The fact that one's email messages may be gathered up and relocated, as it were, to some "place" one would rather they did not appear is rather troubling. There are those who seem to stop thinking when they use electronic mail. Lawyers involved in e-discovery can find a great deal which may be useful to their clients, because there is, apparently, a tendency to become unguarded when at the keyboard; even to become stupid. It's as if we feel somewhat liberated because there is no the need to look at or directly confront others personally. We feel we are not accountable, and are among friends, but we are making marks which can always be found, and will always exist in one form or another.
It's easy to understand, then, the dismay of those whose emails which apparently indicate they have been doing some fudging or disregarding data are upset by this development, and are inclined to blame the "enemy" (who is, of course, unscrupulous and acting contrary to our best interests). But it also is easy to understand why those who can grab emails and publish them widely do so on this issue, and difficult to understand how scientists, or others, can be so unthinking as to make electronic records of this kind.
Like seemingly most everything else these days, climate change is a battleground. "Climate Change" seems a much shrewder description than "Global Warming" by the way. One is not thereby committed to the prediction that things will get warmer, and it seems there are those who say, now, that it isn't at all clear that warming will occur, and that greenhouse gases may in fact result in global cooling, or something else. One may also thereby dissociate oneself from Al Gore, who seems as incapable of appearing at ease and amicable in public as Richard Nixon, for what seem to be different reasons.
Those who claim that global climate change is not occurring, or at least that it is not occurring because of us, can be rather disconcerting. I recently saw an article in which it was claimed that Copenhagen will be the start of a one world government, and that the President intends to enter into a treaty of some kind without consultation with or approval by the Senate which will, inevitably, bankrupt us (further?) and leave us subject to claims by the Thirld World which will be enforced against us in some fashion, presumably by the infant global government which will be spawned.
Knowledgeable scientists may disagree more than we have been led to believe, but it seems to be the case that climate change has taken place in the past, and that its effects were dramatic. Some claim civilization would not have resulted but for the end of the last great Ice Age. What is called the "Little Ice Age" which ended in the mid-19th century did not destroy us, but apparently could have done so if things were a bit different, and caused quite a few serious problems in any case.
It would seem to make sense, then, to study climate change and take steps to avoid its serious effects. That would seem to mean that we should identify the causes of climate change (a single cause of such a complicated phenomenon seems unlikely). We should do so, obviously, using the best science possible. Political and other considerations should not be allowed to influence the study (they always do to some extent, but we should do our best to eliminate politicians and true believers of all sorts from the process). It would seem to make sense to pool our resources to make the study, and may be equally wise to do so based on the results of the study. The problem is that there are many who feel that no complete study has been made.
It makes no sense in any debate, let alone scientific study, to make certain positions sacrosanct, or certain information unavailable, or to actively attempt to silence disagreement. The response that "everything points to it" or "the evidence is overwhelming" has not been satisfactory. If the scientists who are making such claims have been reckless enough to do what their emails appear to indicate, they have only themselves to blame if they are distrusted. All information should be made available (it apparently can be, these days) and subject to dispute. For good or ill, elites can no longer dictate policy with the same ease as they have in the past because nothing is hidden. So, as there is to be a battle, why not get everything out in the open? How else can a reasonable decision be made?
Saturday, November 28, 2009
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
Ezra Pound and Speculations on Monomania and Madness
I've been trying to read certain of the essays of Ezra Pound. I find it's not an easy task.
Pound was, by all accounts, a monumental figure in literature during the 20th Century. He was extraordinarily generous to many authors and poets of the time. He was clearly able and erudite, and this should be evident to any person who reads his work.
Reading his essays, though, (at least those I've read so far) I can't help but get the impression that something is very wrong with the author. I wonder if anyone shares this same impression, or if I'm merely so used to reading certain things, in certain ways, that I miss some essential point or pattern.
Pound was, of course, hospitalized for mental disease, and it may be that the essays I'm reading were for the most part written during that period. If that's not the case, though, I wonder if his manner of writing is peculiar to those who are monomaniacs, as it seems he was.
