Sorry, but I don't mean "martial" as warlike, or of or relating to war (disappointing, I know; nothing is more interesting than war, particularly to those who haven't been in one). Rather I refer to the man we know as Martial, who was more properly Marcus Valerius Martialis. In this year 2766 A.U.C. (Ab Urbe Condita, meaning from the legendary founding of Rome) we remember and read him still.
And not just for the naughty bits as our British cousins might say, though they're certainly present in his epigrams. Nor even for the insight they impart regarding the social life of the Roman Empire in the first century of what is now called, rather insultingly I think, the "Common Era" though there's no question they do. I submit we read the epigrams and remember the man who wrote them because he was clever, artful and amusing and wrote clever, artful, amusing, and even sometimes wise and touching, epigrams.
Epigrams have their fascination, for me at least. To be able to condense thought and criticism and express them with elegance (mixed with vulgarity in Marital's case, but a vulgarity which seems somehow appropriate) requires a certain genius and is a succinct and telling expression of fundamental human characteristics, though they may be less than admirable...just as we often are.
Envy, vanity, lust, greed, egoism, selfishness are especially on display, mostly. They always have been, I think, but have not been so shamelessly and honestly set forth for a long time.
It's curious that Martial was born in much the same location in Spain as was Baltasar Gracian, S.J., author of The Art of Worldly Wisdom and other things. In that work, the worthy Jesuit was rather pithy as well, not in epigrams but in maxims. Those maxims relate to how to distinguish oneself in society, or at least the society of 17th century Spain, and while those maxims are largely secular there is no doubt that they are the creation of a Christian and the product of a profoundly Christian culture. Martial was not a Christian, and the Roman world was not yet Christian; the view of life and people in the epigrams is very different from that in Gracian's maxims. As a result, Martial was often the subject of disapproval by Christian moralists of all kinds, particularly those titans of prudery, the Victorians.
There is a problem with considering Martial and his epigrams from our, largely Christian, perspective, that I think leads us to misinterpret him and the Roman world of his time. We tend to look upon the people of the Roman Empire as immoral and degenerate. We point to Martial and others, especially the wackier emperors, as examples of the monsters we become without religion, which is to say the true religion, of course. Supposedly, the Empire fell due to its decadence. But the "decadence" and the "decadent" we point to in making this judgment existed centuries before the Western Empire dissolved (for various reasons). The Eastern Empire lasted centuries longer, until Constantinople was sacked by Christian Crusaders. We Americans love to compare ourselves to the Romans, particularly those of us who love to moralize and look back to simpler and more virtuous times (as the Romans did, including Martial). We will be fortunate if we last as long as Rome.
Martial was not alone in his condemnation of his contemporaries, of course. Juvenal is another example of a Roman who at least purported to despise most of those around him. But Juvenal's contempt is lengthy and relentless. There is no room for elegance in his satires, and the humor is bitter. Martial is an easier read.
Martial was a professional. He wrote his epigrams to earn his living, in most cases, which makes their vituperativeness somewhat surprising. We don't know who poor Sextus and the others who are lashed in the epigrams were, so it's hard to feel any sympathy for them. We have a tendency to look down on professional artists. Ezra Pound, not the most well-balanced fellow, look down on Pindar for being a professional, and so not a true artist. But artists were and still are professionals, and this was particularly necessary and even deemed appropriate in the world of ancient Rome, where all great men, as patrons, had their followers, called clients. These clients were of all kinds and were dependent on the patron sometimes even for their food (food or at least being seen dining with the great was particularly important in the Roman world, it seems). The clients accompanied the patron, defended him, voted for him, applauded him in the Senate and the courts. He in turn had his obligations to them.
It's still difficult to find good translations of Martial. Older translations of his work tend to disregard the racier epigrams, or even it seems to rewrite them at times. Those translations acknowledge his genius but deplore his lasciviousness. We're not quite as constrained as we once were, though we still tend to look on sex of any kind as shameful, and sex of an unusual kind as sinful. Perhaps literal translations will become more available. Or, perhaps, if we're very fortunate, a new Martial will arise, to lambaste us as elegantly and honestly as he did those of his time.
