Sunday, November 22, 2009

H. L. Mencken and the Art of Journalism

Reading Mencken's articles makes me wonder how it was possible, then, for someone with his intelligence and lucid, interesting and sometimes even learned style to be a journalist, and even-it seems-a journalist who was widely read.  I know of no journalist or columnist (or even blogger!) of our time who can compare.  Were those who read and wrote newspapers in his era simply more intelligent, or better writers or readers, than we are now?  If so, why?

It's important to note that I am speaking of articles in newspapers, not essays or articles in sophisticated journals.  He wrote for newspapers in Baltimore, of course, but also in New York and Chicago (and probably elsewhere also).  And, he wrote (I think) very well indeed, on a number of topics.  I confess to a fondness for the great "bathtub hoax", but he obviously could and did write on many serious subjects.

Unlike Ambrose Bierce (another personal favorite), he did most of his writing for newspapers in the 20th century, so one would think his audience was wider than was Bierce's, and not so much of an identifiable "elite."  Do current journalists and those others who feel they must tell us their opinions, and are allowed to do so by various media, feel they must talk down to us, or is it simply the case that they know no better?

Thursday, November 19, 2009

Trials in which "Failure is not an option"

With some frequency, I find myself grateful for the fact that I don't practice criminal law.  I have some basic knowledge of it, though, and have tried civil cases, to judges and juries.

One of the few things I know about criminal law in the U.S. is that prosecutors face an extremely heavy burden of proof; that being, of course, to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  One of the things I know about juries in civil trials (which of course involve a lesser burden of proof) is that they can be unpredictable.

Now, there is disagreement over whether or not those we call the "9/11 defendants" should be tried in a U.S. District Court or a military tribunal.  An argument may be made that the rights accorded American citizens under our criminal law should be restricted to those who can say civitas Americanus sum. But let's assume (that is to say, I will) that the Obama administration's determination they should be tried in District Court is appropriate.  If that is the case, should the Attorney General be making statements such as "failure [to convict] is not an option" and should the President be predicting that convictions are forthcoming, and the death penalty will be imposed (without prejudging the matter, of course)?

I think not.  Clearly, such statements give the impression that the outcome of the trials is preordained, an impression which those in authority are normally very careful to avoid, with good reason.  And, making such statements seems to fly in face of the supposed purpose for holding the trials in District Court, which appears to be to assure fair trials, and to induce the world to marvel at the impartial nature of American justice and its care for the rights of defendants, even loathsome ones (who will, we are assured, be convicted).

So, it seems appropriate to wonder just what the administration thinks it is doing, and whether it is trying to do something it cannot do--assure fair and impartial trials and assure convictions.  Already we see reference to "show trials."  The effort to please all in politics is futile.  It's likely this will result in trials which will please no one, and which will defy description.

Wednesday, November 18, 2009

Tolerance and Hypocrisy

Is it possible to take position "A" and, at the same time tolerate position "not A" (-A)?  If so, to what extent may one tolerate, without being hypocritical, or at least so inconsistent as to be justly criticized?

These seem to be questions we may be compelled to address with greater frequency in these increasingly contentious times.  And, though I've posed them abstractly here, they're intended to address disputes we must deal with, or are at least confronted with, on a day to day basis, e.g. political, social and religious issues.  "Confronted" in the sense that they are hurled at us by eager adherents of opposite positions from almost every side given the technology of communication.

X claims that God exists (or perhaps that a particular God does so; say a God worshipped by an established institutional religion).  Y disagrees.  May X and Y tolerate each other despite their disagreement?  Should they respect each other in spite of their disagreement?

If X begins hectoring Y, trying to induce him to accept X's God, or if Y begins hectoring X to accept that there is no God, it would seem that in either case the one being hectored could legitmately resent it.  If either sought to impose his/her position on the other, it would be legitimate to object.  This seems obvious enough.