I'll refer to his essay on the letters exchanged by John Adams and Thomas Jefferson as an example. The essay celebrates them as indicative of the fact that America was, at least at one time, civilized, or at least was home to two civilized men (Pound seems to think America lost whatever civilization it possessed shortly after their deaths). So he begins the essay, and then something happens. Various other persons are referred to, from Henry Adams to Romulus Augustulus to Flaubert to Thomas Aquinas. They are either cited with approval, as it were, or disapproval, as are certain institutions. Banks, as institutions, don't meet with approval. Sometimes, but not often, Jefferson and Adams are quoted, though it's not clear if their correspondance with each other is the source of the quotations. Sometimes, it is clear that it is not the source. When quoted, they refer to money and interest on money, except at the very end of the essay, where it is noted (approvingly) that John Adams, I think it was, wrote that they should not die without explaining themselves to each other.
It is a very rambling work, and I finish it feeling that the author intended to say something about Adams, Jefferson and civilization, but just what he intended to say about them is unclear.
Pound was very concerned with usury, and it keeps popping up oddly in the essays I've been looking at, and not merely in those which are actually about usury and economics. He thinks it is a very bad thing. He seemed to feel that it is the cause of most, if not all, of the world's problems, and was the primary cause of both world wars. He said as much on the radio in Italy during WWII, and made anti-semitic statements apparently feeling that the Jews, if they did not create usury, practiced it more than others.
This concern seems to have been an overwhelming one, which he held for most of his life. When one becomes obsessed, does the object of the obsession become of such significance that it is always there, somehow always relevant to what we are thinking, doing and writing that must be mentioned, regardless of its relevance? And, is this a peculiarity of brilliant people, or particular kinds of brilliant people? One thinks of Bobby Fisher, and others--geniuses who are consumed by a very narrow and precise concern, unable to break away from it entirely, anywhere or anytime. Is this a necessary function of genius?
Pound was, by all accounts, a monumental figure in literature during the 20th Century. He was extraordinarily generous to many authors and poets of the time. He was clearly able and erudite, and this should be evident to any person who reads his work.
Reading his essays, though, (at least those I've read so far) I can't help but get the impression that something is very wrong with the author. I wonder if anyone shares this same impression, or if I'm merely so used to reading certain things, in certain ways, that I miss some essential point or pattern.
Pound was, of course, hospitalized for mental disease, and it may be that the essays I'm reading were for the most part written during that period. If that's not the case, though, I wonder if his manner of writing is peculiar to those who are monomaniacs, as it seems he was.
I'll refer to his essay on the letters exchanged by John Adams and Thomas Jefferson as an example. The essay celebrates them as indicative of the fact that America was, at least at one time, civilized, or at least was home to two civilized men (Pound seems to think America lost whatever civilization it possessed shortly after their deaths). So he begins the essay, and then something happens. Various other persons are referred to, from Henry Adams to Romulus Augustulus to Flaubert to Thomas Aquinas. They are either cited with approval, as it were, or disapproval, as are certain institutions. Banks, as institutions, don't meet with approval. Sometimes, but not often, Jefferson and Adams are quoted, though it's not clear if their correspondance with each other is the source of the quotations. Sometimes, it is clear that it is not the source. When quoted, they refer to money and interest on money, except at the very end of the essay, where it is noted (approvingly) that John Adams, I think it was, wrote that they should not die without explaining themselves to each other.
It is a very rambling work, and I finish it feeling that the author intended to say something about Adams, Jefferson and civilization, but just what he intended to say about them is unclear.
Pound was very concerned with usury, and it keeps popping up oddly in the essays I've been looking at, and not merely in those which are actually about usury and economics. He thinks it is a very bad thing. He seemed to feel that it is the cause of most, if not all, of the world's problems, and was the primary cause of both world wars. He said as much on the radio in Italy during WWII, and made anti-semitic statements apparently feeling that the Jews, if they did not create usury, practiced it more than others.
This concern seems to have been an overwhelming one, which he held for most of his life. When one becomes obsessed, does the object of the obsession become of such significance that it is always there, somehow always relevant to what we are thinking, doing and writing that must be mentioned, regardless of its relevance? And, is this a peculiarity of brilliant people, or particular kinds of brilliant people? One thinks of Bobby Fisher, and others--geniuses who are consumed by a very narrow and precise concern, unable to break away from it entirely, anywhere or anytime. Is this a necessary function of genius?