A CICERONIAN LAWYER'S (RETIRED) MUSINGS ON LAW, PHILOSOPHY, CURRENT AFFAIRS, LITERATURE, HISTORY AND LIVING LIFE SECUNDUM NATURAM
Sunday, January 13, 2013
Wednesday, January 2, 2013
Stoicism and Cognitive Behavioral Therapy
I'm reading a book by Donald Robertson regarding Stoicism and CBT, which I find quite interesting.
I should first note that I have, somehow, been ignorant of CBT, though it seems to have been around in one form or another for more than 100 years. This is somewhat daunting. What I don't know is sometimes astonishing. I remind myself that Socrates felt this way as well, and feel better. But I can't help but think I should have been aware of its existence. It seems quite a few good things were going on in philosophy and psychology at the end of the 19th and during the the early 20th century, in addition to pragmatism. I wonder if, and to what extent, James and Dewey were aware of this therapeutic form of psychology.
Perhaps CBT's association with hypnosis and autosuggestion gave me pause; I've always been leery of such approaches. But it has apparently distanced itself from them to some extent, and I may have been misinformed about them or misunderstood them as well.
Even more surprising, in a way, is that the founders of CBT were aware of its debt to Stoicism and expressly called attention to its similarities to Stoicism as a guide to how to live in their written works. Generally, we tend to downplay the extent to which we have been inspired by others, particularly the ancients, particularly when it comes to the sciences. But it appears that Stoicism's emphasis on distinguishing things outside our control from those in our control, and its claim that we are disturbed not by things which happen, but by what we think of them, are among the central tenants of CBT. Also significant to the therapy is Stoicism's insistence that we may discipline ourselves to control what we think and how we feel.
Perhaps Stoicism has not generally been viewed as a form of therapy in the past. The understanding that Stoicism and other ancient Greek schools of thought recommended spiritual or psychological exercises as a practice in attaining happiness and tranquility seems to be a relatively recent development, the result of the efforts of Pierre Hadot and others.
Even more impressive (to me at least) is that it appears CBT may be, and has been, subjected to empirical methods of assessment and evaluation. In other words, the results of CBT can be measured with a certain degree of objectivity, and in fact have been found to be successful in the treatment of certain disorders. This distinguishes it from psychoanalysis it seems, which is something I find delightful as I've always thought Freud and Jung and their followers to be fundamentally misguided and even warped in their view of humanity.
CBT also appeals to me because it (like Stoicism) indicates and maintains that we may at least to a certain extent control and cure ourselves, and attain happiness through our own efforts through discipline and the use of our reason. This is an optimistic view in contrast with those views we encounter far too often these days, which reduce us to helpless victims or slavish denizens of our environment or our genes or society and culture.
Finally, I'm surprised once more that the ancients were so insightful regarding humanity and its nature, and disappointed that we have after thousands of years achieved no more when it comes to determining how best to live, and have in fact even disregarded ancient wisdom which has always been available to us.
I should first note that I have, somehow, been ignorant of CBT, though it seems to have been around in one form or another for more than 100 years. This is somewhat daunting. What I don't know is sometimes astonishing. I remind myself that Socrates felt this way as well, and feel better. But I can't help but think I should have been aware of its existence. It seems quite a few good things were going on in philosophy and psychology at the end of the 19th and during the the early 20th century, in addition to pragmatism. I wonder if, and to what extent, James and Dewey were aware of this therapeutic form of psychology.
Perhaps CBT's association with hypnosis and autosuggestion gave me pause; I've always been leery of such approaches. But it has apparently distanced itself from them to some extent, and I may have been misinformed about them or misunderstood them as well.
Even more surprising, in a way, is that the founders of CBT were aware of its debt to Stoicism and expressly called attention to its similarities to Stoicism as a guide to how to live in their written works. Generally, we tend to downplay the extent to which we have been inspired by others, particularly the ancients, particularly when it comes to the sciences. But it appears that Stoicism's emphasis on distinguishing things outside our control from those in our control, and its claim that we are disturbed not by things which happen, but by what we think of them, are among the central tenants of CBT. Also significant to the therapy is Stoicism's insistence that we may discipline ourselves to control what we think and how we feel.
Perhaps Stoicism has not generally been viewed as a form of therapy in the past. The understanding that Stoicism and other ancient Greek schools of thought recommended spiritual or psychological exercises as a practice in attaining happiness and tranquility seems to be a relatively recent development, the result of the efforts of Pierre Hadot and others.
