and was impressed by them on first reading. I was, however, an adolescent at that time. I was also impressed by the works of Nietzsche in those days. Now, though....
She chose to call her philosophy "Objectivism." She seemed to consider herself something of a realist. But, I think of her as being very much in the Romantic tradition. There is something Napoleonic about her fictional characters (although Napoleon would never have had the time or the patience to indulge in the lectures her characters indulge in, all too often) and the legend of Napoleon, if not the man himself after his youth, was a Romantic creation. She doesn't just favor the individual and expound the importance of individual rights--she glorifies the individual, who is invariably a genius of some kind in her fiction.
Her vision is a very unrealistic vision, I think. Wisdom involves the rational acknowledgement of limitations. This doesn't mean the unthinking acceptance of them, but a recognition that they exist. To deny their existence is stupidity, and ultimately is of no benefit; one must know a problem in order to solve it, and solving it may involve cooperation with others. Goethe, if I recall correctly, said of Napoleon that he was as intelligent as a man can be without wisdom, and as great as a man can be without virtue. For all his ability, he cannot be said to have been great benefactor of humanity. That seems to me a fair description of the Randian Ideal Person. Rand was a Romantic, and Romantics are not known for their thinking. Philosophy involves more than chest-pounding.
Sunday, November 1, 2009
In Praise of "In Praise of Doubt"
I'm reading a rather nice book called In Praise of Doubt by Berger and Zijderveld. Critical of what they call "Fundamentalism" and "Relativism", which they characterize as two forms of escape from the uncertainty of modern life, the authors seem to propose a kind of middle course or path (where have I heard that before?) which seems to be a species of pragmatic (my word) skepticism.
Intelligent doubt (my words) is useful as its application prevents fanaticism which can result from the acceptance of certain ideas as absolute. Intelligent doubt is not, however, the kind of absolute doubt that relativists and postmodernists indulge in. Their escape from uncertainty takes the form of an absolute belief that nothing is, or can be, "true"; all thoughts, ideas are equally invalid narratives. So, in effect, who the hell cares? Choices may have to be made, but one is relieved from the hard work of thinking. No choice, or decision, is better than another. The authors note that both forms of escape may be harmless when confined to sects or university faculties, but become problems when their true believers try to impose them on others.
The emphasis on the usefulness of doubt strikes me as a pragmatic point of view. Dewey criticized famously the "quest for certainity." However, like Peirce, he rejected the kind of futile or faux "doubt" professed by some philosophers and other intellectuals because, I think, he recognized that such "doubt" has nothing to do with, and is belied by, the way we live, i.e. how we conduct ourselves, and how we meet and resolve questions and problems we encounter in life.
Intelligent doubt (my words) is useful as its application prevents fanaticism which can result from the acceptance of certain ideas as absolute. Intelligent doubt is not, however, the kind of absolute doubt that relativists and postmodernists indulge in. Their escape from uncertainty takes the form of an absolute belief that nothing is, or can be, "true"; all thoughts, ideas are equally invalid narratives. So, in effect, who the hell cares? Choices may have to be made, but one is relieved from the hard work of thinking. No choice, or decision, is better than another. The authors note that both forms of escape may be harmless when confined to sects or university faculties, but become problems when their true believers try to impose them on others.
The emphasis on the usefulness of doubt strikes me as a pragmatic point of view. Dewey criticized famously the "quest for certainity." However, like Peirce, he rejected the kind of futile or faux "doubt" professed by some philosophers and other intellectuals because, I think, he recognized that such "doubt" has nothing to do with, and is belied by, the way we live, i.e. how we conduct ourselves, and how we meet and resolve questions and problems we encounter in life.
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