Sunday, November 22, 2009
H. L. Mencken and the Art of Journalism
Reading Mencken's articles makes me wonder how it was possible, then, for someone with his intelligence and lucid, interesting and sometimes even learned style to be a journalist, and even-it seems-a journalist who was widely read. I know of no journalist or columnist (or even blogger!) of our time who can compare. Were those who read and wrote newspapers in his era simply more intelligent, or better writers or readers, than we are now? If so, why?
It's important to note that I am speaking of articles in newspapers, not essays or articles in sophisticated journals. He wrote for newspapers in Baltimore, of course, but also in New York and Chicago (and probably elsewhere also). And, he wrote (I think) very well indeed, on a number of topics. I confess to a fondness for the great "bathtub hoax", but he obviously could and did write on many serious subjects.
Unlike Ambrose Bierce (another personal favorite), he did most of his writing for newspapers in the 20th century, so one would think his audience was wider than was Bierce's, and not so much of an identifiable "elite." Do current journalists and those others who feel they must tell us their opinions, and are allowed to do so by various media, feel they must talk down to us, or is it simply the case that they know no better?
It's important to note that I am speaking of articles in newspapers, not essays or articles in sophisticated journals. He wrote for newspapers in Baltimore, of course, but also in New York and Chicago (and probably elsewhere also). And, he wrote (I think) very well indeed, on a number of topics. I confess to a fondness for the great "bathtub hoax", but he obviously could and did write on many serious subjects.
Unlike Ambrose Bierce (another personal favorite), he did most of his writing for newspapers in the 20th century, so one would think his audience was wider than was Bierce's, and not so much of an identifiable "elite." Do current journalists and those others who feel they must tell us their opinions, and are allowed to do so by various media, feel they must talk down to us, or is it simply the case that they know no better?
Thursday, November 19, 2009
Trials in which "Failure is not an option"
With some frequency, I find myself grateful for the fact that I don't practice criminal law. I have some basic knowledge of it, though, and have tried civil cases, to judges and juries.
One of the few things I know about criminal law in the U.S. is that prosecutors face an extremely heavy burden of proof; that being, of course, to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. One of the things I know about juries in civil trials (which of course involve a lesser burden of proof) is that they can be unpredictable.
Now, there is disagreement over whether or not those we call the "9/11 defendants" should be tried in a U.S. District Court or a military tribunal. An argument may be made that the rights accorded American citizens under our criminal law should be restricted to those who can say civitas Americanus sum. But let's assume (that is to say, I will) that the Obama administration's determination they should be tried in District Court is appropriate. If that is the case, should the Attorney General be making statements such as "failure [to convict] is not an option" and should the President be predicting that convictions are forthcoming, and the death penalty will be imposed (without prejudging the matter, of course)?
I think not. Clearly, such statements give the impression that the outcome of the trials is preordained, an impression which those in authority are normally very careful to avoid, with good reason. And, making such statements seems to fly in face of the supposed purpose for holding the trials in District Court, which appears to be to assure fair trials, and to induce the world to marvel at the impartial nature of American justice and its care for the rights of defendants, even loathsome ones (who will, we are assured, be convicted).
So, it seems appropriate to wonder just what the administration thinks it is doing, and whether it is trying to do something it cannot do--assure fair and impartial trials and assure convictions. Already we see reference to "show trials." The effort to please all in politics is futile. It's likely this will result in trials which will please no one, and which will defy description.
One of the few things I know about criminal law in the U.S. is that prosecutors face an extremely heavy burden of proof; that being, of course, to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. One of the things I know about juries in civil trials (which of course involve a lesser burden of proof) is that they can be unpredictable.
Now, there is disagreement over whether or not those we call the "9/11 defendants" should be tried in a U.S. District Court or a military tribunal. An argument may be made that the rights accorded American citizens under our criminal law should be restricted to those who can say civitas Americanus sum. But let's assume (that is to say, I will) that the Obama administration's determination they should be tried in District Court is appropriate. If that is the case, should the Attorney General be making statements such as "failure [to convict] is not an option" and should the President be predicting that convictions are forthcoming, and the death penalty will be imposed (without prejudging the matter, of course)?
I think not. Clearly, such statements give the impression that the outcome of the trials is preordained, an impression which those in authority are normally very careful to avoid, with good reason. And, making such statements seems to fly in face of the supposed purpose for holding the trials in District Court, which appears to be to assure fair trials, and to induce the world to marvel at the impartial nature of American justice and its care for the rights of defendants, even loathsome ones (who will, we are assured, be convicted).