Even more impressive (to me at least) is that it appears CBT may be, and has been, subjected to empirical methods of assessment and evaluation. In other words, the results of CBT can be measured with a certain degree of objectivity, and in fact have been found to be successful in the treatment of certain disorders. This distinguishes it from psychoanalysis it seems, which is something I find delightful as I've always thought Freud and Jung and their followers to be fundamentally misguided and even warped in their view of humanity.
CBT also appeals to me because it (like Stoicism) indicates and maintains that we may at least to a certain extent control and cure ourselves, and attain happiness through our own efforts through discipline and the use of our reason. This is an optimistic view in contrast with those views we encounter far too often these days, which reduce us to helpless victims or slavish denizens of our environment or our genes or society and culture.
Finally, I'm surprised once more that the ancients were so insightful regarding humanity and its nature, and disappointed that we have after thousands of years achieved no more when it comes to determining how best to live, and have in fact even disregarded ancient wisdom which has always been available to us.
Sunday, December 23, 2012
People with Guns Demand More People with Guns to Stop People with Guns
The impassioned plea by a representative of the National Rifle (Manufacturers?) Association for putting armed guards in schools everywhere provokes thought even if it is, literally, thoughtless. Thus this post.
Given the choice, I would rather have specially trained armed guards patrolling our schools and not teachers or administrators or whomever who have simply done the minimum necessary to obtain a permit in this Glorious Republic. That minimum is nominal indeed. And since even law enforcement officers have been known to shoot innocent but unfortunate bystanders in their quest to shoot their armed opponents, the thought of those who are not professionals attempting this difficult and dangerous task is not a comforting one.
It's odd that a group which is so opposed to the intrusion of government in our lives, at least to the extent they may be affected by guns, is eager to promote a plan by which officers of the government would be placed in all schools. One would think this to be a rather significant increase in government regulation. The resulting bureaucracy would be most impressive. But because money would be required to implement this plan and it is difficult and unpopular to give the government money or allow it to raise money these days, I suspect that nonprofessionals or, at best, private security guards would ultimately be used. Cynical fellow that I am, I also suspect that the NRA is well aware that its plan will not be implemented, but believes that its suggestion will nonetheless result in the sale of more guns.
The Nation (I read conservative journals as well, you know) notes that the NRA, though it prefers not to disclose its donors, has thanked Bushmaster for donations in the past, and that there sits on the board of one of its surrogates a lawyer who regularly represents gun manufacturers. It seems unsurprising that gun manufacturers would support an organization which so avidly promotes the sale of their products and lobbies against their regulation. One wonders just how much they support it, influence it, control it.
As long as the law does not require this disclosure (the government can be useful now and then, can't it?) this remains a subject for some speculation. But the NRA once supported gun control, believe it or not (in the early 20th century), and as corporations and money increasingly "call the shots" as it were these days, suspicion is justified.
While browsing the Web on this issue, I noted a comment made by someone to the effect that blaming guns for violence is like blaming cars for being driven by the intoxicated. I doubt that anyone blames guns in and of themselves, but it is an interesting analogy. Motor vehicles are rather extensively regulated, as a matter of fact, both in their manufacture and in their use. That's because most people recognize that they are extremely dangerous when misused. The regulations require their registration and licensing. Insurance is required in the anticipation that they will be misused, negligently or intentionally. These regulations obtain regardless of any right to travel.
Guns present a danger as much as if not more than motor vehicles. This is largely because it is the purpose of guns and not cars to wound, kill, injure or destroy something, living or not living. Regrettably, guns are at least as susceptible to misuse as cars. If we countenance the extensive regulation of cars and other products which may be harmful, why do we balk at doing so with guns?
Because the right to bear them is enshrined in the Constitution? But other constitutional rights are limited when they result in harm. Proponents of guns are recommending greater regulation of the right of free speech also so enshrined and even given pride of place over the right to bear arms.
I doubt it can be reasonably maintained the it is the intent of the Constitution, or was the intent of the framers of that document, to prohibit all restrictions on the rights it sets forth. The question is what restrictions are reasonable, given their status as constitutional rights. Restricting a right does not necessarily entail its violation.
The problem of gun violence in our society is obviously not solely due to the prevalence of weapons. But calling for restriction of weapons is not premised on such an assumption. Treatment of the other causes is called for as well. One doesn't preclude the other.