What if X asks Y to attend some religious ceremony, or Y asks X to accompany him to a speech by [insert name of prominent atheist]?  I'd say there is nothing a priori objectionable in either case, and the manner of the response would, I think, vary with the circumstances, and how the request is made. In other words, if Y decided to attend the ceremony, or X the speech, I would contend that neither are necessarily hypocrites, or being untrue to themselves or their beliefs, by doing so.  If either chooses to do as they are asked out of friendship, or respect, for example, they are not legitimately subject to criticism.

To criticize in such or similar circumstances seems to me a function of absolutism, regardless of the nature of the request made or position taken.  It also would seem to be the result of needless concern with things beyond our control, which should be anathema to stoics, but also, I think, to any reasonable person, and (by definition, of course!) to any pragmatist, who will make decisions based on an an intelligent consideration of each situation, not according to some preset standard which is unquestioned.  Generally, religious, political or social beliefs and positions will not be objectionable in and of themselves (there can be exceptions, obviously).  Instead, the conduct of those who accept them may be objectionable.

There is no reason why X who accepts A must object every time -A rears its head.

Sunday, November 15, 2009

Montaigne, Dualism and Christianity

I was reading Montaigne's essay On Presumption, and was struck by his rejection of the distinction between mind (or, more properly, soul) and body, which is something of a favorite of certain philosophers, poor fellows.  I was impressed by the fact that he argued that such a distinction cannot even be properly sustained without the use of "hypocritcal monkey tricks" (why monkey?).

For some reason, I thought that someone of his time would be inclined to make the distinction.  I thought the rejection of such dualisms was more of a modern point of view.  Dewey, for example, famously rejected the many dualisms which litter the philosophical landscape.  I've personally felt that those who profess dualism are being in some respects disingenuous as their conduct in life belies the dualisms they cling to, so I had a certain sympathy with Montaigne's view that they rely on hypocritical tricks, though as noted above I'm not sure they are monkey tricks, whatever that's intended to mean.

Montaigne also writes that the rejection of the soul-body distinction is very Christian, which I confess also took me by surprise.  This is due to what used to be called the "resurrection of the body" (who can guess what it is called now?) which it is believed will happen in due time, at least according to the Catholic Credo.  Soul and perfect body reunite for eternity.

I thought the rejection of dualism was a modern tendency, prompted in part by the development of the sciences.  It's a bit humbling to encounter it in Montaigne, backed up by Catholic doctrine.  Nothing new under the sun, indeed.

Wednesday, November 11, 2009

On Our Fascination with Disaster

We're being deluged (it seems an appropriate word) with TV shows regarding 2012 and our impending doom rather regularly these days.  The latest broadcasts predicting our awful fate late in that year and detailing the many horrible ways we may perish were, of course, preceded by various other programs regarding Notradamus, supervolcanos, asteriod or comet strikes, etc., which seem make up a significant part of the fare available on the Discovery, History, National Geographic and Science channels.

We have, of course, been amusing ourselves for many, many years by claiming that our end will most certainly come at various times certain, but have been disappointed so many times in the past that it's difficult to understand why we continue to do so.

What is it about us that leads us to anticipate our violent end so frequently, and with such apparent...delight?  Pleasure?  For that matter, what prompts us to find portents of our doom in ancient Sumerian or Mayan works, or the Bible, or the scribblings of a 16th century pharmacist?

We certainly are capable of being very stupid, but are we really so stupid that we can persist in this kind of delusion over so many centuries, despite the fact that we have always been wrong?  Granted, the great majority have refrained from giving away all their possessions, or drinking poisoned kool aid, in the past, but there seems always to be some group willing to accept, and anticipate, disaster without reservation.

I don't think stupidity is an adequate explanation.  Perhaps we are doomed in the sense that we are never content; we're always unsatisfied.  There always is something which makes us miserable.  Rather than accept what life brings or (worse yet) trying to resolve our problems, we hope for an end to them.  And, if we must end, why shouldn't everyone else?