So, it seems appropriate to wonder just what the administration thinks it is doing, and whether it is trying to do something it cannot do--assure fair and impartial trials and assure convictions. Already we see reference to "show trials." The effort to please all in politics is futile. It's likely this will result in trials which will please no one, and which will defy description.
Wednesday, November 18, 2009
Tolerance and Hypocrisy
Is it possible to take position "A" and, at the same time tolerate position "not A" (-A)? If so, to what extent may one tolerate, without being hypocritical, or at least so inconsistent as to be justly criticized?
These seem to be questions we may be compelled to address with greater frequency in these increasingly contentious times. And, though I've posed them abstractly here, they're intended to address disputes we must deal with, or are at least confronted with, on a day to day basis, e.g. political, social and religious issues. "Confronted" in the sense that they are hurled at us by eager adherents of opposite positions from almost every side given the technology of communication.
X claims that God exists (or perhaps that a particular God does so; say a God worshipped by an established institutional religion). Y disagrees. May X and Y tolerate each other despite their disagreement? Should they respect each other in spite of their disagreement?
If X begins hectoring Y, trying to induce him to accept X's God, or if Y begins hectoring X to accept that there is no God, it would seem that in either case the one being hectored could legitmately resent it. If either sought to impose his/her position on the other, it would be legitimate to object. This seems obvious enough.
What if X asks Y to attend some religious ceremony, or Y asks X to accompany him to a speech by [insert name of prominent atheist]? I'd say there is nothing a priori objectionable in either case, and the manner of the response would, I think, vary with the circumstances, and how the request is made. In other words, if Y decided to attend the ceremony, or X the speech, I would contend that neither are necessarily hypocrites, or being untrue to themselves or their beliefs, by doing so. If either chooses to do as they are asked out of friendship, or respect, for example, they are not legitimately subject to criticism.
To criticize in such or similar circumstances seems to me a function of absolutism, regardless of the nature of the request made or position taken. It also would seem to be the result of needless concern with things beyond our control, which should be anathema to stoics, but also, I think, to any reasonable person, and (by definition, of course!) to any pragmatist, who will make decisions based on an an intelligent consideration of each situation, not according to some preset standard which is unquestioned. Generally, religious, political or social beliefs and positions will not be objectionable in and of themselves (there can be exceptions, obviously). Instead, the conduct of those who accept them may be objectionable.
There is no reason why X who accepts A must object every time -A rears its head.
These seem to be questions we may be compelled to address with greater frequency in these increasingly contentious times. And, though I've posed them abstractly here, they're intended to address disputes we must deal with, or are at least confronted with, on a day to day basis, e.g. political, social and religious issues. "Confronted" in the sense that they are hurled at us by eager adherents of opposite positions from almost every side given the technology of communication.
X claims that God exists (or perhaps that a particular God does so; say a God worshipped by an established institutional religion). Y disagrees. May X and Y tolerate each other despite their disagreement? Should they respect each other in spite of their disagreement?
If X begins hectoring Y, trying to induce him to accept X's God, or if Y begins hectoring X to accept that there is no God, it would seem that in either case the one being hectored could legitmately resent it. If either sought to impose his/her position on the other, it would be legitimate to object. This seems obvious enough.
What if X asks Y to attend some religious ceremony, or Y asks X to accompany him to a speech by [insert name of prominent atheist]? I'd say there is nothing a priori objectionable in either case, and the manner of the response would, I think, vary with the circumstances, and how the request is made. In other words, if Y decided to attend the ceremony, or X the speech, I would contend that neither are necessarily hypocrites, or being untrue to themselves or their beliefs, by doing so. If either chooses to do as they are asked out of friendship, or respect, for example, they are not legitimately subject to criticism.
To criticize in such or similar circumstances seems to me a function of absolutism, regardless of the nature of the request made or position taken. It also would seem to be the result of needless concern with things beyond our control, which should be anathema to stoics, but also, I think, to any reasonable person, and (by definition, of course!) to any pragmatist, who will make decisions based on an an intelligent consideration of each situation, not according to some preset standard which is unquestioned. Generally, religious, political or social beliefs and positions will not be objectionable in and of themselves (there can be exceptions, obviously). Instead, the conduct of those who accept them may be objectionable.
There is no reason why X who accepts A must object every time -A rears its head.
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