The NRA and certain of the proponents of gun rights seem to abhor any restrictions, regardless of the intent of those restrictions or the character of guns as extremely dangerous. They apparently view the right to bear arms as a kind of super-right, trumping all others. It is natural to wonder why they do so.
Given the choice, I would rather have specially trained armed guards patrolling our schools and not teachers or administrators or whomever who have simply done the minimum necessary to obtain a permit in this Glorious Republic. That minimum is nominal indeed. And since even law enforcement officers have been known to shoot innocent but unfortunate bystanders in their quest to shoot their armed opponents, the thought of those who are not professionals attempting this difficult and dangerous task is not a comforting one.
It's odd that a group which is so opposed to the intrusion of government in our lives, at least to the extent they may be affected by guns, is eager to promote a plan by which officers of the government would be placed in all schools. One would think this to be a rather significant increase in government regulation. The resulting bureaucracy would be most impressive. But because money would be required to implement this plan and it is difficult and unpopular to give the government money or allow it to raise money these days, I suspect that nonprofessionals or, at best, private security guards would ultimately be used. Cynical fellow that I am, I also suspect that the NRA is well aware that its plan will not be implemented, but believes that its suggestion will nonetheless result in the sale of more guns.
The Nation (I read conservative journals as well, you know) notes that the NRA, though it prefers not to disclose its donors, has thanked Bushmaster for donations in the past, and that there sits on the board of one of its surrogates a lawyer who regularly represents gun manufacturers. It seems unsurprising that gun manufacturers would support an organization which so avidly promotes the sale of their products and lobbies against their regulation. One wonders just how much they support it, influence it, control it.
As long as the law does not require this disclosure (the government can be useful now and then, can't it?) this remains a subject for some speculation. But the NRA once supported gun control, believe it or not (in the early 20th century), and as corporations and money increasingly "call the shots" as it were these days, suspicion is justified.
While browsing the Web on this issue, I noted a comment made by someone to the effect that blaming guns for violence is like blaming cars for being driven by the intoxicated. I doubt that anyone blames guns in and of themselves, but it is an interesting analogy. Motor vehicles are rather extensively regulated, as a matter of fact, both in their manufacture and in their use. That's because most people recognize that they are extremely dangerous when misused. The regulations require their registration and licensing. Insurance is required in the anticipation that they will be misused, negligently or intentionally. These regulations obtain regardless of any right to travel.
Guns present a danger as much as if not more than motor vehicles. This is largely because it is the purpose of guns and not cars to wound, kill, injure or destroy something, living or not living. Regrettably, guns are at least as susceptible to misuse as cars. If we countenance the extensive regulation of cars and other products which may be harmful, why do we balk at doing so with guns?
Because the right to bear them is enshrined in the Constitution? But other constitutional rights are limited when they result in harm. Proponents of guns are recommending greater regulation of the right of free speech also so enshrined and even given pride of place over the right to bear arms.
I doubt it can be reasonably maintained the it is the intent of the Constitution, or was the intent of the framers of that document, to prohibit all restrictions on the rights it sets forth. The question is what restrictions are reasonable, given their status as constitutional rights. Restricting a right does not necessarily entail its violation.
The problem of gun violence in our society is obviously not solely due to the prevalence of weapons. But calling for restriction of weapons is not premised on such an assumption. Treatment of the other causes is called for as well. One doesn't preclude the other.
The NRA and certain of the proponents of gun rights seem to abhor any restrictions, regardless of the intent of those restrictions or the character of guns as extremely dangerous. They apparently view the right to bear arms as a kind of super-right, trumping all others. It is natural to wonder why they do so.
Tuesday, December 18, 2012
Lawyers as Shills
I've been practicing law for quite some time now. I've always been in private practice, generally in firms of 10 or so attorneys, sometimes a bit more, sometimes a bit less. For a relatively short time, 3-4 years, I worked in a larger firm, with more than 100 attorneys. I've been around, have seen a great deal; have seen the practice of law alter rather dramatically for various reasons, sometimes for the good and sometimes for the bad. One of the ways in which I think it's changed for the bad is the emphasis increasingly being made on the lawyer functioning not as a lawyer, but as a shill.
A shill is a promoter, a booster, someone skilled in the art of the sales pitch. The term can be used derisively and can have somewhat sleazy connotations, but I'm not necessarily saying that a lawyer today is called upon to act as a con man or a carnival barker. However, especially in the case of large law firms, lawyers are being valued more and more for their ability to market not merely themselves and their firms, but their clients as well. They are valued less and less for their skill in the practice of law. They are encouraged to act as shills more than they act as lawyers; not so much practice law as sell, sell and sell.
To a certain extent, of course, this has always been the case. Rainmakers (as they are called) have always been esteemed because of the clients they attract. And of course advertisement of legal services, once restricted, is commonplace. Some of the advertising has been and is less than dignified.
But now large firms are not just trying to attract clients. They also seek to promote their clients to state governments and the federal government; they lobby, sometimes registering themselves as lobbyists, sometimes not. They seek to promote clients as businesses in the global market. They pursue the political aims of their clients and sometimes political parties (Reince Priebus, Chair of the Republican National Committee, practiced in a large firm which regularly represents Republican candidates and elected officials). They network, identify and target key players, push agendas.
For me, this is not practicing law. I find myself wondering why lawyers are doing such things, when it seems anyone with marketing skills would do (likely for much less in the way of remuneration). I also find myself wondering what effect this has or will have on the quality of legal practitioners. If the most glamorous, high-paying jobs for attorneys are as shills (not to mention the easiest jobs when it comes to the knowledge of the law and representing clients before courts and agencies) what motivation is there to be a "real lawyer"?
The law has been used as a stepping stone into politics for a long time. I question whether lawyers make good elected officials. Lawyers are trained to represent a single client, told to avoid conflicts of interest. A lawyer representing a number of people with conflicting interests is, I think, ill-equipped to do so. Lawyers obviously have a place in government, there being so many laws to interpret, apply and draft, but I question whether they should have the place they hold in politics.
Sadly, lawyers already have a poor reputation. I suspect it will get worse, though, the more they act as and are perceived as nothing more than wheeler dealers. But it may be that I'm just an old fashioned sort, and am of a dying breed. No doubt there will always be a need for skilled legal practitioners, but I fear their ranks will grow thinner and thinner. Perhaps the future will see The Triumph of the Shill.
A shill is a promoter, a booster, someone skilled in the art of the sales pitch. The term can be used derisively and can have somewhat sleazy connotations, but I'm not necessarily saying that a lawyer today is called upon to act as a con man or a carnival barker. However, especially in the case of large law firms, lawyers are being valued more and more for their ability to market not merely themselves and their firms, but their clients as well. They are valued less and less for their skill in the practice of law. They are encouraged to act as shills more than they act as lawyers; not so much practice law as sell, sell and sell.
To a certain extent, of course, this has always been the case. Rainmakers (as they are called) have always been esteemed because of the clients they attract. And of course advertisement of legal services, once restricted, is commonplace. Some of the advertising has been and is less than dignified.
But now large firms are not just trying to attract clients. They also seek to promote their clients to state governments and the federal government; they lobby, sometimes registering themselves as lobbyists, sometimes not. They seek to promote clients as businesses in the global market. They pursue the political aims of their clients and sometimes political parties (Reince Priebus, Chair of the Republican National Committee, practiced in a large firm which regularly represents Republican candidates and elected officials). They network, identify and target key players, push agendas.
For me, this is not practicing law. I find myself wondering why lawyers are doing such things, when it seems anyone with marketing skills would do (likely for much less in the way of remuneration). I also find myself wondering what effect this has or will have on the quality of legal practitioners. If the most glamorous, high-paying jobs for attorneys are as shills (not to mention the easiest jobs when it comes to the knowledge of the law and representing clients before courts and agencies) what motivation is there to be a "real lawyer"?
The law has been used as a stepping stone into politics for a long time. I question whether lawyers make good elected officials. Lawyers are trained to represent a single client, told to avoid conflicts of interest. A lawyer representing a number of people with conflicting interests is, I think, ill-equipped to do so. Lawyers obviously have a place in government, there being so many laws to interpret, apply and draft, but I question whether they should have the place they hold in politics.
Sadly, lawyers already have a poor reputation. I suspect it will get worse, though, the more they act as and are perceived as nothing more than wheeler dealers. But it may be that I'm just an old fashioned sort, and am of a dying breed. No doubt there will always be a need for skilled legal practitioners, but I fear their ranks will grow thinner and thinner. Perhaps the future will see The Triumph of the Shill.
Monday, December 10, 2012
Something Regarding Free Will
I've been reading a little book, or essay, on free will by Sam Harris (it's about 70 pages). I haven't read much on the issue, I must confess. But if this work by Harris is representative of the debate, it doesn't seem like much of a debate. Alas, this seems to be my reaction to much of what passes for philosophy; that's to say, of course, much of what I read which purports to be philosophical. It may be I don't read enough, especially regarding the "question" of "problem" of free will. It may also be that I'm simply stupid.
Regardless, I'm perplexed because a great deal of what he has to say in support of his claim that free will is an illusion seems to me to be relatively uncontroversial. I think of myself as being a proponent of free will, so I find it difficult to believe that anyone who is supportive of it would be strongly opposed to some of Harris' position. However, it's evident he believes there to be some significant opposition to his claim.
If I understand him correctly, he notes that we are all influenced by our genes, our hormones, our neurons, our environment, our upbringing, and various other factors regarding which we have no control, and which are not caused by any deliberate action on our part. He feels that these factors so influence our thoughts, feelings, desires, and conduct that there is clearly no such thing as free will. We can't really know why we think and feel and act as we do, and we don't really decide what we do, freely, because all these things are the result of such factors. We may, if asked why we make a certain decision, be able to come up with a rational explanation which seems to be based on our voluntary thought process; but that explanation is not valid. It, no doubt, is also the result of the many factors over which we have no control.
It happens that I have trouble thinking of anyone who would maintain that our genes, hormones, neurons, environment, upbringing etc. do not influence our decisions. It may be that there are such folk, just as there are those who think that the earth was created in 6 days about 6,000 years ago. However, I don't see such folk as serious contributors to the free will debate which apparently is ongoing.
I can conceive of debate over the extent to which such factors influence our decisions, but I find it difficult to accept the idea that a proponent of free will would or must maintain that they have no influence whatsoever.
Oddly, Harris seems to acknowledge that we can, sometimes, come to a conclusion or decision all by ourselves, as it were, with a minimum of influence by these factors, and in that sense have a certain degree of control over what we do. The examples he uses in this regard make sense to me as well, and lead me to wonder just why he feels free will is an illusion. I wonder whether he feels that "free will" means the ability to make decisions without being influenced by the factors I allude to; in other words, I wonder whether he thinks there are proponents of what I'll call here "absolute free will" and seeks to persuade us there is no such thing. Unsurprisingly, because I think that there are few such proponents, I wonder whether he's beating the proverbial straw man.
For me, it's quite possible to believe in free will yet acknowledge that much of what we do is influenced by our genes, etc. That's merely to say I don't believe in "absolute free will." What we desire and want to do are naturally influenced by our environment and our nature, as we are organisms having a certain constitution living in a particular environment. If we weren't so influenced, we wouldn't exist. Yet we make decisions which cannot be attributed solely to influenced desires and needs. We can choose different ways to satisfy them, for example, and determine what ways are more effective.
Harris uses as an example the fact that after many years, he decided to return to the study of and training in martial arts which he had engaged in when young. He claims that while he can think of several good reasons supporting why he returned to marital arts, but he can't really know why he did so, rendering his return to them something different from a voluntary decision.
I fenced when young, stopped fencing for many years, returned to it for about 5 years, and have stopped fencing once more. I stopped fencing because the club at which I fenced is open only certain evening during the week and on the weekend, and my schedule and the schedules of those who pariticipate in determining my schedule prevent me from fencing. I suppose I could fence, but would have to skip meals, reduce sleep, and am not inclined to do so.
Am I coming up with reasons a posteriori? Was I somehow compelled to stop fencing by forces beyond my control? To a certain extent, yes; as my schedule changed for reasons which it is not important to address. And, my genes and whatever may lead me to not want to go without meals or sleep. But is this what is meant when we say that "free will" was not involved in my decision to stop fencing? If so, it's difficult for me to believe that the free will debate has any significance.
Harris maintains we can dispense with the illusion of free will and still maintain that people are responsible for their actions, morality, and the legal system. I find this unsurprising, though, because a belief is "absolute free will" is not required to maintain that people have at least a certain degree of responsiblity
Clarence Darrow was a lawyer who regularly argued that his clients, at least, were not really responsible for the crimes they were said to commit. I doubt, though, that he thought he never voluntarily made a decision in his life.
As with most other things, I think that a determination whether or not a decision is "freely" made must take into consideration the circumstances and the decision-maker. The extent to which a decision is free will vary. I doubt most of us ever feel we're absolutely free, or that we're absolutely "unfree" and think that is a reasonable conclusion to make.
Regardless, I'm perplexed because a great deal of what he has to say in support of his claim that free will is an illusion seems to me to be relatively uncontroversial. I think of myself as being a proponent of free will, so I find it difficult to believe that anyone who is supportive of it would be strongly opposed to some of Harris' position. However, it's evident he believes there to be some significant opposition to his claim.
If I understand him correctly, he notes that we are all influenced by our genes, our hormones, our neurons, our environment, our upbringing, and various other factors regarding which we have no control, and which are not caused by any deliberate action on our part. He feels that these factors so influence our thoughts, feelings, desires, and conduct that there is clearly no such thing as free will. We can't really know why we think and feel and act as we do, and we don't really decide what we do, freely, because all these things are the result of such factors. We may, if asked why we make a certain decision, be able to come up with a rational explanation which seems to be based on our voluntary thought process; but that explanation is not valid. It, no doubt, is also the result of the many factors over which we have no control.
It happens that I have trouble thinking of anyone who would maintain that our genes, hormones, neurons, environment, upbringing etc. do not influence our decisions. It may be that there are such folk, just as there are those who think that the earth was created in 6 days about 6,000 years ago. However, I don't see such folk as serious contributors to the free will debate which apparently is ongoing.
I can conceive of debate over the extent to which such factors influence our decisions, but I find it difficult to accept the idea that a proponent of free will would or must maintain that they have no influence whatsoever.
Oddly, Harris seems to acknowledge that we can, sometimes, come to a conclusion or decision all by ourselves, as it were, with a minimum of influence by these factors, and in that sense have a certain degree of control over what we do. The examples he uses in this regard make sense to me as well, and lead me to wonder just why he feels free will is an illusion. I wonder whether he feels that "free will" means the ability to make decisions without being influenced by the factors I allude to; in other words, I wonder whether he thinks there are proponents of what I'll call here "absolute free will" and seeks to persuade us there is no such thing. Unsurprisingly, because I think that there are few such proponents, I wonder whether he's beating the proverbial straw man.
For me, it's quite possible to believe in free will yet acknowledge that much of what we do is influenced by our genes, etc. That's merely to say I don't believe in "absolute free will." What we desire and want to do are naturally influenced by our environment and our nature, as we are organisms having a certain constitution living in a particular environment. If we weren't so influenced, we wouldn't exist. Yet we make decisions which cannot be attributed solely to influenced desires and needs. We can choose different ways to satisfy them, for example, and determine what ways are more effective.
Harris uses as an example the fact that after many years, he decided to return to the study of and training in martial arts which he had engaged in when young. He claims that while he can think of several good reasons supporting why he returned to marital arts, but he can't really know why he did so, rendering his return to them something different from a voluntary decision.
I fenced when young, stopped fencing for many years, returned to it for about 5 years, and have stopped fencing once more. I stopped fencing because the club at which I fenced is open only certain evening during the week and on the weekend, and my schedule and the schedules of those who pariticipate in determining my schedule prevent me from fencing. I suppose I could fence, but would have to skip meals, reduce sleep, and am not inclined to do so.
Am I coming up with reasons a posteriori? Was I somehow compelled to stop fencing by forces beyond my control? To a certain extent, yes; as my schedule changed for reasons which it is not important to address. And, my genes and whatever may lead me to not want to go without meals or sleep. But is this what is meant when we say that "free will" was not involved in my decision to stop fencing? If so, it's difficult for me to believe that the free will debate has any significance.
Harris maintains we can dispense with the illusion of free will and still maintain that people are responsible for their actions, morality, and the legal system. I find this unsurprising, though, because a belief is "absolute free will" is not required to maintain that people have at least a certain degree of responsiblity
Clarence Darrow was a lawyer who regularly argued that his clients, at least, were not really responsible for the crimes they were said to commit. I doubt, though, that he thought he never voluntarily made a decision in his life.
As with most other things, I think that a determination whether or not a decision is "freely" made must take into consideration the circumstances and the decision-maker. The extent to which a decision is free will vary. I doubt most of us ever feel we're absolutely free, or that we're absolutely "unfree" and think that is a reasonable conclusion to make.
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